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This book started as a PhD project under the supervision of Dr Rebecca 
Suter at the School of Languages and Cultures, University of Sydney, from 
2013 to 2016. Although I am responsible for the arguments presented in 
this book, Dr Suter’s insightful feedback and guidance throughout the 
years were indispensable in its creation. From when I arrived at her office 
as a 20-year-old, she has been a constant source of academic inspiration 
and career mentoring. I cannot thank her enough.
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Award and was also supported by two grants from the School of Languages 
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re-organising my material. I also added sections on two 2016 films, 
Kimi no na wa and Shin Gojira, which are discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, 
respectively. I was able to work on this manuscript using the research 
time given to me by the University of Sydney as a full-time employee. 
During this process, I received detailed and insightful guidance from 
two anonymous reviewers, as well as the editor of the ANU Press Asian 
Studies Series, Professor Craig Reynolds. I was also fortunate to receive a 
Capstone Editing Early Career Academic Research Grant for Women in 
2018, which paid for copyediting costs. Many thanks to Dr Lisa Lines 
from Capstone Editing and Emily Tinker from ANU Press for their 
meticulous attention to detail and editing work.
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Parts of Chapters 1 and 2 have appeared in the Asia-Pacific Journal: 
Japan Focus, under the title ‘The Post-3/11 Quest for True Kizuna—Shi 
no tsubute by Wagō Ryōichi and Kamisama 2011 by Kawakami Hiromi’ 
(2015). I am very grateful to the two anonymous reviewers as well as the 
journal editor, Dr Laura Hein, for their valuable feedback. Another part 
of  Chapter 4 has been published in the Japanese Studies journal and 
I would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for this paper as 
well as the journal editor, Dr Carolyn Stevens, for their well-informed 
comments.
Last, but definitely not least, I would like to thank Sava for his endless 
support and encouragement. If you are a non-Japanese speaker or 
a  non-academic, you have him to thank for the numerous English-
language definitions and explanations I have added following his reading 
of the manuscript.
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NOTE ON NAMES 
AND TERMS
Foreign words from the Japanese or French languages have been indicated 
in italics, with translations provided in square brackets. Word-to-word 
translations of foreign-language titles in the reference list have also been 
provided in this way. In the case of books already translated into English, 
I have placed the title of the English-language publication in the square 
brackets, using italics to indicate this. For foreign terms (identified by 
italics), square brackets are used to provide English equivalents, while 
round brackets are generally used when the term does not have a close 
equivalent in English, to provide explanations or translations that are 
contextually most appropriate. 
The Hepburn system of romanisation  is used throughout for Japanese 
terms, with long vowels indicated by macrons, except for words that have 
been appropriated into the English language, such as ‘Tokyo’ or ‘Kyoto’, 
or when referring to characters whose names appear without macrons in 
the original text. I have avoided the use of Japanese characters in the main 
text unless necessary.
Throughout the main body of this book, the Japanese convention that 
the surname precedes the first name is respected with regards to Japanese 
authors who publish primarily in Japan. Uncertainty may be resolved 
by referring to the reference list, in which all authors are listed by their 
surnames, regardless of their cultural heritage.





The Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami that hit Japan on 11 March 2011 
(3.11) was an event of unforeseen proportions. A magnitude 9.0 earthquake 
was followed by 9.3-metre-high tsunami waves over the coast of north-
eastern Japan, which claimed the lives of nearly 20,000  people and 
obliterated communities. The earthquake began at 2.46 pm, which meant 
that most children were at school and were guided to higher ground in 
anticipation of a tsunami. Over 240 children were orphaned as a result. 
Numerous medical and administrative institutions were destroyed when 
they were most needed and 160,000  people were forced to move to 
temporary shelters.1 However, the disaster did not end there—nearly 
700 aftershocks of magnitude 5 or greater were recorded within a year 
of 3.11 (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2012). Further, 3.11 
developed into a triple disaster, with the subsequent meltdown of three 
nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, which caused 
344,000  people to evacuate from the affected areas (Reconstruction 
Agency, 2012). Many continue to suffer, especially from the effects of the 
nuclear disaster, while the rest of the nation attempts to move on. There is 
no doubt that 3.11 has left a permanent scar on the lives of many—even 
if they did not lose their friends and loved ones, they lost their livelihood, 
their homes and their lifestyles.
In the foreign media, perhaps the most memorable images from the disaster 
were Japanese people calmly lining up to receive supplies or waiting for 
the public transport system to resume without any outward display of 
stress or anguish, despite the shock of the disaster. Perhaps they were 
the pictures of the widescale debris removal that was accomplished one 
year on, which has often been compared to the state of reconstruction in 
post-quake Haiti. These images reinforced age-old foreign stereotypes of 
1  All figures taken from Samuels (2013, p. 3).
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the hardworking, resilient and orderly Japanese and were widely accepted 
by Western audiences. However, did the Japanese feel the same way? 
Some Japanese were inspired by these foreign images to live up to this 
ideal and restore their pride in a country that had been ageing and slowly 
dwindling in global economic and technological influence, while their 
Asian neighbours seemed to prosper. Conversely, many Japanese felt that 
this portrayal masked the real issues of the disaster: the ongoing nuclear 
disaster and radiation damage, the discrimination against Fukushima 
residents, fishermen and farmers that resulted from it, the socioeconomic 
gap between the disaster-hit northern areas versus Tokyo and the insularity 
and secrecy of the nuclear power industry.
For optimists, the disaster resulted in a Nihon raisan, or ‘Japan-praising’ 
boom, in which the Japanese consumed cultural products to regain 
confidence in their identity. Books containing positive portrayals of Japan 
experienced a surge in popularity. For example, a book that explained ‘why 
Japanese people are the most popular in the world’ by pro-royal family 
commentator Takeda Tsuneyasu was fortuitously published a few months 
before 3.11 and sold 47,000 copies. Takeda published two other books in 
the same vein and the series sold 81,000 copies in total (Oguni, 2013). 
Television programs featuring Japanophile foreigners gushing over the 
country and its culture became the norm. However, the fact that these 
cultural products were in high demand illustrated how much the triple 
disaster shook the Japanese to their core.
The Fukushima disaster and the response of the authorities forced many 
Japanese to question fundamental post-war Japanese values: the country’s 
heavy dependence on nuclear power, despite its history of being a victim 
of nuclear bombings and its status as a technologically advanced nation 
that achieved the economic miracle of the 1960s–1980s, despite having 
virtually no resources of its own. A desire to reconstruct Japanese identity 
rather than to praise it can be observed in the birth of an anti-nuclear 
environmentalist movement that blames the Japanese system for the 
ongoing nuclear incident. Those in this movement criticise the ‘typically 
Japanese’ lack of transparency on the part of authorities in dealing with 
the Fukushima nuclear disasters and their attempt to suppress dissenting 
voices through a uniting official discourse. Whether change comes in the 
form of reactionary nationalism or a reconsideration of post-war values, 
3.11 may be a major historical turning point for Japan, akin to the Meiji 




It has become a cliché of Japanese scholarship that big external 
shocks have produced decisive changes in direction. The threat 
of being colonized in the nineteenth century led Japan to jettison 
feudalism almost overnight in the Meiji Restoration of 1868. 
Defeat in the Second World War caused it to pursue ‘greatness’ by 
economic, rather than military, means (p. 303).
If the Meiji Restoration was the catalyst for Japan’s economic and military 
development and the end of WWII led the country to abandon the latter 
and exclusively focus on the former, then the result of 3.11 could be 
considered to be a more complex mix, polarised between the complete 
abandonment of any ambition, as observed in the debates arguing for 
‘degrowth’ in an ageing Japan, and, at the other extreme, enthusiastic 
support for a ‘re-militarised’ and stronger Japan, which has been 
encouraged by the policies of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō.
What can be relied upon to find new directions in such situations of 
national confusion? A major source of inspiration in Japan is literature; 
through their works, authors and intellectuals of the Meiji period prepared 
readers for a new Japan that accepted Western influence but still stood 
on its own two feet. They did this by introducing the West to Japanese 
readers through mass translations of foreign works and by endeavouring to 
create a new, modern Japanese literature using these influences. Similarly, 
contemporary Japanese writing offers a glimpse into potential forms that 
the country may take following the disaster. Despite the physical and 
emotional turmoil caused by the disaster, many Japanese authors chose 
to immediately respond to the disaster and its impact in their writing. 
Important works that reflect on future directions for the country have 
been published by some of Japan’s best-known authors, such as Kawakami 
Hiromi, Tawada Yōko and Takahashi Gen’ichirō.
These works provided a refreshingly different and imaginative way of 
representing Japan at a time when television programs repeated the same 
information on every channel day after day in their focus on  the 
devastation of the disaster-hit areas. Many Japanese who did not have 
any direct experience of the disaster suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) following 3.11 because they were constantly exposed to 
these shocking images in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. A study 
funded by the Japan Science and Technology Agency (Nishi et al., 2012) 
found that those who watched TV a month following the disaster for 
more than four hours a day were at significantly higher risk of developing 
PTSD. In this situation, in which the mainstream media were a constant 
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source of fear and suffering, cultural responses provided those who were 
ready with a more forward-looking way of re-imagining their country. 
It was often said following 3.11 that nuclear power experts lacked the 
imagination to foresee and prepare for large disasters and were only able to 
provide the excuse that such an event was sōteigai [unforeseeable; beyond 
imagination].2 The freedom for imaginative visions in post-3.11 fiction 
allows it to contribute to the debate regarding how Japan should move 
forward from the disaster in ways that are not possible in factual discourse.
Following 3.11, literary critic Saitō Minako (2011) claimed that there was 
an attitude that authors should concentrate on purely literary activities 
and should not be influenced by the earthquake. She argued that this 
attitude was created by a group of influential Japanese literary figures, 
which she termed bungaku mura (literature village) for its similarity to 
genshiryoku mura (nuclear village, which refers to the lack of transparency 
and groupism in the Japanese nuclear energy industry). Published 
immediately following 3.11 on 27 April 2011, her article was a call for 
authors to pluck up their courage to stand up to the bungaku mura and 
express their 3.11 experiences through literature. Authors responded to 
this call, producing literary works and exploring the role and purpose of 
literature in post-3.11 society. For example, Tanikawa Shuntarō’s (2012) 
poem, Words, which opens the 3.11 anthology March Was Made of Yarn, 
evokes the resilience and power of literary expression: ‘Losing everything/
We even lost our words/But words did not break/Were not washed from 
the depths/Of our individual hearts’ (Tanikawa, 2012, p. 7, trans. Jeffrey 
Angles). Meanwhile, other authors and poets sought to disseminate social 
messages through their words (e.g. Henmi Yō and Genyū Sōkyu), in their 
paper publications and online platforms.
These cultural responses went far beyond the scope of the kind of memoirs 
that are typically produced after a disaster. Unlike memoirs, which are 
typically written by direct victims of the disaster (although the concept 
of victim is difficult to define following a nuclear incident like 3.11),3 
fictional responses to disaster are not always created by insiders. Most of 
the authors selected for this study did not experience the event in the most 
affected areas and responses were not limited to those by Japanese authors. 
There is a significant body of responses to the disaster in languages other 
2  See Yanagida (2013, pp. 150–151).
3  See Chapter 1 in DiNitto (2019) for an in-depth exploration of who the ‘victims’ are in 3.11 and 
for nuclear disasters in general.
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than Japanese, which is testament to the fact that, as a national and 
international disaster, 3.11 influenced not only how the Japanese view 
themselves (what I call ‘self-images’), but also how non-Japanese view the 
Japanese (I use the term ‘hetero-images’).
Due to the scale of the disaster and that the world was able to watch 
as it unfolded through extensive coverage on television and the internet, 
the response to 3.11 has been global. There were large-scale anti-nuclear 
protests in France and Germany and there was an overwhelming response 
from overseas governments in the form of donations and disaster relief 
operations, such as the US Operation Tomodachi and the Australian 
Operation Pacific Assist. Artists and authors worldwide organised 
charity publications, such as March was Made of Yarn (an anthology 
of 17  works, all written within three months from the quake by both 
Japanese and non-Japanese authors and published simultaneously in 
Japan, the UK and the US) and 2:46: Aftershocks: Stories from the Japan 
Earthquake (a collection of various written pieces and artworks, including 
contributions from William Gibson and Ono Yōko). As Anderson (2012, 
p. 211) argued, ‘there is a growing sense that 3.11 was not an isolated 
incident … people saw the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and thought 
about the natural disaster that would impact them in their respective 
countries’ (p. 211). Jimenez (2018) also noted that ‘the event has received 
attention on such a worldwide scale … that it in fact constitutes a global 
trauma’ and that ‘the implications of the disaster itself … also extend 
beyond the scale of the national and have influenced global public opinion 
to the extent that we cannot consider 3.11 to be isolable to Japan’ (p. 276).
Foreign interest in Japan has historically had a tendency to increase when 
the country enjoyed a relatively successful political and socioeconomic 
period or when it suffered through a crisis, which was the case for 3.11. 
Following 3.11, many foreign publications attempted to describe the 
country and capitalised on increased reader interest in Japan. Examples 
include British author David Pilling’s (2014) Bending Adversity: Japan 
and the Art of Survival, as well as French publications, such as Japon: 
d’Hiroshima à Fukushima [Japan: from Hiroshima to Fukushima] by 
Philippe Pons (2013) and Atlas du Japon: après Fukushima, une société 
fragilisée [An Atlas of Japan: After Fukushima, a Weakened Society] by 
Philippe Pelletier (2012). Cultures are often studied when they are going 
through crises because it is believed that emergency situations tend to 
reveal psychological and behavioural characteristics that do not otherwise 
surface in everyday life. In French historian Bloch’s (1961) words, ‘just 
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as the progress of a disease shows a doctor the secret life of a body, the 
progress of a great calamity yields valuable information about the nature 
of a society’ (p. 152). Given that ‘disasters unmask the nature of a society’s 
social structure, including ties of resilience and kinship and other alliances’ 
(Oliver-Smith & Hoffman, 2002, p. 9), it is natural that post-3.11 media 
attention on Japan has focused on these areas.
Disasters are also highly televised and broadcast occasions in which 
heightened foreign interest in the country leads to an increase in the 
circulation of national images, in which new images may be produced 
or existing ones reinforced. Moreover, many of these foreign images have 
made their way back into domestic discourse and influenced Japanese 
self-images. The present study examined post-3.11 texts written in 
English, French and Japanese, to gain an understanding of how they 
represented post-3.11 Japan. Below, I explain why English-language and 
French-language texts were important to analyse.
The disaster raised unusually high public interest in the US because some 
parts of the US were affected by the earthquake. For example, one man 
died after being swept out to sea in northern California, where 8.1-foot 
tsunami waves were observed and 6-foot waves reached the Hawaiian 
islands.4 A survey conducted in the US found that more than half of the 
population was following the story ‘very closely’ in the few days following 
the initial earthquake and the media devoted more than half of news 
coverage to the disaster on the first day (Pew Research Center, 2011).
A notable characteristic of US news stories regarding the earthquake in 
Japan was that there was high interest in the lack of ‘looting’ following the 
disaster, especially in comparison to the perceived breakdown of law and 
order in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake or New Orleans following 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.5 American news media also reported 
extensively on the Fukushima nuclear incident. The US had reason to be 
interested, having the largest number of nuclear reactors in the world and 
a vivid memory of the Three Mile Island incident, as well as a long history 
of anti-nuclear activism. This was also evidenced by the press conference 
held by President Obama on 17 March 2011 (Bo, 2011, p. 53), following 
4  ‘As U.S. damage measured, emergency declared in California counties’ (2011).
5  See James and Goldman (2011) and Flax (2011). I use quotation marks for ‘looting’ here 
because it is debatable whether the act of taking bare necesseties during a disaster situation can be 
classified as being illegal.
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the multiple explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, which 
updated the American people on ‘what we’re doing to support American 
citizens and the safety of our own nuclear energy’.
Perhaps due to this heightened interest, English-language authors began to 
produce cultural responses to the disaster simultaneously to their Japanese 
counterparts. For example, 2:46: Aftershocks: Stories from the Japan 
Earthquake—a publication containing essays, artwork and photographs, 
by both Japanese and non-Japanese authors—was created within a week 
of the disaster through collaboration on Twitter. This was followed by 
responses by North American-based authors with extensive knowledge of 
Japanese culture, such as Ruth Ozeki, Gretel Ehrlich and Marie Mutsuki 
Mockett, whose works are explored in this book.
The main difference between US and French reporting on the triple 
disaster  was that initial media stories in France were mostly focused 
on the nuclear incident and not the earthquake or the tsunami. This 
is not surprising, given that while the US has the largest number of 
nuclear  reactors in the world, France has the highest dependence 
on nuclear power, with 75 per cent of its energy coming from 58 active 
nuclear power plants (Bo, 2011, p. 52). The French interest in the nuclear 
disasters was brought to the attention of the Japanese audience when 
satirical newspaper Le Canard enchaîné notoriously published a cartoon 
by Cabu, which portrayed sumo wrestlers with extra limbs fighting in the 
2020 Olympics, with the ruins of the Fukushima nuclear power plant 
in the background.6 Because of this high level of interest in the nuclear 
aspect of the disaster, French texts may provide a different perspective to 
English-language texts.
The French were also unique in their active cultural response to the 
disaster.  Artists and authors in particular have been quick to respond. 
For example, Michaël Ferrier (2012) published his essay Fukushima: 
Récit d’un désastre [Fukushima: The tale of a disaster] and a collection 
of essays by Japanese authors translated into French, L’Archipel des 
séismes [The  archipelago of earthquakes], was published in February 
2012. Emmanuel Lepage, a comic artist known for his Un printemps à 
Tchernobyl [A spring in Chernobyl], produced his Les Plaies de Fukushima 
[The wounds of Fukushima] for the Winter 2013–2014 edition of 
La Revue dessinée [The illustrated review] and it was also French comic 
6  ‘Japan to protest Fukushima-Olympics cartoons in French weekly’ (2013).
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creators Jean-David Morvan and Sylvain Runberg who edited the volume 
Magnitude 9—Des images pour le Japon [Magnitude 9—images for Japan], 
which gathered 250  artworks by comic artists from all over the world 
in response to the disaster. Additionally, Japan was the guest country at 
the 2012 Salon du Livre in Paris, for the second time since 1997, with 
21 authors (including Ōe Kenzaburō, Azuma Hiroki and Hagio Moto) 
invited from Japan.7 Takahashi Gen’ichirō’s (2011a) Koisuru genpatsu 
[A nuclear reactor in love], one of the main works of 3.11 literature that 
is examined in Chapter 4, has been translated into French but not into 
English at the time of writing, which is a testament to the high level of 
cultural interest in the disaster from the French public.
As a manifestation of collective consciousness, these cultural responses 
to the disaster, which I have tentatively named ‘3.11 literature’,8 provide 
useful insight into how Japan and the rest of the world responded to 3.11. 
These responses are rich sources of creative future visions for the country. 
However, if such a literary subgenre exists post-3.11, what are its boundaries? 
Should any text produced in the current Japanese post-disaster climate be 
treated as 3.11 literature? Does 3.11 literature need to explicitly mention 
3.11? Is it possible for an author to completely ignore a mega-disaster 
like 3.11 and carry on writing in the same style, unaffected by the events? 
There are no clear answers to these questions—even if an author does not 
intend to write about the disaster, its influences can subconsciously creep 
into the text. Ultimately, it is up to the reader to decide whether to read 
any piece of writing as 3.11 literature. For example, it is possible to read 
influences of the disaster in Murakami Haruki’s Colourless Tsukuru Tazaki 
and His Years of Pilgrimage, even though the novel itself makes no explicit 
mention of 3.11 because the events of the novel unfold between 1995 and 
2011.9 There are also authors, such as Hirano Kei’ichirō (2013), who have 
publicly spoken about the disaster being an inspiration for their post-3.11 
works, even though they do not directly explore the disaster.
7  The full list of authors is available in the ‘Press release official announcement of Japanese authors’, 
dated 18 January 2012, on the Salon du Livre website (www.salondulivreparis.com/GB/HomePro/
Press/Press-Agency--Releases.htm).
8  Although the term shinsai bungaku [earthquake literature] has gained currency in Japan as a term to 
describe these works, which specifically represent the 3.11 disaster, the term ‘3.11 literature’ is proposed 
in English for this literary subgenre, due to the potential association of the term ‘earthquake literature’, 
with an apocalyptic depiction of earthquakes designed for entertainment, in a similar way to ‘disaster 
novels’ or ‘disaster film’. Further, 3.11 literature is not only about the earthquake, as the term shinsai 
bungaku would imply. Most of the works selected for this study also deal with the nuclear incident.
9  For an exploration of how writing introspective stories of individuals such as Shikisai is Murakami’s 
way of engaging with society, see Suter (2016).
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Defining this genre at this moment in time is made difficult by the fact 
that the genre still has the potential to develop in many different ways. 
However, 3.11 literature has been characterised by extremely efficient 
publication processes, rapid responses on the part of authors, as well as 
the use of new technologies. Some examples of this phenomenon that 
are covered in this study include Kawakami Hiromi’s (2011) Kamisama 
2011, which was published six months after 3.11, and the Twitter poetry 
of Wagō Ryōichi, who started writing and publishing his works online six 
days after the quake.
This book focuses on such early literary reactions to the disaster, by 
examining a corpus of texts published within a six-year period following 
3.11, while keeping in mind that future responses to the disaster may 
be different to these immediate responses. The present work is not an 
exhaustive study of 3.11 literature, even within the time period examined.10 
Instead, the selected texts are designed to provide a small sample of the 
wide range of texts available, from a variety of different genres.
This monograph examines imaginative responses to the 2011 triple 
disaster to gain an understanding of how authors, both in Japan and 
abroad, imagined the future of Japan in the aftermath of the disaster. 
By focusing on cultural responses, I bring to light the creative discourse 
surrounding the disaster, beyond hard facts and numbers. The texts 
analysed include two blockbuster films, Shin Gojira [Shin Godzilla] and 
Kimi no na wa [Your Name], which were released in 2016, Twitter poetry, 
manga and a wide range of novels and short stories, written by Japanese 
and non-Japanese authors.
It is important to note here that my approach to these responses is 
inspired by the imagological method, proposed by Leerssen (2007), who 
defined imagology as ‘a critical study of national characterization’ (p. 21) 
in literary texts (e.g. a study of how the Japanese were portrayed in American 
literature in the post-war period). Imagologists take as their starting point 
the presupposition that these characterisations are a valuable object of study 
in themselves and that it is not the imagologist’s task to verify them. The 
imagologist does not focus on how ‘true’ these characterisations are, but 
rather on how they were formed and how they compare to characterisations 
in other texts (e.g. from different time periods, authors or cultures). In this 
book, I do not make any claims regarding real-life Japan and how it may or 
may not have changed following the triple disaster.
10  For a more comprehensive exploration of 3.11 literature, see Kimura (2013, 2018), who prefers 
to use the term shinsaigo bungaku (post-earthquake literature).
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In talking about images of Japan, it is inevitable to touch upon the concept 
of Nihonjinron (discussions about the Japanese), which makes Japan 
a particularly interesting case for imagological study. Most scholars agree 
that Nihonjinron is the discourse within a corpus of literary texts that 
portrays Japanese identity as being homogenous, unique and static, such as 
Ruth Benedict’s (1946) The Chrysanthemum and the Sword or Ezra Vogel’s 
(1979) Japan as Number One. Nihonjinron is produced by both Japanese 
and foreign writers and typically reiterates preconceived notions relating to 
the Japanese, such as harmony, sympathy and an emphasis on the group 
rather than the individual (portrayed as a positive or negative characteristic 
depending on the author) and attempts to find historical, geographical 
and even genetic explanations for how these national characteristics came 
about. Nihonjinron is also characterised by dichotomous comparisons with 
Western culture, in which the Japanese are said to be group-oriented and 
driven by shame, whereas Westerners are considered to be individualistic 
and driven by guilt. I refer to the concept of Nihonjinron occasionally 
because many of the future visions for the country that are explored in this 
book are based upon these preconceived images of the Japanese.
This book is divided into five parts. This first chapter has established the 
background for the literary analysis to follow by examining the post-3.11 
discourse surrounding Japanese identity created by various authors and 
intellectuals. Chapters 2 to 5 present analyses of 3.11 literature, which 
are divided thematically. The first two chapters contain works by Japanese 
authors only. Chapter 2, ‘Sustainable Japan’, deals with how traditional 
values, especially with regards to relationships with nature, were brought to 
the forefront by authors in the vision for a new Japan, whereas Chapter 3, 
‘Oppressive Japan’, examines the ways in which authors imagined a 
potential future Japan that was lacking in intellectual freedom. The last 
three chapters contain a mix of both Japanese and non-Japanese authors 
and film-makers. Chapter 4, ‘Heterogenous Japan’, examines the disaster 
as a catalyst for destroying the myth of a homogenous Japan and explores 
the future of rural Japan. Chapter 5, ‘(Still) Cool Japan’, focuses on those 
responses that portrayed the continuing appeal of the Japanese brand 
on the global stage. Chapter 6, ‘Exotic Japan’, considers the writings of 
foreign authors, who focused on Japan’s exotic beauty as the unwavering 
core of its culture, although with some unexpected twists. What is clear 
from the large variety of images produced is that the Fukushima disaster 
was an opportunity for many to reimagine Japan, for reasons that I clarify 




Cultural images in literature and film do not exist in a vacuum, so it 
is necessary to examine what kind of non-literary commentary was 
being produced by both Japanese and non-Japanese authors and public 
intellectuals on the subject of post-3.11 Japanese society. This brief overview 
of non-literary expressions guides the analysis of the selected cultural 
responses in the following chapters by giving a general background to how 
people began to reimagine Japan following the disaster. It is important to 
emphasise that the focus of this chapter is on revealing imaginations and 
visions for Japan’s future in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, rather 
than determining the true state of post-3.11 Japanese society.
The discourse produced on post-3.11 Japanese society was not 
homogenous by any means. Heightened emotions as a result of the 
disaster had a polarising effect on Japanese society, dividing both public 
and expert opinion on political and social matters from long-term energy 
options to issues of national security. The 2014 gubernatorial election of 
Tokyo was a testament to this continued polarisation in the country, with 
the candidates’ policies on nuclear power receiving greater voter scrutiny 
than other issues, such as the 2020 Tokyo Olympics and welfare policy.1 
The gubernatorial race had seven candidates, but in the end the pro-
nuclear Masuzoe Yōichi was elected. However, when all the votes were 
tallied, there was a relatively even split between those who had supported 
pro-nuclear versus anti-nuclear candidates.2
1  ‘“Nuclear power” cited the Most in Tokyo Governor Election Tweets’ (2014).
2  There were approximately 2,700,000  votes for Masuzoe and Tamogami Toshio combined 
and 1,900,000 for Utsunomiya Kenji and Hosokawa Morihiro combined (Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government Election Administration Commission, 2014).
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These two opposing camps have painted post-3.11 Japanese society in 
diametrically opposite ways. Although simplistic, writer Tachibana Akira’s 
(2012) summary of these two main views can be used as a starting point 
for my discussion: ‘Japanese disaster victims moved the world and Japanese 
politics drove citizens to despair’ (p. 5). Tachibana’s description of disaster 
victims roughly corresponds to the discussion on disaster nationalism 
in the section ‘Putting the Group Before the Self ’ below, whereas his 
description of Japanese politics corresponds to my discussion of the 
‘anti-nuclear left-wing’ presented in ‘A Disaster “Made in Japan”’. The 
pro-nuclear right-wing is a more recent development, which is partially 
derived from disaster nationalism and is explored in ‘Japan as (Still) 
Number One’. This analysis is followed by the discussion of non-fictional 
responses from the literary world. Although real-life ideological divisions 
are not as clear-cut as this summary implies, it is useful to first paint 
a broad picture of the discourse emerging from these main camps, to 
demonstrate the full spectrum of images that are being produced.
In both journalism and commentaries from intellectuals, the discourse on 
3.11 has crossed Japanese borders in many ways, not only in the sense that 
today’s big names in the Japanese literary world, such as Murakami Haruki, 
Ōe Kenzaburō, Karatani Kōjin and Tawada Yōko have global renown 
and influence, but that they chose to deliberately express themselves on 
international platforms, perhaps because they felt that their views would 
be disseminated more widely if published outside of Japan. Much of the 
commentary on 3.11 by these Japanese authors was published exclusively 
in foreign languages. For example, Murakami Haruki’s interview with 
Judith Brandner was not published in the Japanese edition of her book, 
whereas Ōe wrote a special contribution for The New Yorker and gave an 
interview to French newspaper Le Monde. Foreign-language news stories 
and texts were also enthusiastically received and circulated within Japan, 
with translations made available by avid readers on the internet. This 
coexistence of and, to some extent, convergence between self-images and 
hetero-images is an integral part of understanding post-3.11 Japan.
Putting the Group Before the Self
As one would expect from a nation facing an unprecedented natural 
disaster, the government focused on a nationalistic narrative of a united 
and strong nation, harking back to traditional ideas and myths of 
Japanese-ness. In particular, authorities emphasised the bond, or kizuna, 
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between citizens in the reconstruction efforts. As psychiatrist and critic 
Saitō Tamaki (2011) argued, the term kizuna was originally used to 
describe various types of intimate and personal bonds involving people 
and places, such as the love for one’s family or hometown, rather than 
public relationships. Conversely, following 3.11, kizuna has also been 
used to sentimentalise and standardise positive and heart-warming bonds 
or relationships between Japanese people today—an attitude that may be 
summed up simply as ‘caring for others and working together’, which is 
almost synonymous with Nihonjinron keywords such as ‘group-oriented’ 
and ‘community’. This broadened conceptualisation is especially useful 
for the Japanese authorities, who wish to unite Japanese people in the 
effort to reconstruct the nation. Post-3.11, the authorities have succeeded 
in incorporating kizuna into the Nihonjinron discourse, to make it seem 
as though prioritising reconstruction is part of the natural disposition 
of Japanese citizens. It is implied that this prioritisation is carried out, 
if  necessary, at the expense of more personal and familial goals, which 
is a  complete departure from the original uses of the term, albeit 
a popular one.
The state has been so successful in disseminating this ideology that the 
concept of kizuna has become inseparable from the disaster. The term, 
which was publicly recognised as one of the vogue words of the year,3 was 
voted kanji of the year in 2011, ahead of other kanji such as 災 (sai) or 
震 (shin), meaning ‘disaster’ and ‘quake’, respectively. Kizuna has been 
used as a keyword by numerous projects set up to support the disaster-
hit areas, such as Ken Watanabe’s ‘Kizuna 311’, Japan News Network 
(JNN)’s ‘Kizuna Project’ and Japan Foundation’s ‘Kizuna (Bond) Project’, 
which sent high school and college students from Asia/Oceania and 
North America to the Tōhoku region. The concept of kizuna was also 
evoked indirectly in the ubiquitous Advertising Council Japan television 
advertisements, which replaced withdrawn commercials, such as the one 
featuring soccer player Uchida Atsuto’s message: ‘Japan is all one big team’. 
Even a centre-left ‘Kizuna Party’ was formed in January 2012 by former 
members of the Democratic Party of Japan. The state took advantage of 
this to promote the country to the world. As early as a month after the 
quake, the term was disseminated internationally as Prime Minister Kan 
Naoto’s words of gratitude for international aid, ‘Kizuna—the bonds of 
3  This was for a shingo ryūkōgo taishō award. Established in 1984, the shingo ryūkōgo taishō awards 
are awarded to the top 10 vogue words of the year, which are chosen by a committee of seven judges 
from a pool of public nominations.
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friendship’, were printed as a three-quarter page advertisement in major 
international newspapers, including the International Herald Tribune, the 
Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, Le Figaro, Russian newspaper 
Kommersant and South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo, as well as China’s leading 
newspaper, People’s Daily (Tsuruoka, 2011).
However, one question remains unanswered: why did the concept become 
so widespread and popular in the first place? Although it is clear from the 
examples given above that kizuna has been actively promoted through 
Japanese official discourse, it is also true that foreign-language news stories 
on 3.11 played an equally important role. For example, anglophone 
news media including The Japan Times, The Telegraph and ABC News 
20/20 carried numerous stories on the behaviour of Japanese people in 
the disaster-hit areas, such as the absence of looting. They related this to 
Japanese national stereotypes, such as group-orientation and a high level of 
social order (Chavez, 2011; James and Goldman, 2011; West, 2011). This 
evoked the concept of kizuna, albeit indirectly. Since before the disaster, 
Japanese citizens had been able to watch foreign news on the NHK’s 
BS2 channel, which runs programs from various countries with Japanese 
simultaneous translation. What was interesting in the case of 3.11, was 
that these stories were widely discussed by internet users, who posted 
and viewed these stories on social media, where they were accompanied 
by translated comments written by users from other countries.4 These 
posts glorified what are seen as typically ‘Japanese’ values of unity and 
cooperation. Through the activities of these netizens, the international 
perception that Japan was a country that was calm, collected and united 
in the face of disaster was made known to many Japanese people. These 
values came to be seen as national characteristics to be proud of and 
kizuna was linked to them. This may serve as a partial explanation for 
why this form of disaster nationalism was so readily accepted by ordinary 
Japanese citizens.
Another important example is American-born Japanologist Donald 
Keene  (2012, p. 275), who praised the unique ability of the Japanese 
people to stay calm, humble and respectful towards others in a disaster 
of this scale. Keene was so impressed that he decided to show his 
support towards the disaster victims by moving to Japan permanently 
4  An example of this is ‘Kaigai ‘Nihonjin ni kokoro kara no keii wo’: shinsai ji no ‘Nihon no 
tamashii’ ni gaikokujin kandō’ [The world sends their heartfelt respect to Japanese people: foreigners 
are touched by the ‘Japanese spirit’ displayed after the earthquake] (2013).
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and obtaining  Japanese citizenship, in a time when many foreigners 
were fleeing the country (Keene, 2012, pp. 274–81). This decision was 
announced at a news conference in Tokyo’s Kita Ward and reported by 
media outlets both in Japan and overseas, including Asahi Shimbun, 
The New York Times and The Japan Times (Arita, 2012; Fackler, 2012). 
As popular culture critic and novelist Azuma Hiroki (2011b) observed 
five days after the disaster, these positive foreign reactions were ‘a surprise 
to the Japanese themselves’, which led to the sentiment that ‘we aren’t 
so bad as a whole nation after all’. According to Azuma (2011b), this 
came as a welcome change for Japan, which was ‘a timid nation worrying 
about its eventual decline’ prior to the earthquake. These positive images 
of Japan, or at least the Japanese perception of them, played an important 
role in helping Japanese people to define the future of their country.
Although many Japanese people view kizuna as a positive concept, it is 
also true that some have expressed discomfort at the mindless repetition 
of the term, which carries the risk of masking other serious issues of 3.11. 
For example, Saitō Tamaki (2011) warned that kizuna is not something 
that can be strengthened through effort, but rather is a product of time. 
Further, he feared the spread of what he calls ‘kizuna bias’—a tendency 
to become blind to the shortcomings of society as a whole, as a result of 
excessive groupism. In Saitō’s (2011) view, ‘kizuna bias’ suppresses dissent 
and encourages people to work together towards local and national goals 
rather than thinking about how to make changes in society. He also 
believed that this bias has the potential danger of letting the government 
place the full burden of the care of the weak and vulnerable, including 
disaster victims, on the shoulders of their families, in the name of kizuna.
Another related term that was observed frequently in the media was 
gaman (persevering in the face of adversity, often by putting others before 
yourself ), although it was often generalised to describe the behaviour of 
all Japanese people rather than just the Tōhoku people.5 Starting with an 
article by Nicholas Kristof (2011) in The New York Times on the day of the 
quake, gaman was a term especially favoured by foreign journalists in the 
immediate aftermath of the disaster.6 However, an article in The Economist 
on 20 April 2011, ‘Silenced by Gaman’, pointed out the negative side of 
this gaman mentality, in a similar way to the criticism directed at kizuna 
5  See Burgess (2011) for a detailed exploration of the use of the term in the international media.
6  Also seen in Roan (2011), Beech (2011) and ‘Crushed, but True to Law of “Gaman”’ in 
The Australian, 16 March 2011.
RE-ImAgININg JApAN AFTER FukuSHImA
16
within Japan. The article, which refers to gaman as a typically Tōhoku 
characteristic, observed that ‘people in Tohoku are beginning to resent the 
phrase, because it sounds like a demand to endure even more’.7
Some commentators questioned the assumption that there was any 
increase in kizuna following 3.11. In her Fukushima reportage, Ogino 
Anna (2011, pp. 73, 181, 214) argued that although altruistic behaviour 
could be observed, it was also true that large amounts of cash were being 
stolen from safes and some disaster victims were hoarding or even stealing 
emergency supplies. An important loss of intergenerational kizuna was 
observed in Minami-Soma city. While it was previously common for two 
or three generations to live under one roof, many young people had made 
the decision to move and start a separate household to escape potential 
radiation (Yanagida, 2013, p. 13). Japanologist Richard J. Samuels (2013) 
is one of many who remarked on the ‘shallowness of local identities’ due 
to the large-scale municipal mergers that concluded a year prior to the 
disaster (heisei-no-daigappei: ‘the great Heisei mergers’). According to 
Samuels (2013), ‘reports of distrust among the new neighbours were 
reflected in choices of temporary shelters and undercut the ideals of 
community that were being spun by political leaders and editorialists’ 
(p. 40). Further, despite his previous optimism, Azuma Hiroki (2011a, 
p. 12) observed in September 2011 that 3.11 served to reveal the lack of 
solidarity in Japanese society. The earthquake demonstrated that, despite 
the illusion of homogeneity and equality, personal circumstances such 
as income, place of residence and age translated directly to undeniable 
differences in the ability to deal with such disasters (p. 14). According to 
Azuma (2011a), Japanese people were coming to terms with the depressing 
realisation that they were on their own and that even their government 
could not be relied on in the case of such disasters, which is a far cry from 
the image of social cohesion evoked by kizuna.
Apart from kizuna, there are many other examples of Japanese national 
myths being evoked in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. The talk 
between Fujiwara Masahiko, author of Kokka no hinkaku [The dignity 
of a state] and journalist and ex-TV presenter Sakurai Yoshiko in the 
20 May 2011 issue of the Shūkan Post is one example. In this talk, Fujiwara 
7  Another phrase that the article refers to is ganbarō [let’s hang in there], which is ‘a phrase that 
smacks of heads-down endurance, rather than the hope of better things to come’. The phrase ‘ganbarō 
nippon’ [hang in there, Japan] was even described as a ‘tool of violence’ by philosopher Nakajima 
Yoshimichi (2011, p. 134), for reasons similar to Saitō’s idea of ‘kizuna bias’—the individual 
is forgotten in the pursuit of larger national goals.
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tells the story of a firefighter who messaged his wife before departing on 
a life-risking mission to water and cool down the Fukushima power plants 
and received as a reply: ‘Please become Japan’s saviour’. This unselfish wife 
was praised by Fujiwara as a true ‘samurai wife’ and the couple as an 
embodiment of the values of bushido, which are written into Japanese 
genes since the Yayoi or even Jōmon period. Similarly, Fujiwara also gave 
the example of his acquaintance, who was Emeritus Professor at Tōhoku 
University and the director of the Red Cross hospital at Ishinomaki, 
whose tireless efforts were attributed to the fact that he is a descendent of 
the byakkotai—a military unit composed of teenage samurai from Aizu 
(now part of the Fukushima Prefecture), who fought in the Boshin War. 
Fujiwara and Sakurai conclude this talk by observing that, because of 
these traditional Japanese virtues, Japan was well-qualified to be a model 
nation for the world in the twenty-first century.
Michael Hoffman (2011) is one foreign commentator who raised alarm 
at this display of ‘extreme nationalism’ in a popular national publication 
(Shūkan Post is one of the most popular weekly magazines in Japan), 
where he argued that conservative right-wing ‘fringe thinking’, thought 
to have been ‘buried in the rubble of World War II’, ‘is becoming 
mainstream’. However, not all foreign commentators viewed this surge 
in nationalism as a negative outcome. For example, Benedict Anderson 
(2012, p. 206) stated in an interview that although nationalism had 
a  negative side (especially when exploited by right-wing politicians), 
it also had a beneficial side for post-disaster Japan because it created 
a feeling of responsibility, which encouraged Japanese people to help each 
other and respect laws and societal rules. According to Anderson (2012, 
p. 207), nationalism had replaced religion as the main source of hope for 
the future in today’s world and the hope for creating a better Japan for 
future generations was what drove the support that Japanese people gave 
each other in the aftermath of the earthquake.
A Disaster ‘Made in Japan’
Meanwhile, many citizens expressed their discomfort with such an 
outward display of nationalism and patriotism because they were 
more concerned with the man-made aspect of the disaster—nuclear 
radiation. New  platforms of expression on the internet allowed strong 
criticism against the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the 
government’s response to the disaster to be voiced by citizens from all 
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walks of life. These  commentaries often criticised the entire Japanese 
system, starting with the practices and attitudes that were deemed to 
be responsible for the unresolved situation at the nuclear power plant 
in Fukushima, which culminated in protests against the use of nuclear 
energy in the country. In the words of Murata Mitsuhei, former Japanese 
ambassador to Switzerland: ‘I call it the sickness of Japan. First, we hide, 
then we postpone and then we assume no responsibility’ (in  Willacy, 
2012,  n.p.).8 This perceived tendency for Japanese authorities to hide 
information and act as though nothing was happening has often been 
described as  impei shugi (hide-ism; a tendency to hide; e.g. Yanagida, 
2013, pp. 86–93) and koto nakare shugi (preferring peace at any price; 
e.g. Shiono & Andō, 2012, p. 324). Also on people’s lips were perceived 
Japanese characteristics, such as a  tendency  to sakiokuri (postpone) or 
tanaage (pigeonhole), often referring to the unwillingness of Japanese 
authorities to prepare for potential disasters, which is thought to have caused 
the Fukushima incidents (‘Genpatsu taisaku’, 2014; Tsunehira,  2011). 
These characteristics can be summed up with the term genshiryoku mura 
(nuclear power village), which is used to describe the way the nuclear 
industry behaves similarly to a traditional Japanese mura (village) society 
and that is characterised by strong hierarchy and groupthink tendencies 
(Iida,  Satō & Kōno, 2011). Pseudonymous whistle-blower Wakasugi 
Retsu’s controversial 2013 novel Genpatsu howaitoauto [Nuclear whiteout], 
which explores the possibility of a terrorist attack on nuclear power plants 
in Japan, is an allegorical exploration of the power relationships within 
this ‘nuclear power village’.9
However, the blame was not solely placed on this ‘nuclear power village’. 
Energy is a resource that is used by the whole population, which meant 
that the emotional impact of the tragic disaster evolved into a sense of 
collective guilt for some citizens, in a manner reminiscent of the post-war 
period.10 As Chairman of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission, Kurokawa Kiyoshi (2012) described it:
8  In Owaranai genpatsu jiko to ‘Nihon byō’, Yanagida Kunio (2013, p. 4) also refers to Nihon byō 
[sickness of Japan], which is a failure of social systems such as the government and businesses to 
protect human life. Yanagida also refers to Japan as musekinin shakai [an irresponsible society] (p. 98).
9  This kind of imagination of terrorist attacks on Japanese nuclear power plants (also explored 
by other Japanese authors such as Higashino Keigo in the past) has impacted real-life Japanese 
Government policy following the disaster. For example, nuclear power plants are now required to be 
fully protected against terrorist attacks, such as a plane crash.
10  Higashikuni Naruhiko, a former prince turned prime minister in 1945, famously proclaimed 
the motto ‘ichioku sō zange’ [collective repentance (of a hundred million people)] to avoid attributing 
war responsibility to the Emperor.
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What must be admitted—very painfully—is that this was 
a  disaster ‘Made in Japan’. Its fundamental causes are to be 
found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our 
reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our 
devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our 
insularity. Had other Japanese been in the shoes of those who bear 
responsibility for this accident, the results may well have been the 
same … The consequences of negligence at Fukushima stand out 
as catastrophic, but the mindset that supported it can be found 
across Japan. In recognizing that fact, each of us should reflect 
on our responsibility as individuals in a democratic society (p. 9).
There is a sense that the whole population was guilty of turning a blind 
eye to the obvious faults of the convenient ‘safety myth’ of nuclear energy 
and that all citizens must now become more active in political matters 
to protect future generations. This leftist movement is driven, at least 
in some part, by the general distrust towards mainstream information 
regarding radiation levels and safety,11 which has encouraged the 
formation of online groups, including the National Network of Parents to 
Protect Children from Radiation and the Food Business Safety Network. 
The state is perceived to be playing down the issue to avoid widespread 
panic, which has caused some of its citizens to be exposed to dangerous 
levels of radiation. These fears, which reached hysteric levels on many 
occasions—one of the most notable examples being the dangerous 
consumption of gargling solution containing iodine being encouraged 
on the internet—coupled with the relative ease of participation in the 
movement through the internet and in mass street protests, have caused 
this new left-wing movement to rapidly grow. In summary, those who 
were concerned with the state’s handling of the incidents at Fukushima 
expressed a bleak outlook for the country’s future, in the hopes that this 
would improve transparency and accountability in the nuclear power 
industry as well as citizen interest and involvement in energy policy.
11  As Fukuda (2012, p. 117) contended, there were many problems with the official information 
regarding nuclear radiation levels. Not only were the government press releases highly technical 
and difficult for most citizens to understand, there were also differences in information disclosed 
by TEPCO and various governmental organisations. This discrepancy, combined with the fact that 
data such as the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information was not made 
widely available to citizens, were among the causes for this distrust of the authorities.
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Japan as (Still) Number One
While the anti-nuclear camp focused on the ills of Japanese society, the 
pro-nuclear camp continued to paint Japan’s future as a technological 
superpower and denied the breakdown of the safety myth, which was 
observed by the left-wing camp. This was supported by foreign news 
stories such as Anne Applebaum’s (2011) ‘If the Japanese can’t build 
a safe reactor, who can?’ in the Washington Post, which claimed that the 
‘technological brilliance and extraordinary competence of the Japanese 
are on full display’, or the coverage of the extensive impact the car part 
factory closures in northern Japan had on the rest of the world (Boudette 
& Bennett, 2011; White, 2011)—Japanese technology still mattered. 
For  example, economist Ikeda Nobuo (2012) claimed that it is in fact 
the ‘danger myth’ of nuclear power that collapsed after Fukushima 
because no harmful radiation was produced as a result of the partial 
meltdown. Tamogami Toshio (2013), a former Chief of Staff of Japan’s 
air self-defence force from Fukushima, who is known for his nationalistic 
political stance, commented that the nuclear incident effectively proved 
that Japanese nuclear power plants are safe, even during a magnitude-9 
earthquake. He emphasised that no one had died from a radiation accident 
caused by an operating nuclear power plant in the 50 years of Japanese 
nuclear power, despite the fear that nuclear power is dangerous. Similarly, 
physicist Takada Jun (2011) argued in his award-winning essay that 
‘the country that stands on the vanguard of radiologic technologies in the 
fields of energy and medical care is becoming a laughing stock around 
the world’ in reference to growing anti-nuclear sentiments in Japan and 
that what Japan should be doing is to ‘take the lead in developing the 
world’s safest nuclear energy technologies’. Takada also gave as evidence 
the fact that the Onagawa nuclear power plant, which was the closest 
plant to the epicentre, survived the tsunami. This kind of discourse has 
also been observed overseas. For example, it was reported in the Sankei 
News (20 April 2012) that Lady Barbara Judge, Chairperson Emeritus of 
the UK Atomic Energy Authority, praised Japan’s technological prowess 
by commenting that, in the UK, even those in the anti-nuclear camp 
commend Japan on its nuclear technology.
Because of their belief in the safety of nuclear power, the right-wing camp 
expressed their concern for the reputational damage (fūhyō higai) inflicted 
by some left-wing activists, who were exaggerating the dangers of radiation 
in the disaster-hit areas in their argument against nuclear energy and 
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contributing to the prejudice against people and produce from these areas 
as well as Japan’s national brand. An example was the manga Oishinbo by 
Kariya Tetsu and Hanasaki Akira (2013), which depicted the protagonist 
suffering from a nose bleed after visiting the Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear 
power plant.12 Oishinbo was criticised by various authorities, including 
the Ministry of the Environment and Prime Minister Abe, for spreading 
‘baseless rumours’ (Shushō, 2014).
Another issue that received widespread attention was the rejection of 
ceremonial wood from Rikuzentakata, Iwate, for the annual bonfire festival 
in Kyoto, due to radiation fears. In an unfortunate series of events, the 
initial plan to burn wood from trees killed by the tsunami was cancelled 
due to complaints from Kyoto City residents, even though no radioactive 
materials were detected.13 However, as the news came under the national 
spotlight, Kyoto City and the organisers of the festival received criticism 
for perpetuating reputational damage and for being disrespectful to the 
disaster victims, who wrote their wishes and prayers on the wood. Kyoto 
City (2011) eventually decided to obtain a new batch of wood (the first 
batch was burned at a Bon Festival in Rikuzentakata), only to find that 
the surface of the wood contained a level of caesium higher than what was 
allowed for internal consumption and decided against burning it. What 
began as an innocent attempt by the organisers to support the disaster-hit 
areas came to be an incident that symbolised the lack of kizuna beyond 
the borders of the Tōhoku region, as well as the radiation hysteria in Japan 
in the months following the disaster. Authorities have been active in their 
attempts to reverse this negative image. For example, the Fukushima 
Prefecture created television advertisements featuring members of the 
popular pop band TOKIO promoting Fukushima produce such as 
peaches and rice,14 and Prime Minister Abe (2013) famously portrayed 
Tokyo as ‘one of the safest cities in the world’ at the 2020 Olympics 
Host City Elections and claimed that the situation at Fukushima was 
‘under control’.
12  It is important to note that Oishinbo also portrayed rice farmers suffering from reputational 
damage (despite their rice testing negative for radiation) in Episode 110, which came just before the 
‘nose bleed’ episode (Kariya & Hanasaki, 2013, p. 17).
13  Reported in MSN Sankei News, 26 November 2012.
14  There is also the catchphrase Tabete ōen (Support by eating), which is used by Food Action 
Nippon (syokuryo.jp/tabete_ouen/) as well as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(www.maff.go.jp/j/shokusan/eat/index.html).
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At the most extreme end of the pro-nuclear movement are the radical 
right-wing organisations that belong to the Kōdō suru hoshu [Conservatives 
that act] movement and the netto uyoku [internet right-wing],15 who label 
any opposition to their views as han’nichi [anti-Japanese], hikokumin 
[unpatriotic] or even baikokudo [traitor]. The activities of this radical right-
wing movement are characterised by negative propaganda rather than 
positive patriotism. Since the anti-nuclear left, referred to most commonly 
as sayoku (written in katakana instead of kanji to denote foreignness), is 
considered to be anti-Japanese, they are grouped together with their other 
un-Japanese enemies—Korean and Chinese people, which also includes 
zainichi, who are Korean citizens residing in Japan. Although the radical 
right-wing have directed their hatred towards Korean and Chinese people 
since before 3.11, their actions became more visible after the disaster, 
with demonstrations in 2013 gathering hundreds of protesters (Hayashi, 
2013).16 The active organisations of extreme right-wing politics such as 
Zaitokukai (the association of citizens against the special privileges of the 
zainichi) and Genpatsu no hi wo kesasenai demo kōshin (the demonstration 
march against extinguishing the flame of nuclear power plants) took their 
xenophobia and hate speech to the streets, along with their pro-nuclear 
ideology. Conversely, netto uyoku spread their hate speech against those 
they call shina jin (Chinese—derogatory), chōsen jin (Korean—derogatory) 
and tokua (short for tokutei ajia, which means ‘certain countries in Asia’, 
namely South Korea, North Korea and China) online. The netto uyoku 
also typically associate Koreans and Chinese as well as the participants 
in environmentalist left-wing politics with the centre-left Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ).17 An example of this is their use of derogatory 
Korean-sounding nicknames such as Minsutō (for Minshutō, the DPJ) and 
Kangansu (for former prime minister Kan Naoto). Also observed in the 
aftermath of the 1923 Great Kantō earthquake and the 1995 Hanshin 
earthquake, this xenophobia and exclusion of foreign people (especially 
those from other Asian countries) seems to be an unfortunate trend 
associated with post-disaster Japanese nationalism. However, in post-3.11 
15  The netto uyoku are differentiated by their anonymous nature to traditional right-wing activists, 
who drive big black sound trucks on the streets to yell out propaganda to passers-by (gaisen uyoku). 
For a detailed analysis of the netto-uyoku’s activities on 2-channeru, see Sakamoto (2011).
16  However, these protests have also been met by a counter-protest by those who believe radical 
right-wing groups are ‘the shame of this country’ (Kendall, 2013).
17  The DPJ was in office between 2009 and 2012, which made history by breaking the Liberal 
Democratic Party’s long-term dominant hold of political power in Japan. The association of the new 
environmentalist left-wing movement with the DPJ is an oversimplified perception held by the netto 
uyoku. Many environmentalists were critical of the decisions the DPJ made with regards to  the 
Fukushima incidents and voted against the DPJ in the 2012 elections.
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discourse, perhaps due to the fact that domestic social issues, such as the 
living conditions of foreign residents are under stricter foreign scrutiny 
than in 1923 or 1995, this kind of radical right-wing movement has 
received both official and unofficial criticism for being un-Japanese. Prime 
Minister Abe commented that this kind of racist hate speech was ‘truly 
regrettable’ and that ‘the Japanese respect harmony and should not be 
people who exclude others … The Japanese way of thinking is to behave 
politely and to be generous and modest at any time’ (‘Abe  Criticizes 
Increase in Hate Speech’, 2013). Similarly, right-wing journalist Sakurai 
Yoshiko (2016) observed that those who participated in hate speech 
against Korean people were lacking in pride as Japanese citizens as well as 
the kindness, compassion and tolerance typical of Japanese people.
Interestingly, some commentators who are associated with conservative 
ideology have expressed their anti-nuclear views following 3.11, 
which complicated the ideological landscape.18 An example is pro-
royal family commentator Takeda Tsuneyasu, who published his Kore 
ga ketsuron! Nihonjin to genpatsu [This is the conclusion! The Japanese 
and nuclear power] in 2012.19 Takeda (2012, pp. 203–205) argued that 
Japan, a  country created by Gods according to the kuni-umi (birth of 
the country) myth, should not be using nuclear power because it is a 
presence that impinges the realm of the Gods. Further, Takeda (2012) 
claimed that conservatives should not support nuclear power because it 
‘causes the Emperor anxiety’ (pp. 208–210). Another famous example is 
manga artist Kobayashi Yoshinori, who published his Gōmanizumu sengen 
special: Datsu genpatsu ron [Special manifesto of arrogant-ism: on anti-
nuclear politics] in August 2012.20 Kobayashi has been well known for 
expressing his conservative politics in his Gōmanizumu sengen [Manifesto 
of arrogant-ism] series since he wrote his Shin gōmanizumu sengen special: 
Sensō ron [Special manifesto of neo-arrogant-ism: on war], in which 
he praised Japan’s activities during WWII. Kobayashi’s (2012, p. 88) 
claim regarding nuclear power is that, as a patriot, he cannot accept the 
use of nuclear power, which pollutes his beloved homeland that many 
died to protect during the war. In a line of reasoning not too distant 
to that of Takeda, he observed that conservatives (hoshu) should protect 
18  The book Migi kara no datsu genpatsu [The anti-nuclear right-wing] (2012) by Harigai Daisuke 
summarises the ideologies of the Migi kara kangaeru datsu genpatsu network [The anti-nuclear right-
wing network], which is a citizen group that takes this ideology onto the streets of Tokyo.
19  This was a revised version, of Genpatsu wa naze Nihon ni fusawashiku nai noka [Why nuclear 
power is not suitable for Japan], which was published in June 2011.
20  For an in-depth analysis of this work, see Sakamoto (2016).
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the Japanese national character (kunigara) and evoked ‘the origins of 
Japanese spirituality’—respect and fear for nature, which humans cannot 
completely control (Kobayashi, 2012, p. 119). In  an interesting twist, 
Kobayashi is not against the use of nuclear weapons, which, in his view, are 
necessary for autonomy and peace in Japan (p. 129).21
Even within the right-wing camp, the discourse is thus divided in terms 
of what is considered most valuable for Japan’s future: a traditional 
form of coexistence with nature that protects its beauty, or economic 
and technological success that allows Japan to continue being a world 
superpower. How have other Japanese intellectuals responded to this 
conflict? The next part of the chapter outlines how Japanese authors have 
portrayed their visions for future Japan.
Remembering Hiroshima and Nagasaki
In Japan, authors are as influential as politicians and other intellectuals 
in their role of helping the general public come to terms with traumatic events. 
As Gebhardt (2014) argued in her paper on 3.11 literature:
in a confusing and worrying situation, statements by writers are 
expected to serve as a cultural corrective … these texts might help 
to capture in words that which has happened to order and clarify 
thoughts, suppress feelings of panic and instil in people some kind 
of hope for the future (p. 22).
However, following 3.11, Japanese fiction and non-fiction authors have 
generally expanded on criticisms of Japanese society voiced by left-wing 
environmentalists, rather than focusing on ‘suppress[ing] feelings of 
panic’. Authors have also expressed a more nuanced view of Japan’s future, 
compared to other public intellectuals.
21  Kobayashi (2011) outlined his pro–nuclear armament view further in the last chapter of his 
Gōmanizumu sengen special: Kokubōron [Special manifesto of arrogant-ism: on national defense], 
Genpatsu to kokubō [Nuclear power plants and national defense] and Gōsen dōjō: genpatsu wa yabai, 
kakuheiki wa anzen [The school of arrogant-ism: nuclear power is dangerous, nuclear weapons are 
safe] (2012). Former Minister of Defence Ishiba Shigeru is an example of a politician who supported 
nuclear power precisely because of the technology’s potential to be used for the manufacturing of 
nuclear weapons. Ishiba stated in an interview with News Post Seven (5 October 2011) that having the 
potential to create nuclear weapons in a short amount of time would have a deterrent effect, should 
Japan come close to having a war.
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Ogino Anna (2011), an Akutagawa prize–winning author, made positive 
and negative observations of post-disaster Japan in Daishinsai: yoku to 
jingi [The great earthquake: greed and honour]. Ogino (2011, pp. 55–56, 
59) criticised the Japanese-style top-down organisation that she observed 
at the evacuation shelter, giving examples of supplies not being distributed 
efficiently (or sometimes, not at all) because official procedures could not 
be bypassed and dead bodies that were not removed as quickly as they could 
have been. Ogino (2011, pp. 237–240) explained these unfortunate events 
using her view of the Japanese national character: twenty-first-century 
Japanese are people who have stopped thinking or taking responsibility, 
living happily in a system that encourages obedience. She concluded that 
the Japanese tendency to be calm in the face of such disasters also has 
a negative side—this calmness comes from a blind, unquestioning trust 
towards authority. According to Ogino (2011, pp. 237–238), Japanese 
people do not take pride in their citizenship and are happy to obey as 
long as the economic conditions in their country are favourable to them. 
However, Ogino (2011, p. 201) also saw some hope for the future in the 
behaviour of certain individuals who took matters into their own hands 
in this time of emergency. For example, a high school principal decided 
to allow evacuees to find shelter at his school, even though his school 
was not a formally designated evacuation shelter. It is this kind of active, 
individual response that Ogino (2011, p. 240) saw as a force that moved 
Japan forward from the immediate aftermath of the disaster.
While Ogino believed that the Japanese, especially in the disaster-
hit areas, needed to become more active citizens for reconstruction to 
occur, other authors questioned whether the Japanese can even be active 
participants in political discourse. For example, some have pointed out 
the tendency for the Japanese to jump to conclusions with regards to 
political affiliations, especially when it came to left-wing ideologies. Muroi 
Yuzuki (2013), author and Takahashi Gen’ichirō’s ex-wife, condemned 
Japanese society in the 5 July 2013 issue of Shūkan Asahi for labelling 
any concerns about radiation levels as ‘left-wing’ and argued that not all 
Japanese citizens are cleanly divided between right-wing and left-wing 
politics. As manga artist and researcher Takekuma Kentarō (2011, p. 152) 
contended, in post-war Japan, being pro-nuclear has traditionally been 
associated with conservative politics, whereas being anti-nuclear is being 
a political dissident and a communist or an anarchist. Murakami Haruki 
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(2011) expressed a similar view, albeit in a more indirect way: ‘The label 
of “unrealistic dreamer” has been slapped on anyone who expresses 
reservations about nuclear power’ (n.p.).
This left-wing movement was also perceived to have become too 
extremist by some authors. Yōrō Takeshi, author of the best-seller Baka no 
kabe [The wall of fools], was one of the intellectuals who argued that the 
tendency to be polarised between extreme views is typical of the Japanese, 
quoted in a 2011 talk with Genyū Sōkyu, Akutagawa prize–winning 
author and Buddhist monk from Fukushima, which was published in 
Voice. He claimed that this stems from the fact that Japanese people are 
less interested in facts compared to Anglo-Saxon people, who wait for 
objective and scientific data to become available before reaching their 
conclusions. This leads to a situation in which participants in political 
debates choose their stance on a more emotional basis. In the same article, 
Genyū Sōkyu observed that since no scientific conclusion had been 
drawn on the health effects of low-level radiation, it was necessary for the 
Japanese to accept that they simply ‘don’t know’. He even labelled post-
3.11 anti-nuclear activism as being ‘violent’. Conversely, Yōrō suggested 
that Japanese political structures encourage this kind of polarisation—
residents in the areas surrounding nuclear power plants were able to receive 
the most amount of compensation when the votes ‘for’ constructing 
a nuclear power plant only exceed the votes ‘against’ by a small margin.
Odajima Takashi, an author and columnist, also raised alarm over this 
issue. Odajima (2012) drew parallels between the discourse on Fukushima 
and the discourse surrounding the Nanjing massacre, pointing out that in 
both cases, the two opposing forces refused to listen to each other, which 
caused discussion to become meaningless and further increased tensions. 
Additionally, this kind of attitude causes the topic to become shunned by 
the average citizen and only discussed by fanatics who fabricate facts to 
further their arguments. Like Yōrō, Odajima (2012) claims that this leads 
to a ‘typically Japanese’ lack of discussion of the truth of the matter, which 
becomes ‘massacred’. Odajima referred to a Yūkan Fuji article from nine 
days prior (14 March 2012) by ex-journalist Uesugi Takashi, which was 
widely criticised for claiming that ‘the cities of Fukushima and Kōriyama 
are uninhabitable’ (the two cities have an estimated population size of 
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287,365 and 332,176, respectively, as at 1 June 2019).22 Uesugi’s reasoning 
for this statement was that two journalists from the Wall Street Journal 
made this claim. However, it was later discovered that these journalists 
never made these comments and an erratum was published on Yūkan Fuji 
on 22 March.23 Odajima (2012) argued that such fabrications of ‘facts’ 
directly hinder efforts to have a meaningful discussion on nuclear power.
The topic that has stirred up the most critical responses from Japanese 
authors is undoubtedly that of nuclear power. For example, Murakami 
Haruki, Ōe Kenzaburō and Karatani Kōjin—perhaps the three most 
internationally recognised public figures from the Japanese literary 
world—have all expressed their opposition to nuclear power in the wake 
of the disaster. These three men have been vocal on this issue on the global 
stage, which has had an important influence on Japan’s post-3.11 image. 
Murakami Haruki famously commented on the disaster in his speech, 
‘Speaking as an Unrealistic Dreamer’, delivered when he received the 
23rd Premi Internacional Catalunya in Barcelona in 2011. In this speech, 
Murakami (2011) expressed hopes for Japan’s reconstruction by linking 
the ability of the Japanese to deal with the frequent natural disasters to the 
idea of mujō—‘a resigned worldview’ and a perspective that ‘all things must 
pass away’.24 Murakami (2011) explained that this idea of mujō comes 
from the view that humans are simply renting space on this planet called 
Earth: ‘It’s not as if the earth came up and asked us, “Please come live 
here”’. This view, which has its roots in Buddhism, ‘has been seared deeply 
into the Japanese spirit, forming a national mindset that has continued 
on almost without change since ancient times’ (Murakami, 2011) and 
allows the Japanese people to rebuild their homes and carry on living 
after natural disasters. However, Murakami claimed that nuclear power 
does not belong in such a worldview because it is part of an intangible 
moral decay, a mindset of efficiency and convenience that ‘cannot be so 
easily repaired’. This led to the author’s conclusion that Japan should not 
possess nuclear power. Murakami (2011) strongly criticised the Japanese 
Government and the electricity companies that promoted nuclear power 
22  Data taken from official city council statistics: www.city.fukushima.fukushima.jp/jouhouka-
seisaku/shise/opendate/suikeijinnkou/h31suikeijinkou.html; www.city.koriyama.lg.jp/soshiki nogoannai/ 
seisakukaihatsubu/seisakukaihatsuka/gomu/2215.html.
23  The full details of the incident can be found here: togetter.com/li/276770.
24  Quotes are taken from the English translation, available at: japanfocus.org/-Murakami-Haruki/ 
3571.
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in the interest of profitability and claimed that ‘the citizens of Japan will 
become really angry’ this time, even though ‘the Japanese are a people 
who tend not to get angry easily’.
At the same time, like Ogino and many other commentators, Murakami 
(2011) urged all citizens to accept responsibility—‘when it comes to 
rebuilding damaged morals and ethical standards, the responsibility falls 
on all our shoulders’. Because Japanese people have ‘a positive mind, 
a respect for things that have passed away and a quiet determination to go 
on living with vigor in this fragile world filled with dangers’ as evidenced 
by the idea of mujō, their task as Japanese citizens should have been to 
accept ‘collective responsibility for the many victims who perished at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki’ by ‘[shouting] “no” to the atom’. Murakami 
(2011) thus included opposition to nuclear power as part of what it 
means to be Japanese. Further, Murakami outlined his vision for Japan 
as not only an anti-nuclear nation, but a world leader in non-nuclear 
energy sources. If Japan could ‘[combine] all our technological expertise, 
[mass] all our wisdom and know-how and [invest] all our social capital 
to develop effective energy sources to replace nuclear power’, it would 
be ‘a tremendous opportunity for us truly to contribute, as Japanese, to 
the world’ (Murakami, 2011). In an interview with Austrian journalist 
Judith Brandner, Murakami commented that the ‘strong and earnest’ 
nature of the Japanese people makes them particularly suitable for this 
monumental task:
Once national goals are set, everyone tries their best to achieve 
them. Once something is decided, everyone follows. If it is decided 
that nuclear power will be phased out, everyone will definitely 
work together to achieve this and happily reduce their energy 
consumption. It’s just that there is no one to make these decisions 
(in Kirishima, 2013, p. 32; trans. by author).
Murakami displays as much faith in Japanese national characteristics and 
technological prowess as those in the pro-nuclear camp, even though 
the disaster represents ‘the collapse of a myth, the belief in the power 
of technology that has been a source of pride to the Japanese for so 
many years’. The only difference is that Murakami focused on using this 
Japanese technological advantage for the development of alternative green 
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technologies,25 whereas the pro-nuclear camp focused on developing 
a safer and greener way to produce nuclear energy, namely through the 
reprocessing of radioactive waste and the attainment of commercial 
nuclear fusion technology.
In a 2011 essay published in The New Yorker titled ‘History Repeats: 
Japan and Nuclear Power’, Ōe Kenzaburō also placed Fukushima on 
a continuum from Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as the hydrogen 
bomb testing at Bikini Atoll—three events that have come to represent 
the dangers of nuclear technology in recent Japanese history. Ōe (2011) 
described the use of nuclear power in Japan as ‘the worst possible betrayal 
of the memory of Hiroshima’s victims’ and expressed his hopes that 
Fukushima ‘will allow the Japanese to reconnect with the victims of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to recognize the danger of nuclear power and 
to put an end to the illusion of the efficacy of deterrence that is advocated 
by nuclear powers’. Referring to Japan’s three non-nuclear principles—
‘don’t possess, manufacture, or introduce into Japanese territory nuclear 
weapons’—Ōe suggested that both nuclear power and nuclear weapons 
do not belong in Japan. Although nuclear power and nuclear weapons are 
produced using different processes, authors such as Murakami and Ōe feel 
that Japan should embrace its identity as a completely nuclear-free nation 
and allow the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to endure.
Karatani Kōjin (2011) was of a similar view to Murakami and Ōe, in 
observing that ‘the crisis at the Fukushima nuclear power plant cannot help 
but call forth memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki’ in his article on the 
US left-wing CounterPunch magazine on 24 March 2011. He suggested 
that the use of nuclear power in Japan was a result of ‘criminal deception 
on the part of industry and government’. However, Karatani (2011) also 
took the concept slightly further than Murakami and Ōe, urging Japan 
to undergo a ‘rebirth’ by abandoning capitalist economic development 
altogether—‘it is only then that people will, for the first time, truly be 
able to live’. This comes from a perspective held by Japanese citizens since 
before the disaster, that ‘acknowledges the reality and continuing prospect 
of low growth and that calls for the formation of a new economy and 
civil society’. This is similar to the observation made by political scientist 
25  This kind of discourse painting Japan’s new future as a world leader in green technologies is also 
observed outside the literary world. Examples include former US Vice President Walter F. Mondale 
(2012, p. 121) and US environmental analyst Lester R. Brown (2012, p. 167), who were both 
featured in the same Kyodo News publication.
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Mikuriya Takashi (2011, p. 22), that the disaster will allow Japanese 
people to finally accept the ‘slow life’ (a Japanese term used in the same 
way as the ‘slow movement’ in English) philosophy, where importance is 
placed on whether citizens can live comfortably within Japan rather than 
the country’s position relative to the rest of the world. For Takashi (2011, 
p. 23), this also meant a society that embraces the rapid ageing of Japan’s 
population and respects the experiences and wisdom of the elderly, rather 
than viewing their existence as a problem. The argument for degrowth 
has even spread to the political world, proposed by former Minister of 
Economy, Trade and Industry Edano Yukio as part of his ‘Edanomics’ 
policy (Satō & Kawaguchi, 2012) and is an important part of the analysis 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3.
The End of ‘Cool Japan’?
The aforementioned three authors observed that the disaster revealed 
outdated post-war values in Japanese society, such as an obsession with 
economic growth fuelled by nuclear power and that this post-disaster 
period was a good opportunity to rethink these values. To borrow from 
Mikuriya Takashi’s (2011) book title, the ‘post-war’ period has ended and 
the ‘post-disaster’ period has begun. For Takashi (2011, p. 7), the disaster 
represented a shared national experience comparable to Japan’s defeat in 
WWII, which finally marked the beginning of a break from the post-war, 
post–economic miracle model. However, this post-war society, with its 
long period of uninterrupted peace and prosperity, gave birth to some 
of the most important cultural expressions in modern Japan—popular 
culture, namely that of manga, anime and otaku (here I am using the term 
otaku as a convenient way to refer to consumers of manga and anime ; 
however, the term is much more complex in meaning, as examined in 
Chapter 5). Just nine days after the earthquake, academic and otaku 
researcher Morikawa Kaichirō (2011a, 2011b) tweeted that since ‘otaku 
culture had been built on the foundation of the stable yet suffocating 
everydayness’ of Japanese society,26 the crisis of 3.11 may ‘cause cracks to 
form in this foundation’. He gave the simple example of the ubiquitous 
24-hour convenience stores, which had been a symbol of this everlasting 
26  The idea of the ‘endless everyday’ was proposed by sociologist Miyadai Shinji in his 1995 book 
Owari naki nichijō wo ikiro [Living in ‘the endless everyday’]. Miyadai (1995) argued that it was this 
boredom that led to the rise of the Aum Shinrikyō cult in Japan.
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‘everydayness’ and argued that such symbolism was likely to change 
following the experience of inconvenience during the disaster, which 
extended to rolling blackouts in the Kantō region.27 Since Morikawa’s 
tweets, several otaku culture experts have expanded on the view that 3.11 
represented a rupture from the everydayness of the post-war period, which 
may cause a fundamental shift in future Japanese cultural expressions.
Azuma Hiroki, known for his philosophical work on otaku culture, is 
an example of an author and a public intellectual whose recent work 
embodies  this concern. Since 3.11, Azuma has published controversial 
works and philosophical essays as the editor of his Shisō chizu beta magazine, 
hosted debates on the Japanese video sharing website Niconico as part of 
the activities of his publishing company, Genron, and been the creator 
and proponent of the idea of turning the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant into a ‘dark tourism’ destination. Referring to the tweets 
by Morikawa, Azuma (2011c) suggested that this sudden break in the 
everydayness caused by the disaster was likely to become a turning point 
for the culture of ‘Moe’ and ‘Cool Japan’.28 Azuma (2012, p. 44) observed 
that the 1985 animation Megazōn tsū surī [Megazone 23] captured the 
essence of the foundation of pre-3.11 Japanese popular culture—the 
setting of this cult film is a simulated reality modelled on 1980s Tokyo, 
‘when people were most happy’. Pre-3.11 mainstream Japanese popular 
culture had been focused on preserving this happiness, whether imagined 
or real, by avoiding the question of what it is to be Japanese in this day and 
age—what should be done about nuclear power, Okinawa, or the issue of 
intergenerational inequity, just to name a few examples. In the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster, Azuma (2012, pp. 43–45) viewed his role as 
helping to create a new mindset to create a new country, by assisting his 
readers to think about these issues.
Takekuma Kentarō (2011, p. 154) also predicted a shift in otaku culture 
in his article titled ‘The day the “endless everyday” ended’. In Kentarō’s 
(2011) view, pre-3.11 otaku was characterised by a cynical attitude to 
life and a reliance on apocalyptic fantasies to deal with the suffocating 
boredom of prosperous and seemingly endless ‘everyday’ (p. 155). Since 
the events of 3.11 exceeded this otaku imagination by their sheer scale 
27  The rolling blackout (keikaku teiden) were a measure adopted by TEPCO from 14 March 
2011, when electricity delivery was intentionally stopped for three-hour periods in selected regions 
(TEPCO, 2011).
28  ‘Cool Japan’ is a slogan used by the Japanese Government to promote the country as a cultural 
superpower.
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and proximity, he believed that it was likely that future works with 
apocalyptic themes would not be able to compete with this reality. Kentarō 
(2011, p. 151) provided the example of his experience walking through 
the streets of Shinjuku on the day of the earthquake, when the ordinary 
and everyday scenery of the city co-existed with the extraordinary sight 
of the paralysis of transport systems and people spending the night on 
the streets. He  claimed that this looked eerily similar to a scene from 
the 1993 anime film Mobile Police PATLABOR 2, in which men and 
women in business attire commute to work by walking past tanks parked 
on the street, in a city on full alert in preparation for a terrorist attack. 
He suggested that one of the preoccupations of the director of the film, 
Oshii Mamoru, was to portray the fear caused by our trusted everyday 
falling apart. Now that this has happened in reality, these apocalyptic 
portrayals may not appeal as much, or evoke as much fear in the Japanese 
audience, as they previously did.
The pendulum could also swing in the opposite direction for some, in 
which such apocalyptic portrayals remind them of the horrors of 3.11 and 
contribute to issues such as PTSD. Due to this, these apocalyptic works 
may be considered inappropriate and inconsiderate towards disaster 
victims (fukinshin; imprudent). Many pre-3.11 film, anime and manga 
works had their releases postponed or cancelled due to the disaster.29 
This also presented an issue for popular culture responses to subsequent 
disasters in Japan, such as the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016. Following 
the Kumamoto Earthquake, there were many internet users (the so-called 
fukinshinchū, or ‘fukinshin maniacs’) who patrolled social media platforms 
for any mention of anime viewing (among other forms of consumption 
of entertainment) to label these activities as fukinshin during a time when 
many were still suffering. It has become increasingly difficult to publicly 
portray or consume the apocalyptic scenes typical of sekaikei anime and 
manga, such as Neon Genesis Evangelion, which formed the foundations 
of ‘Cool Japan’.30
29  Some examples of major films that had their releases postponed include Feng Xioagang’s 2010 
Aftershock, Alister Grierson’s 2011 Sanctum and Lucy Walker’s 2010 Countdown to Zero.
30  Sekaikei fiction consists of stories in which the romantic relationship between male protagonists 
and heroines are directly related to the fate of the entire world, usually a global crisis or an apocalypse 
(Azuma, 2007, p. 96). However, Sekaikei is not dead: Kimi no na wa [Your Name], a 2016 anime film 
explored in Chapter 4, is a post-3.11 example of an extremely popular sekaikei work.
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Is otaku culture really so fragile that it can be destroyed by a seismic 
movement? And if so, should we make an effort to artificially preserve 
it? Art critic Sawaragi Noi claimed that the ‘post-war’ period was nothing 
more than a period of absence of major earthquakes, which allowed the 
safe development of otaku culture as well as Japan’s economic growth up 
to 1995 (Kurose, Sawaragi & Azuma, 2012, pp. 351–352). If Sawaragi’s 
theory is true, then it follows that otaku culture is in danger of extinction. 
The future of otaku culture seems bleak—even contemporary artist 
Murakami Takashi (2012, pp. 86, 88), whose lifework has been based 
around ‘communicat[ing] to foreigners the sensibility of the Japanese 
otaku’, believes that ‘the age of otaku has ended’.31 However, contrary to 
his own comments, Murakami’s recent work shows new hope: The 500 
Arhats (2012), which was exhibited in Doha, Qatar, seemed to be 
Takashi’s artistic statement that Japan was still capable of producing and 
exporting unique cultural products. As if to mark the beginning of a new 
cultural era, Takashi’s work focuses on a grand fusion between East and 
West—a  departure from his traditional theme of post-war Japan–US 
relations and its influence on otaku culture (Takashi, 2012, p. 355). 
Whether post-3.11 otaku expression will be able to grow out of the 
formula of ‘creating something new out of imported American culture’, 
an active effort will be required if the prosperous and peaceful mindset 
of the otaku is to be preserved. In Takashi’s (2012, p. 98) words, amae 
[dependence]32 can no longer be tolerated—otaku must also move beyond 
the traditional idea of amateurs offering art for free over the internet and 
begin aggressively marketing their work as professional art to survive.
If the otaku is seen to be incapable of nurturing their culture in the face 
of global competition and crises, the same may apply to the Japanese 
Government. It was only after American author Douglas McGray spelled 
out the potential of the country’s soft power in 2002 that the Japanese 
Government began officially promoting Japanese popular culture exports 
such as ‘idol’ music, manga and anime, under the ‘Cool Japan’ policy. 
This recent increased visibility of Japanese popular culture on the global 
stage, whether caused by government policy or not, may be partly 
responsible for the enormous amount of donations and support that 
31  English references are taken from John Person’s translation at the end of Shisō chizu beta, vol. 3.
32  Amae is a term known for its difficulty of translating into English, which was explored extensively 
in Doi Takeo’s (1971) Amae no kōzō [The Anatomy of Dependence]. It was described by Doi (1971) 
as a uniquely Japanese desire to be liked by others, so that you can depend on them; much like the 
behaviour of children towards their parents.
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poured into Japan from overseas following the earthquake. However, it 
is not certain what kind of long-term effects the disaster will have on 
this national brand. As Ian Condry and Yuiko Fujita (2011, p. 2) ask in 
their introduction to the ‘Cool Japan’ special issue of the International 
Journal of Japanese Sociology: ‘Does the idea of “Cool Japan” have a place 
in a post-3.11 world? … In the wake of the “triple disaster,” could it be 
that Japan would go from kakkoii (cool) to yabai (dangerous)?’ Although 
otaku culture is alive and well following 3.11, it is noteworthy that so 
many well-known authors and otaku critics felt that the disaster would 
introduce a fundamental shift in these cultural expressions.
From the image of a Japan uniting its social and technological forces in 
the face of a disaster to rise again as a world superpower, to a Japanese 
system failing to cope with an un-Japanese technology or even a nation 
being punished for its capitalist sins, Japanese intellectuals and authors 
have portrayed post-3.11 Japan in various and often contradictory ways. 
Regardless of these contradictions, one thing is clear: disasters continue 
to be catalysts that stimulate debates on Japan. The Japanese viewed 
Fukushima as an opportunity to change or to reinforce and revisit values 




One way in which Japanese authors presented a vision for Japan’s recovery 
was to portray a Japan that stepped down from its position as a global 
economic and technological superpower to embrace a more traditional 
relationship with nature, in line with the ‘slow growth’ movement 
proposed by intellectuals such as Mikuriya Takashi and Karatani Kōjin. 
While the movement has not gained mainstream support in Japan, literary 
texts that present this kind of vision for Japan’s future have been some of 
the most popular responses to the disaster. This chapter focuses on three 
such texts: Shi no tsubute [Pebbles of Poetry] by Wagō Ryōichi (2011), 
Kamisama 2011 [God Bless You, 2011] by Kawakami Hiromi (2011) and 
Ano hi kara no manga [Manga Since that Day] by Shiriagari Kotobuki 
(2011).1 Rather than simply repeating mainstream ideas from non-literary 
discourse (such as those from the previous chapter) in a different format, 
these works either add new dimensions to the debate on Japan’s post-3.11 
future or convey these ideas in a more accessible way that takes advantage 
of the power of fiction.
The idea of using disasters as a catalyst for the rethinking of human 
behaviour dates back to the premodern period prior to 1600 CE, when 
most Japanese believed that ‘natural disasters were the result of imbalances 
in the five elements of nature caused by social impurities directly linked 
to human behaviour’ (Weisenfeld, 2011, p. 14) and that an underground 
catfish (namazu) acted as a divine messenger, shaking the land on its back 
1  Another example is Takahashi Mutsuo’s poetry, which is explored extensively in Angles (2017), 
which also examines Shi no tsubute.
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when it was angered (p. 25). This belief was prevalent in Japan as recently 
as the early 1920s, when many literary intellectuals referred to the 1923 
Great Kantō Earthquake as a form of ‘divine retribution’.
What is particularly interesting in the 3.11 case is that, although the 
Tōhoku region bore the brunt of the damage in the case of 3.11, it was 
the materialism and modernity of the country that was blamed for this 
‘divine retribution’. However, this was not the case in the aftermath of the 
1995 Hanshin earthquake, when it was the opportunism, materialism 
and capitalistic tendencies of the disaster-hit Hanshinkan region that 
was blamed. In particular, this moral wake-up call of the triple disaster 
is addressed to those who had forgotten their traditional Japanese values 
and were living a comfortable life in Tokyo at the expense of the innocent 
disaster victims (the nuclear power plants in Fukushima supplied electricity 
to Tokyo). Although few today would believe in the existence of a divine 
catfish, the literary responses analysed in this chapter reveal a continuing 
desire of the Japanese to seek a moral lesson as a way of coming to terms 
with disasters.
Alternative Visions of Kizuna by Wagō 
Ryōichi and Kawakami Hiromi
Shi no tsubute by Wagō Ryōichi (2011a) and Kamisama 2011 by 
Kawakami Hiromi (2011) are two very early literary responses to the 
disaster. These two works, albeit very different in genre and style, share 
an exploration and questioning of the concept of kizuna [bonds] that was 
popularised following 3.11, using traditional Japanese values. Chapter 1 
outlined some of the weaknesses of the concept of kizuna, as argued by 
Japanese public intellectuals and authors. Although they did not deny 
the importance of helping each other in the aftermath of the disaster, the 
authors examined in this chapter contend that what Japan may need the 
most to move forward is a different vision of kizuna—one that encourages 
bonds with nature and future generations. Wagō Ryōichi and Kawakami 
Hiromi are two authors who, by using their writing to offer alternative 
views of kizuna and of 3.11, found strong support among those who were 
dissatisfied with the official representations of the disaster and sought 
an alternative.
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Wagō Ryōichi is a poet from Fukushima who grew up in the prefecture and 
now works as a Japanese teacher at a local high school, which complements 
his career in contemporary poetry. Wagō already had an established career 
as a poet prior to 3.11, having received the Chūya Nakahara prize for his 
debut poetry collection, AFTER (1998), and the 47th Bansui Prize for 
his fourth poetry collection, Chikyū Zunō Shihen [Earth brain psalms] 
(2006). Himself a victim of the earthquake, Wagō decided to remain in 
Fukushima and to continue transmitting his first-hand views to the rest 
of Japan through his poetry. He most notably achieved this through his 
use of Twitter—a tool that allowed him to keep publishing his words 
in a time of emergency, when he did not even have a landline phone 
connection (Wagō & Kamata, 2011, p. 59). Wagō conducted numerous 
impromptu poetry sessions on Twitter for a real-time audience using the 
handle @wago2828.2 These works have now been published in book 
format in the trilogy Shi no tsubute [Pebbles of poetry], Shi no mokurei 
[Silent prayer of poetry] and Shi no kaikō [Encounters with poetry].3
Remaining in deserted Fukushima after sending his family off to Yamagata, 
Wagō was under no illusion that kizuna between Japanese citizens was 
magically strengthened as a result of the earthquake. He reminisces that, 
at the time, he felt a profound sense of loneliness sitting alone in his 
room with the realisation that society does not necessarily protect all its 
members (Wagō, 2011c, p. 130). One of Wagō’s central themes at the start 
of Shi no tsubute is precisely the lack of cooperation and understanding 
between Tōhoku and Tokyo, or the rest of Japan. Wagō (2011a) started 
tweeting on 16 March 2011, just five days after the earthquake and some 
of his first words express this concern:
I hear that no supplies have reached Minami Sōma, the city where 
I used to live. They say that’s because no one wants to go into the 
city. Please save Minami Sōma (p. 11).4
He also observed that people in Fukushima were ‘taught to wash their 
hair, hands and face after going outdoors’ (Wagō, 2011a, p. 11) as a way 
of reducing radiation exposure, despite the serious lack of water in 
2  Thanks to the ideographic writing system, it is possible to say a lot more in a tweet (which has 
a 140-character limit) in Japanese than in English.
3  For more information about Shi no tsubute and an excerpt translated by Jeffrey Angles, see Wagō 
(2011b). For an in-depth analysis of Wagō’s use of Twitter, see Odagiri (2014).
4  Translated by Jeffrey Angles. All further translations from Shi no tsubute are my own and the page 
numbers are from the print version.
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Fukushima at the time. There is silent anger in his words: ‘We do not have 
the water to do so’ (Wagō, 2011a, p. 11).5 This railing against injustice 
is intensified by the fact that the electricity generated in Fukushima has 
supplied Tokyo for many decades.
However, Wagō’s criticism and initial anger seem to become increasingly 
tempered as time goes by. He began to appreciate the bonds he forms 
with the ever-growing number of his followers on Twitter (of which there 
were only a dozen to begin with). He even mentions the word kizuna to 
refer to his 10-day bond with his readers in a tweet on 25 March (p. 129). 
At  this stage, Wagō seems to feel that, despite the lack of government 
support and differences in attitude between Tōhoku and the rest of Japan, 
there was a certain kizuna that still existed in the country at the grassroots 
level. He was encouraged by the feedback from his readers, which helped 
him ‘find himself ’ again and calm down the angry tone of his writing 
(Wagō & Kamata, 2011, p. 60).
Through this renewed understanding of the positive powers of kizuna, 
Wagō proceeds to outline his own vision for Japan’s future, which contains 
two elements: kizuna between humans and nature and kizuna between 
the current and future generations of Japanese people. The kizuna 
between humans and nature is evoked by the animal metaphors that 
occur throughout the work. Wagō (2011a) used the vibrations created 
by galloping horses as a metaphor for the earthquake and described 
those affected by the disaster as ‘sad riders’ (p. 22). His choice of the 
horse is symbolic because Minami-sōma hosts the famous Soma Wild 
Horse Chase (Sōma-Nomaoi Festival).6 Many horses in the region were 
abandoned after 3.11 and were trapped without food or water. Therefore, 
horses symbolise the innocent sacrifice of the Tōhoku people. Further, 
horses are represented as divine figures that are ‘trying to ascend to the sky’ 
(p. 106). In the Tōhoku region, the horse-god oshira-sama is revered as 
a guardian of the home. The horses in the text are described as angry and 
in despair (p. 68), which may be a reference to the horses having turned 
into a kind of vindictive god (tatarigami), due to our selfish exploitation 
5  The tone of the Japanese is difficult to capture in English. The original sentence is: 私たちには、
それを洗う水などないのです。
6  Furukawa Hideo (2011), who wrote Umatachi yo, soredemo hikari wa muku de [Horses, horses, 
in the end the light remains pure: a tale that begins with Fukushima] in July 2011, also uses horses as 
a way of defamiliarising the disaster. Furukawa does this by relating Japanese history through the eyes of 
these horses in the disaster-hit areas and showing how, by abandoning these horses, the Japanese people 
severed a long lineage of these animals who played a crucial role in the formation of their country.
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of nature and nuclear power. Wagō initially adopts a confrontational tone 
towards the horses: ‘When I start writing, an aftershock. Fine, I’ll just 
write on your back’ he writes on 19 March 2011 (p. 48). Eventually, 
Wagō politely asks for forgiveness from the horses and says that he is 
willing to be alone in Fukushima if need be, as though offering himself 
as a human sacrifice to appease the angry animals.
The other animal that appears frequently in the work is the cat, which he 
uses as a metaphor for nuclear energy:
Humans felt safe, having domesticated the uncontrollable cats. 
They loved their best friends, embracing their fluffy safety myth. 
Every human being on Earth entrusted their obedient slaves with 
their body and soul. Many billions of cats. Hairs standing on end. 
Hostility. Revealed (p. 141).
These cats are also metaphors for the radioactive particles that have 
been ‘set  free’ by the nuclear meltdowns and are now roaming around 
Fukushima  (p. 141). As with the horse metaphor, Wagō implies that 
humans are at fault for causing this ‘cat revolt’. Humans cuddle up to 
the cats when they need them and then ‘abandon them with scorn when 
things go bad’ (p. 213). Wagō seems to imply that all these ‘animals’ 
can be tamed, but to do so, a trusting relationship must be maintained 
between the two parties (p. 208). Whether horse riders or cat owners, 
Wagō asks his fellow human beings to ‘stroke the mane of the horses, 
tied up in the darkness’ (p. 227). This can be interpreted as a call for the 
Japanese to return to the respectful relationship with nature that they had 
in pre-industrial times—a form of kizuna that seems to have been entirely 
left out in post-3.11 discourse, which was centred on bonds between 
humans. Wagō’s animal metaphors subvert the official discourse of kizuna 
by bringing to mind the bonds between humans and nature that were 
neglected before and after 3.11.
Wagō also places emphasis on the kizuna that he feels between himself 
and future generations of Japanese people. He suggests that we view the 
current generation as a renketsuten (link) in history rather than as an 
endpoint (p. 49), which implies a responsibility for providing the best 
circumstances possible for future generations. Further, he believes that 
the way to achieve this kind of kizuna is through the power of words 
(p. 210). To connect with these future generations, Wagō explores new 
means of expression through his poetry. Wagō usually writes in abstract 
contemporary verse, but the language used in his Twitter poetry is plain 
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and unadorned. Wagō claims that, pre-3.11, he had been against the idea 
of poetry being written horizontally, using a word processor and that he 
had never used direct expressions such as ‘sadness’, ‘dream’ or ‘life’ in his 
poetry. In this sense, Shi no tsubute represents a 180-degree turn in his 
stance towards poetry (Wagō, 2011d, p. 247). In a public talk with Azuma 
Hiroki on 28 May 2011, Wagō said he felt as though he needed words that 
could be delivered immediately and directly to his readers to represent the 
disaster in real time, like a documentary (Wagō & Azuma, 2011, p. 187).7 
He also acknowledged that this involved the use of language that was 
more informative than literary. In Wagō’s own words, ‘the metaphor has 
died’ in the face of the sheer scale and immediacy of the disaster (p. 64). 
Wagō’s goal in his post-3.11 writing has been to engage with reality more 
directly than his traditional poetry (p. 187) and to engage with a wider 
readership. As the myth that nuclear power is absolutely safe (zettai anzen 
shinwa) came crumbling down, Wagō also found himself abandoning his 
‘absolute rules’ and challenging the limits of poetry (Fukuma & Wagō, 
2011, p. 18) to rebuild his poetry from the debris, pebble by pebble.
Wagō’s work ends with a verbal duel with a devil, who tells him that his 
words are powerless and that they cannot bring about any physical change 
or bring back the dead. However, Wagō uses his poetry to fight and insists 
that he will keep writing and thinking about the disaster. He  imagines 
himself being on a boat, paddling towards his goal of ‘living this new 
poetry’ (p. 261). Wagō continues to live his poetry by publishing it on 
Twitter and making his voice heard and thereby opens up possibilities for 
bringing his words closer to reality. By living his poetry, Wagō also believes 
he helps the souls of the dead to live on. The book version ends with his 
afterword, in which he finds a single walnut from the dead tree in his room, 
which he calls his ‘pebble of poetry’ (p. 263). Through his poetry, Wagō 
is reminded of his kizuna with his deceased grandmother, whose voice 
reminds his angry childhood self to be kind to others. His poetry creates 
kizuna where it is otherwise difficult to create, with the deceased and 
with the yet-to-be-born, in the ineffable devastation of the tsunami and 
fears of invisible radiation. Wagō acts as an example for post-3.11 Japan 
to explore ways of imaginatively using language, without being overly 
7  The video version of this talk is available at: ‘Nico nama shisō chizu 01 Wagō Ryōichi × Azuma 
Hiroki’ [Niconico live thought map 01 Wagō Ryōichi and Azuma Hiroki] (30 May 2011), Niconico. 
Available from: www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm14599601.
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concerned with the various rules and conventions of communications. 
This creative use of language facilitates a rekindling of connections to 
nature and the creation of kizuna with past and future generations.
Kamisama 2011 by Kawakami Hiromi (2011) also builds on the 
mainstream notion of Japanese kizuna by exploring the ideas of kizuna 
between humans and nature and between generations. Kawakami Hiromi 
is an Akutagawa prize–winning novelist, known for her signature style of 
mixing fantasy and reality in her writing. Kawakami’s Kamisama 2011 
[God  Bless You, 2011], is a rewriting of Kamisama (1994)—her first 
published literary work. Short and like a fairy tale in its composition, 
Kamisama is a story about watashi (I), who is assumed to be a young woman, 
who goes on a walk with a friendly talking bear.8 The 2011 version has the 
same plot as the original, except for the fact that the events take place in 
a world post-3.11, probably near the Fukushima power plant, where one 
has to measure one’s own radiation exposure every day and where there are 
no longer any children. The disaster of 3.11 is never referred to explicitly 
in the work, but indirectly as ano koto (that thing). Despite the plot of the 
story being the same, the 2011 version feels completely different, because 
‘that thing’ has permeated every aspect of life.
Through a seemingly innocent juxtaposition of these two versions, 
Kawakami demonstrates the devastating effects of 3.11, in which 
everything that was normal in the past has changed beyond repair. 
The juxtaposition serves to highlight the fact that the abnormalities of life 
post-3.11 make us appreciate these normal moments that were perhaps 
overlooked prior to the earthquake. The 2011 version also demonstrates 
that we can no longer read the original version in the same way—and, by 
extension, we can no longer read or write any piece of literature in the 
same way. Kawakami achieves this effect in her work by inserting words 
such as ‘plutonium’, ‘caesium’ and ‘sV’ (sieverts) that would perhaps not 
otherwise have appeared in her fantastical writing.9
It is significant that Kawakami chose to rewrite this short story at this 
particular moment. Even in the original version, the bear in the story 
seems to represent the kind of real kizuna associated with traditional 
Japanese values and customs. When the bear moves to the same building 
8  Although the bear is referred to with male pronouns here, the gender of the bear is not stated 
in the novel.
9  All English translations for Kamisama, Kamisama 2011 and the postscript are works of Ted 
Goossen and Shibata Motoyuki, taken from March was Made of Yarn.
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as watashi, he goes to greet all his neighbours on the same floor of his 
building (and to the three remaining households post-3.11 in Kamisama 
2011) with some soba noodles and 10 postcards. Watashi seems to 
consider this unnecessary, which is a reflection of the erosion of these 
traditional bonding customs in Japanese society. Further, the bear appears 
to be moved by the fact that watashi is a distant relative of someone who 
helped him a lot in the past (or during the post-3.11 evacuation process in 
Kamisama 2011) and uses the old-fashioned word enishi  (fate) to describe 
the situation. These gestures and words lead watashi to consider the bear 
to be old-fashioned and she reasons that the bear’s non-human status is 
to blame for this—the bear needs to be overly considerate to others to be 
accepted in human society. The fact that the bear’s traditionally Japanese 
actions appear odd and old-fashioned shows how much Japanese society 
has changed and how little kizuna there remains in Japanese society. 
Later on, when the bear offers to sing a lullaby to watashi before her nap, 
watashi refuses, saying she can fall asleep without it (p. 13). This prompts 
a disappointed expression on the bear’s face, probably because the lullaby 
was intended less as a pragmatic tool to help watashi fall asleep than as 
a moment of bonding between them. He feels slightly offended that his 
offer was refused. Watashi seems unable to even recognise these signs of 
kizuna, let alone to strengthen her bonds with others.
In Kamisama 2011, the nuclear meltdowns in Fukushima are shown 
to have exacerbated this lack of kizuna between humans. Although the 
bear is punched and kicked by a little child in Kamisama, this violence is 
portrayed partly as a childlike and innocent act. However, in Kamisama 
2011, where there are no longer any children, two men in protective gear 
(‘Long Gloves’ and ‘Sunglasses’) simply come up to the bear and watashi 
and pull on the bear’s fur while talking about its resistance to radiation. 
Although there is less physical violence involved, the way the man in the 
sunglasses refuses to look the bear straight in the eye and talks about 
the bear as if he is not even there makes the encounter much more hostile. 
Conversely, the bear remains considerate and polite in Kamisama 2011, 
hiding his true feelings from watashi by saying, ‘I guess they meant well’ 
(p. 30). However, he sounds much less certain than in the original version, 
in which he says ‘young people don’t mean any harm, you know’ (p. 10).
The fact that this messenger of kizuna takes the form of a bear is 
significant. The bear may not literally be a creature of another species, 
but rather a metaphor for those who are discriminated against in Japanese 
society for looking different. The bear, who eats pâté and radishes with 
43
2 . SuSTAINAblE JApAN
a baguette for lunch, whereas watashi eats an umeboshi (pickled plum) 
rice ball, is a foreign figure to some extent, although bears are often seen 
around humans in Fukushima. This bear seems to belong neither in bear 
society nor in human society. In Sōjō no chūshoku [The luncheon on the 
grass], a story that appears in the original Kamisama collection of short 
stories as a sequel to Kamisama, the bear eventually feels ostracised in 
a human society that lacks kizuna and goes back to live with his fellow 
bears. Tragically, Kawakami seems to suggest that there is no longer a place 
for real kizuna in modern Japan. Whether one views the bear as an animal 
or as a metaphorical figure, it is clear that the novel is making a comment 
on Japanese society. In a society in which strong community ties have 
been lost, people have much to learn about kizuna from these outsiders, 
whom Kawakami refers to as ‘symbols of minorities’ (Kawakami  & 
Numano, 2012).
Kawakami also implies that an Earth without bears or nature is not 
a  sustainable place for humans to live. As Kawakami points out in the 
afterword to her book, Japanese people traditionally believed in a divine 
presence or spirit in all existing objects and living beings (yaoyorozu no 
kami), including mountains, rivers, rain and animals, as well as wells 
and even toilets (p. 39). Evoking this respectful kizuna that humans had 
with nature, Kawakami asks what the God of Uranium would think of 
our exploitation of this natural resource (p. 43). Kawakami is suggesting 
here that we have made a kind of vindictive god (tatarigami) out of the 
God of Uranium and that Japanese people have forgotten their general 
sense of reverence for those elements of nature that make their current 
lifestyles possible. She also warns her readers of the dangers of playing 
God. The nuclear reactions that happened over billions of years have 
reduced radioactivity to a level that finally ensures that human beings 
can inhabit the planet. Kawakami points out the irony that humans are 
risking turning Earth into an uninhabitable planet again by playing with 
nuclear power.
Conventional Japanese literature focuses on the portrayal of the self, or 
watashi (as typified by the ‘I novel’ genre, known as watakushi shōsetsu 
or  shishōsetsu). Although the boundaries of the genre are subject to 
debate, ‘I novels’ are generally written from the point of view of the 
author, whether in the form of a first-person or third-person narrator 
and have strong autobiographical tendencies.10 Kawakami’s works 
10  For an in-depth exploration of the genre, see Fowler (1992).
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portray a different worldview, in which watashi is but a tiny existence in 
a world that will continue to revolve without these individuals. Watashi 
is not completely insignificant—Kawakami believes that each person’s 
perspective still matters (Kawakami & Numano, 2012). In Kawakami’s 
worldview, although humans have a contribution to make, they must 
realise that they are not as significant as they think. Such a view leads 
to better kizuna with nature. Kamisama 2011 warns humans who act as 
though they are rulers of the vast playground of planet Earth that they are 
children, who still have much to fear from nature. Unlike the traditional 
Japanese association of earthquakes with an angry catfish, which aims 
to convey a similar message using scare tactics, Kawakami’s story evokes 
feelings of shame, with particular pertinence in contemporary Japan.
Like Wagō, Kawakami also evokes the kizuna that exists (or that needs 
to be strengthened) between Japanese people and future generations. 
Novelist Takahashi Gen’ichirō (2011a) includes a chapter in his post-3.11 
novel Koisuru genpatsu [A nuclear reactor in love], called Shinsai bungaku 
ron [An essay on earthquake literature], in which he reviews some of 
the literary texts he believes to be relevant to 3.11. Although it is by no 
means clear whether this chapter reflects Takahashi’s opinion, since it is 
part of a novel and not an essay, his analysis of Kawakami’s text is worth 
mentioning. The Kawakami work discussed by Takahashi is an imaginary 
text, built on both versions (Kamisama and Kamisama 2011). Takahashi’s 
version is Kamisama (2011), which is a new and merged text that adds 
parentheses to Kawakami’s Kamisama and Kamisama 2011 to indicate 
parts that have been added or deleted. Takahashi focuses his analysis on 
the aforementioned confrontation scenes, in which the child punches 
and kicks the bear in the original version and the two men, who were 
accompanying the child in the original version, simply pull the bear’s fur 
and talk about him as if he is not there, in the post-3.11 version. Takahashi 
claims that superimposing the two texts in this manner creates an effect 
of the children talking behind the men as if they are ghosts (p.  210). 
Although the ghost-like presence of children could be interpreted as the 
spirits of the young victims of the earthquake and tsunami, Takahashi 
prefers to consider them as being the future victims of radiation 
poisoning—children who will be killed by radiation or who will never be 
brought into this world due to fears about the effects of radiation (p. 211). 
For Takahashi, Kamisama (2011) is Kawakami’s display of commitment 
towards future generations as a member of current society, in line with 
Kawakami’s humble and respectful attitude towards the world.
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Kawakami’s vision of community also involves kizuna and offers 
reconciliation with those who were directly involved in the nuclear 
meltdowns. Kawakami prefers to refer to nuclear incidents as ‘that thing’ 
(ano koto) to avoid placing the full blame on those who operated the 
power plant (e.g. by calling them genpatsu jiko or nuclear accidents). 
She shows that the incident was not created solely at the nuclear power 
plants in Fukushima, but rather there was a large network of people 
who contributed to it, including politicians, workers and consumers. 
This displays Kawakami’s willingness to accept some of the blame as 
a  member of society who used electricity derived from nuclear power 
without questioning its safety. In this vision, all Japanese citizens who 
used electricity were in some way involved in the disaster and bear some 
responsibility for future consequences. Kawakami does not use quotation 
marks for watashi’s dialogue, as though she is intending to merge the 
reader’s consciousness with watashi’s. The whole story reads as though it 
is a daydream. Kawakami guides her readers to accept what has already 
happened and move forward, living in harmony with nature, so that their 
homeland can be passed onto future generations without further damage.
Wagō and Kawakami challenge and then expand on the narrative of 
kizuna, which has been repeated in mainstream media following 3.11. 
Rather than denying or questioning the existence of this kizuna in 
Japanese society, Wagō and Kawakami present visions of kizuna that they 
believe to be more relevant to the physical and emotional reconstruction 
of the disaster-hit areas, at times referring back to traditional Japanese 
worldviews. Most notably, both authors emphasise the importance of 
kizuna with nature as well as with future generations as part of their new 
vision for Japan, even though these elements were not included in the 
popular notion of kizuna that was used by the mainstream media and 
the general public.
Traditional Living in Ano hi kara no manga 
by Shiriagari Kotobuki
Manga artist Shiriagari Kotobuki’s post-3.11 work is similar to those 
of Kawakami and Wagō in that he also places emphasis on a more 
sustainable future for Japan. In terms of style, Shiriagari’s manga was an 
approachable, yet no less serious, form of social engagement, which was 
appreciated by many in the months following the disaster. Shiriagari’s 
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work Umibe no mura [Seaside village] in the May 2011 issue of Comic 
Beam broke the post-3.11 jishuku—self-restraint or self-censorship, to 
borrow Jacqueline Berndt’s term (2013, p. 72)—silence in the manga 
industry (responding to the fukinshin criticism outlined in the section 
‘The End of “Cool Japan”?’ in Chapter 1), which saw publishers refrain 
from carrying works related to disasters or nuclear power as a sign of 
respect towards the disaster victims and their families. Most notably, the 
chapter Genshiryokyu mafia [Nuclear-power mafia] in Hakuryū-LEGEND 
[White dragon-LEGEND] by Tennōji Dai and Watanabe Michio, the first 
instalment of which was published in February 2011, was discontinued 
because it coincidentally portrayed the death of a subcontract worker in 
a nuclear power plant (Berndt, 2013, p. 75). Despite these circumstances, 
partly fuelled by a  necessity to keep writing for his serialised yonkoma 
(four-frame) manga on the national daily, Asahi Shimbun (under the title 
Chikyū Bōeike no hitobito [The Earth Defenders]), Shiriagari continued to 
publish at his usual pace following 3.11. For example, the yonkoma was 
published as usual on Saturday 12 March 2011; on Monday 14 March, 
Shiriagari made his first reference to 3.11. Many other manga artists 
followed suit in their portrayal of the earthquake following Shiriagari’s 
courageous publications.11
Ano hi kara no manga [Manga since that day] is a publication containing a 
collection of works by Shiriagari, all written in the few months following 
3.11. The publication belongs to the Beam Comix series published by 
Enterbrain, with many works first published in the monthly manga 
magazine Comic Beam, from the same publisher. The selection of texts is 
varied because the publication traces Shiriagari’s writings in chronological 
order, starting from the yonkoma from Chikyū Bōeike no hitobito on the 
back of the front cover, which was published on 14 March 2011, to the 
wordless comic Sora to mizu [Sky and water], published in the August 
2011 issue of Comic Beam. Some of the works, such as Chikyū Bōeike are 
drawn in Shiriagari’s characteristic humorous ‘gag’ manga style,12 drawn 
in a deliberately childish and rough way, whereas others, such as Sora to 
11  See Berndt (2013, p. 72) for an overview of non-fiction manga works published after 3.11, 
including documentary-style manga, essay manga and educational manga.
12  The gyagu or ‘gag’ manga form usually involves humorous manga made up of one or four frames, 
which appear ‘in Japanese newspapers as well as manga magazines and anthologies’ (Bryce & Davis, 
2010, pp. 40–41), typically drawn using a simplistic style. Further, ‘humor in manga encompasses an 
astonishing range of styles or expressions such as satire, gaglike punch lines, surrealistic absurdities, 
parody, comedy, caricature and outright nonsense’ (p. 40) and ‘gag’ manga is just one of them. Mary 
Knighton (2014) explored Shiriagari’s ‘gag’ manga works from Ano hi kara no manga in detail.
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mizu and Umibe no mura [The village by the sea] (May 2011) are more 
experimental. The publication was met with considerable critical and 
popular success, reprinted over six times within a year of being published 
and awarded one of the 15th Media Arts Excellency Awards from Japan’s 
Agency for Cultural Affairs in February 2012. Shiriagari also received one 
of the 2014 Medals of Honour with Purple Ribbon from the Emperor for 
his recent work.
Because these texts are in chronological order, the publication provides 
a rare insight into the development of public sentiment surrounding the 
earthquake. In Shiriagari’s (2011b) own words, ‘scientists can produce 
numbers and politicians can produce policies, so I thought about what 
manga artists could do and decided that I could portray kūki (air or 
atmosphere, here mood)’. Shiriagari explains that although he does not 
know for sure what the scientific data surrounding 3.11 represents, he 
thought he would be able to add feelings and kūki to these representations 
by using his imagination and felt that this was part of his role as an artist. 
The text is similar to the aforementioned works by Wagō and Kawakami 
in that it attempts to represent what was not portrayed by facts or the 
mainstream media in response to the disaster. For Berndt (2013), Ano hi 
kara no manga invited readers ‘to contemplate and communicate on what 
kind of life to lead and what fundamental changes to accept’, rather than 
telling them what to do or think (p. 74). Since before 3.11, Shiriagari’s 
style (especially in his yonkoma) has been to ‘drop the ball in the middle 
of the debate’ (2004, p. 16), exposing flaws in both sides rather than 
adopting a particular view. This is perhaps why his manga became so 
popular following the disaster. Shiriagari does not spell out the tragedy or 
devastation of the disaster, preferring instead to use his words and images 
for portrayals of hope and humorous stabs at society. Shiriagari observes 
that mainstream popular Japanese manga depict universal feelings in 
stories that develop at high speeds, which grip readers around the world 
by giving them an adrenaline rush (J. A. C. Project, 2006, p. 72), which 
is a similar form of entertainment to an attraction at an amusement park 
(Shiriagari, 2011c, p. 23). Shiriagari’s own work is quite different to this 
mainstream form of manga, which is commonly appreciated in the West 
and provokes thought by being more ambiguous.
Shiriagari’s stance with regard to post-3.11 expression has been to maintain 
his socially engaged gag style in the face of the disaster and continue 
writing, rather than letting this unprecedented situation influence his 
form. As  Knighton (2014) contended, despite the name of Shiriagari’s 
RE-ImAgININg JApAN AFTER FukuSHImA
48
publication, ‘Manga since that day’, what really changed ‘since that day’ 
was not so much his style but rather ‘the serious attention his manga 
garnered when he dared to take the crisis as subject matter for humor and 
commentary so soon after 3.11’. Shiriagari is no stranger to the portrayal of 
disaster and death since before 3.11: his Jakaranda [Jacaranda], published 
in June 2005 by Seirin Kōgeisha, is a 300-page story of a colossal tree 
that starts growing in the middle of Tokyo, crushing buildings and 
killing people in its way. He also humorously explored the topic of death 
extensively in works such as Hinshi no essayist [The dying essayist] and O-i 
memento mori [Hey, memento mori], as well as in his best-known work, 
Mayonaka no Yaji-san Kita-san [Yaji and Kita: The Midnight Pilgrims], 
which has also been turned into a film. Further, his 1986 manga Gerogero 
pūsuka (a new edition of this was published post-3.11) responded to the 
Chernobyl disaster by portraying a world in which only the elderly and 
children up to 14 years of age could survive.
In Ano hi kara no manga, Shiriagari suggests that there may be a solution 
to the problems that Japan is facing in the Japanese fondness for nature 
and modest ways of life. Umibe no mura is one of the works portraying 
Shiriagari’s vision for Japan’s future—50 years after 3.11, humans have 
abandoned nuclear energy and fossil fuels, relying on solar panels for 
electricity. There is no longer any air-conditioning in homes or street lights 
in the cities and being able to watch television is a rare event, dependent 
on the functioning of the solar panels. Although the grandfather of the 
family finds it difficult to adapt to this new way of life, both men and 
women of the next generation are more accepting of the change and their 
children are brought up to believe that this way of life is normal. Although 
they have heard of nuclear power plants, these children can only imagine 
what life would have been like for their parents when they were younger 
because this modest way of life is the only one they know. The youngest 
child of the family, who is the first in the family to have developed wings 
(this phenomenon is suggested to be part of the evolutionary process), is 
symbolically named ‘Mirai’, or ‘Hope’. The story does indeed end with 
hope—the construction of a renewable energy power plant in the village is 
announced, which is likely to improve the quality of life in the community. 
The last page, composed of a single panel portraying a starry sky, follows 
the granddaughter’s words of encouragement to her grandfather that these 
changes may bring back the material wealth that he longed for, to which 
he replies, his face covered in tears, ‘But back in our days, we didn’t have 
such beautiful starry skies’ (pp. 33–34).
49
2 . SuSTAINAblE JApAN
Shiriagari (2011b) explains this work as being made possible by the 
power of cultural expression, which allows for the lack of material wealth 
to be considered as something beautiful. He describes this tendency to 
find beauty in modest ways of living by giving as examples the Japanese 
concepts of hakanai (fleeting), mujō (derived from the Buddhist concept 
of impermanence and the aesthetic of transience) and aware (or mono no 
aware, meaning empathy and sadness, which comes from an awareness of 
impermanence). The parents’ generation in Umibe no mura have obtained 
happiness by gaining awareness of this transient nature of material wealth 
and striving instead for spiritual wealth: ‘Many things were lost … and 
we decided to try a different path … We decided to choose everlasting 
happiness instead of living conveniently, under the constant fear of losing 
our material wealth’ (p. 26). Although the family’s wooden house appears 
run-down, with laundry hanging outside and filled with retro objects, 
such as the low chabudai dining table with zabuton floor cushions, there 
is a sense of strong community ties (kizuna in post-3.11 language) and 
a  carefree way of life reminiscent of the Shōwa 30s (the mid-1950s). 
These core years of the Shōwa period, which are often subjects of nostalgic 
depictions in Japanese popular culture, typically represent stress-free 
happiness and hope for the future in the Japanese consciousness.13 The 
two-page image of evolved, winged children flying over the remains of 
the nuclear power plant, covered in windmills, which was also published 
in the Magnitude ZERO collection of illustrations, symbolises the 
spiritual freedom obtained by future generations as a result of the earlier 
generations giving up their material wealth (pp. 28–29).14
However, Shiriagari (2011d) claims that Umibe no mura does not 
represent his ideal future, but rather just one version of multiple possible 
futures that he arrived at through a process of elimination. Shiriagari 
started on the work around 20 March and this rather bleak portrayal of 
Japan’s future was Shiriagari’s attempt to portray hope at a time when 
he was observing uncertainty everywhere. Shiriagari is not suggesting 
that humankind should abandon modern technology. Instead, he offers 
a comforting portrayal of the resilience of the Japanese people and their 
fondness for a more primitive way of life, which would allow them to 
survive and get by in the worst-case scenario. In this way, Shiriagari fully 
13  For an exploration of the ‘Showa Retro Boom’ phenomenon in Japan, see Thompson (2011).
14  Since Shiriagari’s publication, this idea of ‘living with less’ has taken off, both in Japan and the 
rest of the world, with the minimalist movement as well as the huge success of Marie Kondo’s books 
on decluttering.
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harnesses the power of literary imagination. The ability to portray imagined 
alternative futures, regardless of whether they are likely to happen, is part 
of what distinguishes literature from other more factual media.
Shiriagari (2011c, p. 20) observed that people stopped being affected by 
trivial matters following the disaster and ‘raised their faces up’, looking 
towards the future of the world surrounding them. Despite the tragedy of 
the earthquake, he observed a positive trend in ‘people getting interested 
in matters which they previously considered to be unrelated to them, such 
as the situation in the Tōhoku region or even visions of how the world will 
look like in the far future’ (Shiriagari, 2011c, p. 20). Imaginative manga 
works depicting this post-3.11 kūki in Japan, such as those by Shiriagari, are 
valuable resources for gaining insight into the future visions of the Japanese. 
In the words of Berndt (2013), ‘being a site of imaginary worlds rather than 
direct depictions of social reality, manga may be expected to make important 
contributions’ (p. 78) in picturing an alternative future post-3.11.
Wagō, Kawakami and Shiriagari all portray the issue of moral debasement 
in contemporary Japanese society due to technological advances and 
convey a sense that the disaster occurred as a wake-up call to alert the 
Japanese to their ethical degradation. This took the form of portrayals of 
the erosion of traditional values and community ties, as symbolised by the 
out-of-placeness of Kawakami’s bear, the degradation of the relationship 
between Japanese people and nature as depicted in Wagō’s work and the old 
man who hangs on to his capitalist values and greed in Shiriagari’s Umibe 
no mura. Current Japanese society is contrasted with traditional Japanese 
society, which is portrayed as being ideal and altruistic, characterised by 
a respectful, Shintoistic and harmonious relationship between nature 
and humans. Traditional Japanese values, which are romanticised and 
idealised, are used as a way of reclaiming Japanese identity in the face of 
the perceived breakdown of Japan’s status as a technological superpower. 
In this way, this group of 3.11 literature shares many of the concerns 
that have been explored in other environmental texts. In post-Chernobyl 
literature, which is a prime example of environmental literature, the 
warning against environmental degradation was a means of recovering 
Ukrainian cultural identity and traditional values under industrialising 
Soviet rule (Sukhenko, 2014, p. 128). Ukraine is an interesting case 
study because it has ‘its own unique cultural traditions and perspectives 
regarding the natural world, rooted in pre-Christian beliefs and rituals’ 
(Sukhenko, 2014, p. 114), which are similar to Shintō. A comparison 
between these post-3.11 texts and post-Chernobyl literature is likely to be 




One of the main criticisms of Japanese authorities and the media 
following the triple disaster was that there was a lack of freedom of press, 
information and expression—to raise concerns for radiation levels, or to 
make any comments that are perceived to dampen the spirit of kizuna 
and reconstruction. In Chapter 1, I discussed how certain commentators 
argued that kizuna led to excessive groupism and suppressed dissent, which 
drew attention away from the negative consequences of the disaster. I also 
discussed how negative opinions and depictions of the disaster were often 
labelled as causing fūhyō higai (reputational damage) for the residents and 
farmers of Fukushima, as observed in the case of the ‘nose bleed’ in the 
manga Oishinbo.
Several critical developments that followed the triple disaster were 
instrumental in drawing further attention to the issue of freedom of 
speech in Japan. First of all, the 2013 Act on the Protection of Specially 
Designated Secrets, also known as the ‘State secrets bill’, was designed 
to protect information relating to national defence. This event caused 
much debate due to the perceived ambiguity as to what constitutes 
a secret or punishable offence under this law. Protesters against the Act 
gathered in November and December 2013, twice filling to the brim 
the 3,000-seat-capacity Hibiya Outdoor Theatre in Tokyo. This concern 
was also reflected in the 2016 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters 
Without Borders, which ranked Japan 72nd out of 180 countries (ranked 
11 lower compared to 2015 and 61 lower compared to 2010), below 
Asian neighbours, such as Hong Kong and South Korea, who were ranked 
69th and 70th, respectively.
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Shortly after the World Press Freedom Index results were released, the issue 
of freedom of speech received much media attention again when David 
Kaye, a UN special rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, visited Japan in April 2016. Kaye reported in his preliminary 
observation that while there was a high level of freedom of expression and 
speech, there were issues in terms of the freedom and independence of 
press, in both print and broadcast media. Specifically, he drew attention 
to the issue of self-imposed censorship:
Numerous journalists, many agreeing to meet with me only on 
condition of anonymity to protect their livelihoods, highlighted 
the pressure to avoid sensitive areas of public interest. Many 
claimed to have been sidelined or silenced following indirect 
pressure from leading politicians.1
There is a growing sentiment in Japan that while there is no official 
government censorship, freedom of information and press was 
compromised in post-disaster media reporting. This sentiment is conveyed 
in a growing number of dystopian texts by authors such as Tawada Yōko, 
Henmi Yō and Yoshimura Man’ichi, which are set in a future Japan, 
in which these freedoms have been further compromised. Conversely, 
Takahashi Gen’ichirō chose to tackle these issues more directly by 
composing his novel out of the very language that is shunned in Japanese 
society. In this chapter, I analyse how these texts portray and imagine 
different discursive environments in Japan’s future.
Dystopian Responses by Tawada Yōko, 
Henmi Yō and Yoshimura Man’ichi
Many Japanese-language responses to 3.11 situate Japanese society in 
a post-nuclear disaster apocalyptic dystopian future, in which high levels 
of radiation have become the norm and a totalitarian government is in 
place. A selection of these works will be outlined briefly here because 
they yield more or less similar results in terms of images for Japan’s 
potential future—although there are differing degrees of negativity 
and hope across the works, they point to right-wing tendencies and 
ineptitudes of the (future) Japanese Government and their tendency to 
1  Full text available at: www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19842.
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hide information.2 Transnational author Tawada Yōko (2012), who writes 
in both Japanese and German, perceptively led this group of responses 
by publishing Fushi no shima [The island of eternal life] in the collection 
Soredemo sangatsu wa mata [March was made of yarn].3 According to the 
limited information the Japanese protagonist and narrator of the story 
could obtain in Germany, Tawada’s dystopian Japan is closed to the rest 
of the world in a new form of sakoku4 and run by a private corporation 
by the name of ‘Z Group’, whose identity is hidden behind black masks. 
In this story, radiation from Fukushima has had the strange effect of 
making centenarians immortal, while children are weak and dying from 
radiation disease. Despite this tragedy, Japanese citizens manage to 
find entertainment in the form of go and shōgi board games and ‘with 
no television, there is nothing to do during the long evenings but read, 
yet as the lights go out at sundown, storytellers have appeared to recite 
the stories of old comic books or animated films to the accompaniment 
of guitars or lutes’, in a ‘weird return to life in the Edo Period’ (p. 11). 
This idea of Japan, the former technological and economic giant, taking 
a step back and coming to terms with living within its means is similar 
to Mikuriya Takashi’s proposal of the slow life philosophy explored in the 
previous chapter.
Tawada developed this dystopian theme fully in her novella Kentōshi 
[The  Emissary (US); The Last Children of Tokyo (UK)], published in 
a collection of the same name in 2014 (which also contains The Island 
of Eternal Life).5 Instead of a Japanese citizen living in Germany, 
The Emissary is written from the perspective of Yoshirō, who is a strong 
and immortal 107-year-old man who devotes his energies to looking after 
his weak seven-year-old great-grandson Mumei. Mumei (whose name 
literally means ‘no name’ because his parents were not there to name him 
following his birth) is so weak that he struggles to walk more than a few 
metres, to get dressed without assistance and even to eat solid food. 
Yoshirō and Mumei live in temporary housing on the Western fringes 
2  There are many other dystopian works I have not covered here, such as Baraka by Kirino Natsuo 
(2016), Hangenki wo iwatte [Celebrating the half-life (of caesium)] by Tsushima Yūko (2016) and 
Beddosaido mādā kēsu [Bedside murder case] by Satō Yūya (2013).
3  The title evokes ‘Fukushima’ as well as ‘Fuku no shima’, which is an appellation used for 
advertising campaigns in the region, such as ‘Fuku ga mankai, fuku no shima’ [Happiness in full 
bloom, the island of happiness] (fukucam.jp/).
4  The term sakoku refers to the policy of national isolation in Tokugawa Japan, in which foreigners 
were not allowed to enter the country and Japanese were not allowed to leave.
5  The English translation of Kentōshi by Margaret Mitsutani (2018), The Emissary, was the winner 
of the inaugural National Book Awards for Translated Literature.
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of Tokyo because the city centre has become uninhabitable. Areas such 
as Okinawa and northern Japan are said to be prospering by producing 
valuable crops such as fruit and rice. While the exact cause of this is never 
mentioned explicitly, it is hinted that the setting is a future Japan, where 
a much worse version of Fukushima has occurred (other than Yoshirō’s 
immortality, there are also references to contaminated produce and 
mutated giant dandelions), as described in The Island of Eternal Life.
However, Tawada’s dystopian imagination of Japan’s future is not 
characterised by an Orwellian display of surveillance and political 
oppression. Instead, what gives her novella an eerie, dystopian feel is an 
extreme lack of clarity surrounding the exact nature of the system: how 
it came about, who is ruling the country and what would happen if you 
break the unspoken law. In Tawada’s dystopia, citizens refrain from doing 
anything that might upset the privatised government because they live 
in fear, even though they do not know what it is exactly that they fear. 
For example, foreign languages and cultures are not completely banned, 
but because there is an invisible consensus that it is not desirable, citizens 
refrain from doing anything that could be interpreted as being foreign. 
In a manner reminiscent of wartime in 1940s Japan, native words are 
preferred to foreign imported terms: tsunagi instead of ōbāōru (overalls) 
and kawaya instead of toire (toilet). Because they are no longer used, 
foreign terms are associated with the older generation and children are 
made fun for using the English ‘mama’ instead of okāsan. The baker that 
Yoshirō frequents was an abstract painter in a previous life, but decided 
to take up baking instead for his personal safety because his paintings 
would often be interpreted to be depicting foreign scenery. Yoshiro buries 
a half-finished draft of a novel that he wrote (also titled Kentōshi) at the 
‘cemetery of things’ rubbish dump because he feels that he included too 
many foreign place names in it. This future Japan is eerily frightening 
because it is a self-perpetuating dystopia, which is powered by invisible 
consensus, rather than set laws. Although a legal system exists, the laws 
keep changing all the time. Tawada (2014b) explained this in an interview 
with literary scholar Robert Campbell:
If a dictatorship is born in Japan (and I fear that this may happen), 
I don’t think it would be in a simple form where there is a clear 
government and those who criticize the regime get sent to prison. 
We’ve seen dictatorships like that everywhere and they still exist. 
Instead, I imagine it to be a scary time where a shapeless, sticky 
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and dark fear would spread and no one does what they should be 
doing, as human beings, because they restrain themselves saying: 
‘I’m not going to do that because I’m scared’.
Tawada provides a future vision for what would happen if the current 
self-restraint (jishuku) of expression is taken to an extreme.
Another factor that makes this dystopia eerily recognisable to post-3.11 
Japanese readers is that citizens have accepted and adapted to this way of 
life, which is presented as being tolerable. Satire is allowed on newspapers, 
which also publish letters from Japanese citizens living abroad. One letter 
claims that ‘it is more profitable and also safer to continue being pirates 
with my foreign comrades than to return to Japan’ (p. 110), making 
Yoshirō laugh out loud. This small freedom gives a false sense of illusion 
that ‘life is not so bad’, despite travel being restricted domestically and 
banned internationally and information being heavily controlled (helped 
by the fact that the internet is no longer used). However, there are also 
some arguably positive aspects to the system, including that wealth 
has become unimportant and that the country is no longer excessively 
centralised around Tokyo. Tawada’s dystopian Japan is not without hope, 
which is presented towards the end as Mumei is selected as a messenger 
to travel to India, in the hopes that the data on his health will help others 
to find a cure for his condition. Kentōshi is more forward- and outward-
looking than Fushi no shima in that the solution is presented in the form 
of increased intercultural communication and cooperation.
Conversely, Aoi hana [The blue flower] by Henmi Yō (2013) and Borādo 
byō [The bollard disease] by Yoshimura Man’ichi (2014a) present a bleaker 
view of Japan’s future as a totalitarian dystopia, in which government 
control is maintained through the means of terror, propaganda or 
drugs that prevent people from thinking. Aoi hana is the monologue of 
a man, an internal refugee who is fleeing earthquakes and foreign bombs 
(Henmi, 2013, p. 12) following the death of all his family members. 
The man walks along the ruins filled with radioactive corpses in search 
of poranon, a happy-drug that brings to mind the methamphetamine 
hiropon, which was widely popular following WWII and famously used 
on kamikaze soldiers. Despite this reference to the war, the setting of the 
novel is clearly designed to defamiliarise post-Fukushima Japan. In a way 
that brings to mind the post-3.11 official attempt to unite citizens in the 
name of kizuna, television advertisements consist of pro-war messages by 
the Advertising Council Japan (p. 36) and a song that ‘makes everyone 
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feel the sense of fulfilment that comes with caring for and helping others 
and the happiness that comes with not resisting’ and those who dislike 
the song are ‘suspected of antisocial personality disorders and a tendency 
towards unpatriotism and watched carefully by their organizations and 
society’ (p. 119).
Death and totalitarian control are also prevalent in Borādo byō, which tells 
the story of a town called Umizuka, from the perspective of a young girl 
called Kyōko. In Umizuka, residents are brainwashed to stay united in 
their allegiance to their ‘clean and safe town’ by singing the ‘Umizuka song’ 
and participating in community activities. In reality, radiation sickness is 
everywhere and the disfigured children continue dying,6 but the town’s 
residents must keep their myth alive through the fervent propaganda of 
musubiai (coming together), which is reminiscent of kizuna. Those who are 
suspected of having the slightest amount of doubt in Umizuka’s greatness 
or musubiai, such as Kyōko and her family, are reported and taken away 
by mysterious ‘men in suits’. Yoshimura’s dystopia is characterised by an 
eerie facelessness, in which the exact nature of the town’s government is 
unclear, but residents must watch their every move and utterance to ensure 
that they do not do anything that makes them stick out from the majority. 
For example, Kyōko’s mother throws away the meat and vegetables she 
buys (she needs to buy them to keep up appearances in public) and feeds 
her daughter imported canned foods  and  instant noodles, which she 
believes are safer. However, when they are at a community lunch with 
other townspeople, where they are served local produce, Kyōko’s mother 
tells her that she must eat everything. Umizuka’s eeriness is amplified by 
the fact that the story is narrated by Kyōko, who as a child does not 
fully understand her situation. Kyōko is constantly scolded by her mother 
for what seem like insignificant acts for both her and the reader, such as 
staring too much at a flower or a baby’s mouth. It becomes clear by the 
end of the novel that the flower and the baby’s mouth were both disfigured 
by radiation and that staring at these was not acceptable because it meant 
that she noticed that they looked different. The implication is that the 
successfully brainwashed townspeople do not even see the world because 
they become blind to the reality around them.
6  Although Yoshimura (2014a) only refers to the sickness as ‘poison’, there are various clues in the 
novel that point to radiation being the cause, such as Kyōko’s pet rabbit having no front legs (p. 162). 
Yoshimura (2014b) claims that a non-3.11 reading is possible and that the cause could be a poisonous 
gas or a virus.
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The dystopian works that I have outlined above each have in common 
an eeriness that comes from a lack of clarity surrounding the government 
and the diseases affecting citizens, which is a metaphor for the insidious 
and invisible nature of radiation. These works are convincing in their 
dystopian portrayals of the country because they build on the fear of the 
invisible that many Japanese felt post-3.11, as well as real-life restrictions 
on freedom of speech during the war. In both Aoi hana and Borādo byō, 
mindlessly conforming to mainstream ideology by taking drugs or singing 
propaganda songs is the only way of being normal and surviving in this 
future Japanese society. This provides a powerful critique of the culture 
of shikō teishi (the suspension of thought) and avoiding unpleasant 
discussion, which is believed to have become apparent in post-3.11 
Japan.7 This critique is carried out even more directly and controversially 
in Takahashi Gen’ichirō’s Koisuru genpatsu, which I explore below.
Conformity versus Pornography: 
Takahashi Gen’ichirō’s Koisuru genpatsu
If the dystopian responses to 3.11 portray a future Japan in which 
minority opinions and critical thinking are quickly suppressed by social 
consensus, Takahashi Gen’ichirō’s (2011a) post-3.11 novel, Koisuru 
genpatsu [A nuclear reactor in love], demonstrates how this may be 
overcome to allow for greater freedom of expression. Similar to the 
dystopian responses, Takahashi portrays the atmosphere of conformity 
and social pressure, which he believed was pervasive in post-3.11 critical 
discourse. He demonstrates that this is created by a mix of Japanese blind 
trust for authority, legitimate-sounding rhetoric used by the authorities 
and the existence of many taboo topics that are never properly discussed. 
However, Takahashi’s novel is also a kind of social experiment, which 
confronts readers by bombarding them with language that would be 
considered to be inappropriate by many in Japan, especially following 
7  Shikō teishi has been a keyword in Japanese critical discourse since around 2010, appearing in 
book titles such as Shikō teishi shakai: ‘junshu’ ni mushibamareru Nihonjin [The ‘thought suspension 
society’: a people being ruined by obedience] by Gōhara Nobuo (2009) and Taima Hisuterî: shikō 
teishi ni naru Nihonjin [The cannabis hysteria: the Japanese who cannot think] by Takeda Kunihiko 
(2009). There was also some interest raised following the results of the World Values Survey 2010–
2014, which demonstrated that 73.8 per cent of Japanese answered that they believe newspaper and 
magazine reporting to be reliable and 69.7 per cent answered that television reporting was reliable, 
compared to 22.8 per cent and 23.2 per cent respectively in the US (Maita, 2015).
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such a devastating disaster. Instead of simply showing the process by 
which consensus is formed, Takahashi demonstrates by example that 
such consensus can be broken by a strong presence of inappropriate and 
incorrect language. If read in this way, Takahashi’s novel has the effect 
of blurring the line between correct and incorrect, which seems to have 
become more rigid post-3.11 and shows hope for greater freedom of 
expression in future Japan.
Since before the disaster, Japan has often been described both domestically 
and overseas as a society with groupthink tendencies, in which individual 
opinions are not valued. Decisions are said to be made on the basis of kūki 
(air) and those who do not follow the consensus are described as kūki ga 
yomenai (unable to read the air; ‘KY ’ for short), which is synonymous with 
lacking social skills in Japanese society.8 It is a cliché of Nihonjinron that, 
to survive in the closed mura shakai (village society), the Japanese must 
adhere to the majority group at all costs, as ‘the nail that sticks out gets 
hammered’ (deru kui wa utareru) and might even be subjected to mura 
hachibu (ostracism/excommunication from the group) (Christopher, 
1984, p. 53; Reischauer, 1977, pp. 135, 141). As outlined in Chapter 1, 
the disaster was perceived to have reinforced this cultural threat to freedom 
of expression. Due to the polarisation in opinions on questions such as 
nuclear power, Fukushima essentially created two ‘villages’ that the Japanese 
must choose between. Intellectuals such as Odajima Takashi (2012) 
argued that a very small selection of opinions received public attention in 
Japan and that when there were two opposing forces, they refused to listen 
to each other, which created tension rather than discussion. Takahashi 
(2012a, p. 129) also viewed post-3.11 Japanese society as an environment 
that was dangerously polarised, especially between pro-nuclear and anti-
nuclear camps and has actively commented on this on his Twitter account 
@takagengen, as well as other media.9 According to Takahashi (2012a, 
p. 130), members of Japanese society have been forced to make a choice 
between these two stances, to determine which one is tadashii (correct), 
8  For example, Kōkami Shōji (2009) explored this in detail in his Nihonjinron work Kūki to seken 
[The ‘air’ and society].
9  A selection of his comments on Twitter have been published in a book, ‘Ano hi’ kara boku ga 
kangaeteiru ‘tadashisa’ ni tsuite [What I’ve been thinking about ‘correctness’ since ‘that day’] (2012), 
from which these quotes are taken. Takahashi (2012) has also published the short story collection 
Sayonara, Kurisutofâ Robin [Goodbye, Christopher Robin] and the essay collections Hijōji no kotoba: 
shinsai no ato de [Words in crisis: after the earthquake] (2012) and Bokura no minshushugi nandaze 
[This is our democracy] (2015) and has appeared at various public talks.
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to be a rightful citizen—an intellectual atmosphere that stymies healthy 
debate and creativity. Koisuru genpatsu is a more literary and imaginative 
expression of these concerns, explored through the lens of language.
Keeping with his metafictional stance, Takahashi has always played 
with the idea of a central and stable plot or storyline in a novel, which 
is true to  some extent for Koisuru genpatsu. Takahashi’s works typically 
attempt to provoke thought, rather than to tell a coherent story. Although 
ostensibly about a group of men who attempt to create a charity adult 
video for the victims of 3.11,10 the story mostly happens in a complex web 
of tangents and no actual filming occurs in the novel. As the protagonist, 
Ishikawa asks, ‘How much progress have we made in the story? Are we 
nearing the end, or have we entered a dead-end? I have no idea. Has it 
even started? I often get this feeling, actually’ (p. 230).11 Some of the 
most important scenes in the novel occur in these tangents, such as the 
story of the war veteran president of the adult video production company 
where the protagonist works as a cameraman. The president was on the 
battleship Yamato when it sunk on 7 April 1945. Floating on the water, 
the president has a comic and poignant conversation with his friend 
Katahira, who is a 20-year-old virgin, about what they imagine vaginas to 
look like. Katahira dies shortly after and the president decides that if he 
makes it home alive, he will dedicate his life to thinking about sex—the 
only thing that matters. Another tangent occurs when the 55-year-old 
pornography actress, Yoshiko, gives a lesson to Saori, who is in her fourth 
year of primary school, on how to protect herself from the sexual advances 
of men. Yoshiko, who was raped by her primary school teacher, has some 
unconventional views on education—she believes that schooling should 
consist entirely of practical lessons on sex and death, which take priority 
over book-learning. Each of these tangents have a story of their own to 
tell, whether they are individual histories or snippets of social criticism 
and the charity adult video that Ishikawa is making is what binds these 
stories together, rather than being the story that Takahashi wants to tell.
Takahashi makes his reader question whether Koisuru genpatsu is even 
a novel, just like it is unclear whether the adult videos in the novel are 
indeed adult videos, with their lengthy historical scenes and singing. 
10  The tagline for the book is: ‘大震災チャリティーAVを作ろうと奮闘する男たちの愛と冒険と
魂の物語’ [A group of men give their all in making a charity adult video for the Great Earthquake 
… A story of love, soul and adventure].
11  All translations of Takahashi’s writing are my own.
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As  part of his attempt to avoid any kind of expression that can be 
considered to be normal, conventional or mainstream, Takahashi also 
challenges his readers to go beyond genre conventions. For example, the 
obi strip around the cover of the book asks, ‘Do you accept this novel?’ 
and Takahashi repeatedly attempts to break the fourth wall by conversing 
with his readers throughout the novel, addressing them as anta, which 
is an affectionate second person address (p. 29). He also employs his 
signature self-reflexive style in the narrative, making Ishikawa correct and 
ridicule himself—playing the role of both boke and tsukkomi in Japanese 
comedy:12 ‘Suddenly, on the screen, Mr Monkey (osaru-san) appears. 
Well, it’s really just a monkey (saru), but today I just feel like calling him 
“Mr Monkey”’ (p. 11). Perhaps the most striking metafictional technique 
employed is that the adult video in the novel, and consequently the novel 
itself, is partly narrated in musical style, which eliminates any remaining 
possibility of suspension of disbelief. Characters suddenly burst into 
song during the dialogue, in a manner reminiscent of Dennis Potter’s 
1986 BBC television series The Singing Detective, or the literary works 
of Thomas Pynchon. The song selection is a combination of foreign pop 
songs with some Japanese popular songs.
Takahashi’s career as an author has revolved around the issue of the lack 
of freedom in both literary and political expression in Japan. Following 
his involvement in the radical student movement of the late 1960s 
and his eventual arrest and aphasia, Takahashi became sensitive to the 
ways in which the Japanese language was used to define and suppress 
political minorities.13 In particular, the aggressive use of the terms bōryoku 
(violence) and bōryokudan (violent groups) by the mainstream media to 
characterise the student movement led Takahashi to fear the Japanese 
language itself, including how it is used as a source of violence.14 In his 
previous novels, Takahashi wrote against this kind of aggressive political 
12  In manzai stand-up comedy, there is usually a comedian who acts as boke and another who acts 
as tsukkomi. The boke’s role is to make silly and funny remarks, which the tsukkomi corrects, causing 
the audience to laugh.
13  Although through a different medium, there can be some parallels drawn between Takahashi’s 
works and the non-fiction and documentary work of Mori Tatsuya, whose Aum Shinrikyō 
documentary A is critically acclaimed outside of Japan.
14  Takahashi (Yoshimoto & Takahashi, 2005, p. 304) gives the example of the response of the 
Chancellor of Tokyo University following the death of a far-left revolutionary group member in 
the 1967 Haneda Incident: ‘minshu shugi no na no moto de bōryoku wa ikenai’ [violence is wrong 
in a democracy]. Takahashi (1998, p. 225) used the term ‘fear’ to describe his relationship with 
language. See Yamada (2011) for an in-depth exploration of other events that shaped Takahashi’s 
literary project.
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language that attempts to define and oppress, by exploring the boundaries 
of the Japanese language beyond a one-to-one correspondence between 
its signs and meaning. As Yamada (2011) claims, referring to Takahashi’s 
first two novels, Sayōnara, gyangutachi and Jon Renon tai kaseijin [John 
Lennon v. The Martians], these are ‘metafictions, or fictions that self-
consciously underscore the conventions of signification’ (p. 5). In his 
earlier works, Takahashi achieved this by ‘invit[ing] readers to experience 
and even collaborate in the unbounding of meaning in the interpretation 
process’ (Yamada, 2011, p. 18). This can be observed in the titles of his 
novels, which frustrate our desire to assign a single and stable meaning to 
them: Yūga de kanshō teki na Nippon yakyū [Japanese Baseball: Elegant and 
Sentimental] and Jon Renon tai kaseijin [John Lennon v. The Martians], 
for example, and similarly, Koisuru genpatsu [A nuclear reactor in love].15 
In this sense, Koisuru genpatsu continues many themes from his previous 
works: exploring new possibilities for unassertive language that encourages 
multiple interpretations and testing the limits of the Japanese language, 
while being aware that he is still using the language that he is criticising.
Published in November 2011, just eight months after 3.11, Koisuru 
genpatsu can be differentiated from Takahashi’s previous works in that it 
responds in real-time to the aggressive language that proliferates in post-
3.11 Japan on both left- and right-wing sides of the political spectrum. 
In addition, he addresses the issue of correctness—when a certain 
political discourse gains majority support in a group in Japan, it also 
becomes correct, which then silences all other minority views. The novel 
paradoxically highlights this politicalness and correctness of mainstream 
expression in post-3.11 Japan by exploring minority views and the realms 
of language with the least aggression, which is deliberately unassertive, 
inappropriate and, at times, nonsensical.
Takahashi’s criticism of the post-3.11 Japanese discursive environment 
focuses on the social pressure to conform to what is right and what is 
done by the majority—to donate money to charities, to refrain from 
frivolous activities and entertainment in the spirit of jishuku (voluntary 
self-restraint or mourning) and to conserve electricity (setsuden). For 
example, many graduation ceremonies around Japan were cancelled 
15  One could interpret this title as a reference to the single-mindedness of those at the opposite 
extremes of the nuclear power debate (as in the saying koi wa mōmoku [love is blind]), or simply the 
heatedness of the debate, being equated to the excitement of love. However, the title still thwarts our 
attempts to ascribe meaning to it, by making the subject of this love the nuclear reactor.
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following the earthquake because it was considered to be inappropriate 
to hold celebratory events in such circumstances. Takahashi, who lectures 
at the Meiji Gakuin University, planned on delivering a speech to those 
students who decided to turn up on campus anyway. Although Takahashi 
was unable to deliver the speech, he made it available on Twitter. In this 
speech, Takahashi (2012a, p. 33) tells his students that it is okay not 
to conform to what is ‘right’, if they do not feel that that is genuinely 
what they want to do. The opening sequence of the charity adult video 
in Koisuru genpatsu contains slogans such as ‘hang in there, Japan’, ‘Japan 
is one’ and ‘we are all Japanese’ (p. 16)—slogans that bear a strong 
resemblance to those used in 3.11 campaigns. To this, Ishikawa has the 
following reaction:
To be honest, I’m a bit sick of it all. The repetition of words like 
‘Japan’ and ‘Japanese’ is starting to sound rather pushy … No, it’s 
not right to say things like that. If everyone likes it, there is no 
reason to protest. They can do as they like. But I really wish they 
would give it a rest with the slogans (p. 16).
Here, Ishikawa seems to be speaking for all Japanese people, who are feeling 
overwhelmed by the slogans and social pressures in post-3.11 society. 
Through Ishikawa’s words, Takahashi reveals a part of post-3.11 society 
that does not appear in official discourse—those who feel uncomfortable 
with these slogans but are unable to speak out against them due to the 
pressure to conform.16
However, Takahashi is not condemning the act of charity itself; he is 
simply criticising people who donate money as a result of social pressure. 
Takahashi is suggesting that charity has become an automatic reflex for 
Japanese people, which prevents them from reflecting on what is needed 
in the disaster-hit areas. Ishikawa claims that he cannot understand 
anything except for adult videos, so he should ‘stay quiet’ and donate 
without asking questions—‘after all, as long as you pay a bit of money, no 
one will complain, right?’ (p. 196). What Ishikawa does not understand, 
at this stage of the novel, is that everyone can contribute in their own 
way and this is not necessarily by giving money: the president and the 
16  These slogans are reminiscent of other periods of crises in Japan, as Takahashi (2012a) points out: 
‘The same thing happened during the wars of the Meiji period, when the wars started in the Shōwa 
period and also when that ended and Japan turned into a democracy. Just like what is happening now, 
using pretty words, people fervently insisted on conforming to what is “right”, while denouncing all 
that is “inappropriate”, “unpatriotic” or “reactionary”’ (p. 33).
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chairperson, who are originally from Tōhoku, go home to help their 
families, whereas Ishikawa’s colleagues Yama-chan and Kameda go to 
volunteer in Iwate and start an outdoor childcare centre in Fukushima, 
respectively. Takahashi’s message is that Japanese people should think on 
their feet and help people in creative ways when they feel the need  to 
do so, not just always mindlessly donating for the correct good cause 
to which everyone else donates.
Takahashi begins his novel with a quote from an imaginary book, 
Intānetto  jō no meigen shū [A collection of quotes from the internet]: 
‘I  dedicate this book to all those who passed away … No, saying that 
would be too shallow’. He follows this with ‘a letter from a reader’, which 
reads ‘this is extremely inappropriate. I hope there will be punishment for 
those involved’. Takahashi’s response to this typically Japanese, ‘legitimate’ 
opinion is expressed through the protagonist of the novel, Ishikawa, 
who appears and speaks directly to the readers (anta) in the casual first-
person ore, instead of the more formal watashi, in a more colloquial tone 
(also represented by the more curvy, playful font):17
It goes without saying that this is a work of complete fiction. 
Even if some parts of it resemble reality, that’s just a coincidence. 
If you even entertain the idea that there may be a slight chance 
of something written in this book happening in real life, 
you’re barking mad. How can such a crazy world exist? Go see 
a psychiatrist! Right now! That’s the only piece of advice I can give 
you. See you later.
These three pages clearly display that Takahashi is aware that his writing 
may be viewed as inappropriate in the post-3.11 context and he does 
so deliberately. Ishikawa’s retort retains elements of the same violence 
inherent in the language that criticises him, such as labelling his readers 
as ‘barking mad’. However, because his language is more illegitimate, this 
violence is easier to observe for his readers than in the legitimate-sounding 
rhetoric of mainstream discourse.
Takahashi makes it clear that he is deliberately avoiding conventional 
Japanese forms of mourning disaster victims because he believes that 
those words do not carry any substance. Later, Ishikawa questions: ‘I am 
sensitive to my own pain, but maybe I am insensitive to the pain of others 
17  It is assumed that the speaker is the protagonist as the pronoun ore is used, which is the pronoun 
Ishikawa uses throughout the rest of the novel.
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… Is it possible at all to understand other people’s pain, though?’ (p. 127). 
Takahashi suggests that since it is not possible to understand the suffering 
of others, it is insincere to pretend to understand. Takahashi does not 
pretend to be able to understand or that a legitimately written dedication 
in his book would do anything to let their souls rest in peace. From the 
beginning of the novel, Takahashi calls for his Japanese readers to base 
their evaluation of information on its content, rather than its source or its 
appearance of legitimacy.
Takahashi favours pornography as a way to talk illegitimately because it 
does not follow the moral and aesthetic codes of mainstream discourse 
and can have the power to bring socially formed preconceptions to 
light. Pornography is a device he previously used in his 1999 novel 
Adaruto [Adult], which focuses almost exclusively on non-mainstream 
pornography, such as those featuring old women or scatological elements, 
in a way that makes his readers question what exactly is normal and what 
is an unusual fetish. However, as Takahashi (1998, p. 118) contended, 
‘normal pornography’ that attempts to follow the rules and ‘ideologies’ of 
pornography has the potential to be didactic and to play a part in dictating 
how sex should be done ‘correctly’. This is why Takahashi seems to feel an 
affinity for the unconventional pornography of Japanese directors, such 
as Baksheesh Yamashita and Company Matsuo, who actively challenged 
conventions in the pornography genre by including ‘bizarre things no one 
has ever seen before and unimaginable kinds of people doing all sorts of 
things’, which forced viewers to leave behind their societally conditioned 
conceptions of love and sex (p. 119). For example, Ishikawa describes 
the video of 72-year-old pornography film star Yone as something that 
is as ‘frightening as the leakage of contaminated water from Fukushima’ 
and reports that, when confronted with this ‘frightening’ image, many 
viewers chose to close their eyes to avoid looking at it (pp. 128–132). 
As Takahashi (2012b) explains, ‘we become lost for words when confronted 
with nude old women, because, unlike young girls, society doesn’t have 
the words to describe what they look like. I want my readers to become 
lost for words in my novel’—old women do not usually figure in socially 
formed preconceptions about sex. Takahashi’s use of unconventional 
pornography in his works relates closely to his political concerns that 
mainstream discourse defines ‘the correct way to think about love and 
sex’ and that unconventional pornography has the power to destroy these 
preconceptions, just like literature.
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Although the authorities and the government clouded their post-3.11 
arguments in legitimate and authoritative sounding rhetoric, using 
keywords such as kizuna, jishuku and tabete ōen (support the disaster-
hit areas by eating their produce), Takahashi implies that the problem 
is compounded because Japanese people blindly trust official-sounding 
discourse without questioning its content. While the Japanese loyalty 
to and respect for their rulers has been a subject of wonder in the West 
since WWII, Japanese intellectuals have recently criticised this tendency 
as shikō teishi (suspension of thought), which is characterised by a kind 
of laziness when it comes to critical thinking with regards to official 
discourse. In his novel, Takahashi uses language that is as far removed 
as possible from legitimate-sounding political rhetoric to create obstacles 
to this Japanese style of unquestioning obedience. Readers are prevented 
from trusting anything in the book because characters in Koisuru genpatsu 
lack confidence and express themselves in colloquial speech (even heads of 
state including former prime minister Kan Naoto) and hardly a page passes 
without some form of sexual slang. This illegitimate effect is amplified by 
the fact that disaster and death are considered serious issues that must be 
discussed using legitimate language.
Another example of Takahashi’s criticism of legitimate-sounding rhetoric is 
a chapter entitled Shinsai bungaku ron [An essay on earthquake literature], 
inserted towards the end of the book, which appears to be a discussion 
on the role of 3.11 literature. In stark contrast to the rest of the novel, 
the content of this chapter is much more serious and written in normal 
language. As Ishino (2013, p. 31) observed, this chapter is the only part 
of the novel that is logical and coherent, which may cause readers to 
conclude that this chapter represents the crux of what Takahashi wanted 
to say in his novel. Because they feel so relieved to finally read something 
that they can understand after being bombarded by Takahashi’s absurd 
writing, most readers would not stop to question whether its content were 
reliable (p. 31). However, this chapter is also a work of fiction, which 
discusses imaginary works with the names of artists and authors written 
in katakana, like the other characters in the novel. The eight-hour version 
of Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind, as well as Kamisama (2011), which 
are discussed in the chapter, are both fictional works, despite being 
based on their real versions (by Miyazaki Hayao and Kawakami Hiromi 
respectively). Although the chapter deals with some of the concerns that 
Takahashi explores during the rest of the novel, its content cannot be 
taken at face value. Takahashi frustrates readers’ attempts to find any 
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easy explanation of the novel. Takahashi suggests that reality does not 
have easy explanations and that Japanese people must learn to take all 
discourse surrounding the disaster with a grain of salt and to be suspicious 
of language that appears to be legitimate and authoritative, whether it be 
his own essay or any other commentary on the disaster.
In Koisuru genpatsu, Takahashi reveals that many taboos remain in Japanese 
society by using pornography as a direct metaphor for them. The words 
of the 55-year-old pornography film star Yoshiko highlight this similarity: 
‘the problem is that no one wants to talk about it … So you never gain 
an understanding of what it is’ and the real reason why people do not talk 
about it is because ‘it’s hidden away, so you can’t see it’ (p. 160). Koisuru 
genpatsu is Takahashi’s attempt to encourage debates on delicate matters 
in Japanese society—sex, money, death and, perhaps most importantly, 
nuclear power. Pornography is a highly appropriate metaphor for nuclear 
power in that they are both essential parts of the everyday lives of Japanese 
people, yet are hidden away from the public eye. Pornography is also 
rigged—it is a yaochō, a ‘put-up job’, in which everyone knows what will 
happen at the end, despite any unwillingness feigned by the participants 
(p. 10). In a similar way, Japanese nuclear politics is also rigged because it 
is governed by political and financial interests. Through his metaphor of 
pornography, Takahashi suggests that what needs to change in Japanese 
society is not the taboo or sexual perversion, but the lack of discussion 
about these subjects, which make it seem as though they are not happening. 
Takahashi shows that the hesitation and shock the reader feels when 
reading his novel plays an important role in perpetuating these taboos.18
Takahashi’s boundary-testing demonstrates that taboos can be overcome 
when there is enough discussion on the subject—readers eventually get 
used to the sexual explicitness and inappropriateness of the novel and 
begin to question why it is a taboo at all. The novel demonstrates that 
the act of talking about a taboo, in any shape or form, can make it more 
acceptable, even in Japan. However, it is also true that debates surrounding 
the taboo subject of nuclear power would not have occurred in Japan in 
18  An example of this is the reaction of Waseda University to this book. Takahashi revealed on 
Twitter that the university banned the use of Koisuru genpatsu as part of the title of a talk he was going 
to give on campus in October because they considered the expression to be inappropriate (this is 
further evidence to Odajima’s claim that nuclear power is becoming an issue that no one wants to be 
involved with in Japan). The combination was probably considered problematic in that it carried the 
risk of making it appear as though he was making a pro-nuclear statement and being inconsiderate to 
the disaster victims and that Waseda University supports this.
67
3 . OppRESSIvE JApAN
the first place were it not for the Fukushima disasters. Sadly, it seems that 
the power of speech is insufficient, in many cases, to instil enough of 
a sense of urgency in the general population to start such debates. This is 
why Ishikawa decides not to use his alien assistant’s supernatural powers 
to go back in time and make it so that 3.11 never happened at the end 
of the novel—not only would this be turning away from reality, but it 
would also reverse an invaluable opportunity to begin the debate on 
taboo topics in Japan, including nuclear power. To borrow the words of 
the chairperson of the adult video production company, Japan has been 
‘shaking’ for decades, without anyone realising it (p. 94) and 3.11 simply 
brought to light all the existing problems of Japanese society. The best 
we can do is not to pretend that it never happened, but to face the issues 
squarely and to keep speaking about them.
Post-3.11 critical discourse has been characterised by the use of easily 
discernible markers to identify and label ‘enemies’. In Koisuru genpatsu, 
this is illustrated through the example of two words: hōshanō (radioactivity) 
and hōshasei busshitsu (radioactive material). Although it is technically 
incorrect, the term hōshanō is often used to refer to radioactive materials 
in Japan in expressions such as hōshanō more (leakage of radioactivity), 
especially in the media because the term is easier to say. However, following 
3.11, the correct usage of these terms has been an indicator of the depth 
of the speaker’s knowledge of nuclear power, which has led to nit-picking. 
Takahashi seems to feel that this is an issue of minor importance relative 
to the urgency of healthy debates surrounding the future of nuclear power 
in Japan. As Ishikawa puts it, ‘Why do I have to worry about such things? 
People tell me I shouldn’t get it wrong. Why? I don’t understand at all’ 
(p. 180).
Another example is the discussion of two cover songs: the Korean versions 
of Itsuwa Mayumi’s song Koibito yo ([Oh, lover], probably referring to 
Rhee Hwa Sook’s version) and Yuki ga furu [Tombe la neige] by Salvatore 
Adamo. In Japan, Korean copying of Japanese culture is often derogatorily 
referred to as pakuri (stealing). However, Ishikawa reveals that the Korean 
singers sung these songs with such pride that he was moved to the point 
of tears, claiming that ‘it really doesn’t matter whether a song is honmono 
(real) or pakuri’ (p. 44). What is important here is Takahashi’s choice of 
Yuki ga furu as his example—written by Salvatore Adamo, an artist born 
in Sicily and raised in Belgium, who was known for performing all over 
the world in numerous languages. Although the song is well known in 
Japan, it was originally written in French and sung by Adamo in many 
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languages, including Korean. Takahashi most likely deliberately included 
this example to further blur the line between real and fake or right and 
wrong. By referring to these examples, Takahashi suggests that whether 
one’s language is correct or not (both in the sense of word selection and the 
choice of the language itself ) is unrelated to the value of what is expressed.
On the very last page, Takahashi once again brings up the issue of what 
constitutes an adult video, and by extension a novel, with what appears to 
be a conversation between Ishikawa and the president:
What do you think?
Suggestion dismissed.
Why?
Because that’s not porn! (p. 276)
With this conversation, Takahashi paradoxically demonstrates that even 
such labels of genre are unimportant and unnecessary in the interests 
of free expression. If not a novel, Takahashi’s novel could be called 
a  performance, much like the actions of the Yubisashi otoko [pointing 
man], who gained fame for filming himself pointing his finger at the 
LiveCam at the Fukushima Daiichi Power plant. The back cover of the 
novel references this video with an image of Takahashi pointing at his 
readers. In Takahashi’s (2012a, p. 283) own words, the ‘pointing man’ is 
saying, ‘You’re all pointing at others and attacking them, but why don’t 
you try point that finger to yourself for once?’ Takahashi’s finger-pointing 
performance is a powerful criticism of the tendency to hide away from 
real debates in post-3.11 Japan.19 Takahashi’s question, ‘do you accept this 
novel?’ becomes a question aimed at Japanese society as a whole when 
read in this light. Takahashi encourages Japanese people to go beyond 
narrow-minded labels such as left-wing or right-wing and to pay more 
attention to the content. Although Takahashi admits that he is powerless 
as an individual, he displays hope in the collective power of Japanese 
society. As he argues, ‘there is no freedom of expression in Japan because 
Japanese people do not want it’ (p. 73); that is, he believes that it is 
possible for Japan to break out of the stifling cloud of conformity if the 
Japanese people decide to work together. Takahashi attempts to aid this 
19  In this way, Takahashi’s work shares much in common with the music and performances of the 
anti-nuclear protestors in Tokyo following 3.11; see Brown (2018) and Manabe (2016).
69
3 . OppRESSIvE JApAN
process by stirring up controversy for controversy’s sake, in the hopes that 
he will be able to desensitise Japanese society to unconventional opinions 
and expressions and to encourage healthy debates.
The dystopian works explored in the first half of this chapter are different 
in nature to Takahashi’s novel. In the dystopian works, minority opinions 
are suppressed, whereas they are celebrated in Takahashi’s work. However, 
if dystopian literature is considered to provide negative examples of what 
society should not aim for, we can also say that the authors in this chapter 
express hope for a more democratic future Japan, in which minority 





As mentioned in Chapter 1, Azuma Hiroki (2011a, p. 12) observed 
in September 2011 that 3.11 served to reveal the lack of solidarity in 
Japanese  society. The disaster highlighted that, contrary to the popular 
Nihonjinron belief of Japan being a homogenous nation, significant 
economic and cultural differences existed between the disaster-hit 
areas and Tokyo. To give one oft-cited example, just as the disaster-hit areas 
began their long journey to recovery, television programs in Tokyo were 
already discussing what would happen if a disaster of such a scale were to 
occur in the nation’s capital, which emphasised the Tokyo-centric nature 
of public discourse in Japan.1
Jake Adelstein, an American Yomiuri Shimbun journalist and author 
of Tokyo Vice (a chronicle of Adelstein’s experiences in crime reporting 
in the city), highlighted this lack of solidarity in his work Muenbotoke 
(Adelstein, 2011a), which was first published in Shambhala Sun and 
rewritten for 2:46—Aftershocks: Stories from the Japan Earthquake. 2:46 is 
a publication that contains essays, artworks and photographs by Japanese 
and non-Japanese authors, created within a week of the disaster through 
collaboration on Twitter. Among this collection of mostly non-fictional 
accounts of the disaster (by names such as William Gibson and Barry 
Eisler), Adelstein’s (2011a) Muenbotoke is unique in its fictional and 
indirect approach. The story is about a middle-aged couple who commit 
double suicide and become muenbotoke (the dead who do not have any 
living relatives to look after their graves). Symbolically, the surname 
1  In April 2017, Reconstruction Minister Imamura Masahiro resigned after commenting that the 
earthquake ‘was okay because it happened over there, in Tōhoku’ (‘Imamura Fukkōshō jinin’, 2017).
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of the couple is Akutagawa, which evokes Akutagawa Ryūnosuke who 
famously committed suicide due to a ‘vague anxiety about his future’. 
However, unlike Akutagawa Ryūnosuke, Mr Akutagawa’s anxiety for his 
future is much more tangible: he had been recently laid off from his job 
as a temporary employee at a construction company and was simply too 
poor to carry on living.
Adelstein’s account of the story is interspersed with the story of the 
self-sacrifice and imagined death of the nuclear power plant staff 
at Fukushima, which is in italics and written in a more journalistic 
and impersonal tone. This interspersing vividly portrays the paradox 
in Japanese society: that there appears to be cohesion and cooperation in 
the society as a whole, but on closer inspection, many individuals are 
excluded from this society. It is suggested that this self-sacrifice, going 
hand in hand with extreme isolation of certain individuals, are difficult for 
foreigners like Adelstein to comprehend. Adelstein (2011a) incredulously 
asks, ‘Many of the staff at the nuclear power plant stayed on the job long 
after radiation levels had risen past even the laxest of safety standards, 
to prevent a full meltdown. Why?’ (p. 56). He explains that ‘they are 
willing to give their lives to save the lives of thousands of other people, 
people they know, people they don’t know and people they will never 
meet’ (p. 57), which evokes the notion of the Japanese group mentality, 
or kizuna (see Chapter 1), in the post-3.11 context.
However, members of Japanese society can also be cold towards people 
they know and people they have met—such as social outcasts like 
Mr and Mrs Akutagawa, 62 and 59 years old respectively, who were found 
dead in their apartment in Totsuka, Shinjuku. The use of Totsuka as 
a setting highlights the juxtaposition between the couple’s real-life plight 
and Japan’s perceived image as an altruistic group community. Totsuka 
is known as fukushi no machi [the welfare town], due to the presence 
of many non-government organisations, such as Amnesty International, 
Médecins Sans Frontières and Peace Boat. Mr Akutagawa ‘was practically 
invisible’ (p. 57), except to the debt collectors who regularly threatened 
and harassed him. The few people that know something about him do not 
seem to be moved or surprised by his death at all, behaving as though it 
was inevitable. As Adelstein (2011a) argues, ‘it’s amazing to me that people 
can live in an apartment complex right next to each other for years and 
not know each other at all’ (p. 57). Although Adelstein (2011a) admits 
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that ‘a lot of Japanese people hate to ask others for help’ (pp. 57–59), the 
statement leaves the readers questioning who the socially isolated couple 
could have possibly talked to, rather than finding reassurance in the 
possibility of help available on demand. Just like ‘the unseen radiation 
they were exposed to has probably already killed [the nuclear power 
plant staff]’ (p. 57), the Akutagawas had already ‘been dead for a long 
time’ (p. 57). Having no family, the Akutagawas do not receive any care 
even when they are truly and officially dead—the police only care about 
whether Mr Akutagawa killed his wife with her consent, so they can fill in 
the necessary paperwork, in case he needs to be prosecuted post-mortem. 
Only Adelstein goes to the effort of visiting the grave, from which they 
have ‘probably been evicted or displaced by the ashes of other muenbotoke’ 
(p. 59) by the time of writing because no one would have paid for the 
upkeep fees—in Adelstein’s (2011a) words, ‘even the dead can only rent 
in Tokyo’ (p. 60).
Interestingly, Adelstein (2011a) does not ask his readers to pray for the 
Akutagawas, but ends the story with the last component of the Fukushima 
narrative in italics:
May their memories last longer than the accident that took their lives. 
Because remembering them is all we can do for them now and for all 
those who lost their lives. And in that act of remembering, hopefully 
we will lead better lives and remember to care for all living things. 
We owe the dead that much (p. 59).
By concluding his narrative with this praise for the (imagined) heroes of 
the disaster, Adelstein brings our attention to the lack of such a discourse 
for the thousands who silently passed away like Mr and Mrs Akutagawa, 
without any recognition for their contribution to society. Adelstein’s story 
is a reminder for the Japanese, especially in the cities, to remember these 
sacrifices that make their modern lifestyle possible, as well as a challenge 
to the discourse of kizuna and national unity, which was prevalent at the 
time of his writing. Similarly, the three authors that I explore below paint 
post-3.11 Japan as a heterogenous space (at least temporarily), despite the 
common perception of the country as being highly homogenous.
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Tradition versus Modernity: Richard 
Collasse and Shinkai Makoto
As I mentioned above, a way in which the Japanese ‘homogeneity myth’ 
was questioned in the cultural response to the disaster was to highlight 
the major economic and cultural differences that exist between the 
nation’s capital and countryside. Albeit very different in style, the 2016 
blockbuster film Kimi no na wa [Your Name] by Shinkai Makoto and 
the French novel L’océan dans la rizière [The ocean in the rice paddy] by 
Richard Collasse both deal with a ‘culture shock’ that occurs as a result 
of these two sides of Japan being brought together after a disaster. While 
Shinkai presents a vision of post-disaster Japan in which homogeneity is 
restored, Collasse paints this heterogeneity as a positive and essential part 
of a reconstructed future Japan.
The universe of Kimi no na wa is split into two storylines that eventually 
merge. One of them is situated in Itomachi, which is a sleepy fictional 
town with a population of 1,500 in the Prefecture of Gifu, where Mitsuha, 
a girl born into a family of Shintō shrine maidens, wishes to escape her 
world of rituals and offerings. The other storyline, three years later, is 
inhabited by Taki, who is a privileged high school boy in Tokyo, with all 
the luxuries associated with living in the capital, including stylish cafe 
food, cinemas and Italian restaurants with chandeliers. The disaster that 
occurs in the film is an allusion to 3.11. Although in Itomachi the disaster 
is caused by a meteor fall, it is eerily reminiscent of 3.11 in its sudden 
and devastating nature. In Tōhoku, the giant tsunami waves started 
reaching residential areas half an hour after the earthquake, similar to 
how the beautiful meteor unexpectedly splits into two and starts falling 
onto the village, giving residents little time to escape. The recurring nature 
of this fictional disaster (it recurs every 1,200 years) is also reminiscent of 
the fact that the Tōhoku tsunami brought attention to the large tsunamis 
that previously occurred in the region, including in 869, 1611 and 1933.
In Kimi no na wa, the economic and cultural gap between Tokyo and the 
disaster-hit rural area is highlighted by means of strong juxtapositions. 
In the animated film version, this difference is manifested in the visual 
contrast between the beautiful scenery of the Hida mountains and the 
bustling technological cityscape of Tokyo. For example, in the Itomori 
scenes, the train station is mostly empty (the local train only passes by once 
every two hours), whereas in Tokyo trains are shown to arrive and depart 
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continuously in every direction. Most importantly, the difference in the 
lives of these two characters is underscored by the repeated representation 
of surprise as the characters experience each other’s lives through frequent 
body swaps. In the book version, Taki repeatedly describes Mitsuha’s 
universe as being similar to that of a folkloric tale (mukashi banashi), while 
Mitsuha feels as though the conversations of Taki’s schoolmates are taken 
straight out of ‘celebrity posts on Facebook’.
The portrayal of Mitsuha’s life in Itomori is not just a portrayal of difference, 
but also an extremely exoticised portrayal—in this mountainous land, 
shrine maidens such as Mitsuha and her sister continue to perform divine 
dances in traditional costume, craft intricate kumihimo ropes by hand and 
produce sake by chewing rice and mixing it with their virginal saliva in 
their mouths. This exotic appeal of Itomori is perhaps best demonstrated 
by the sudden boom in real-life ‘pilgrimage’ or seichi junrei to the Gifu 
Prefecture, a phenomenon in which fans travel to find sites that may have 
inspired certain scenes in animated films. The exoticised and, to some 
extent, eroticised gaze of the city dwellers towards these sacred, virginal 
sites is also apparent in the merchandising related to the film, such as the 
local sake, Hōrai, which was made available for purchase in the ‘saliva 
sake’ bottles from the film. The film led some Japanese to rediscover parts 
of traditional Japanese culture, much like the ‘discover Japan’ or the ‘exotic 
Japan’ tourism campaigns by the Japanese National Railways in the 1970s 
and 1980s,2 and reminded them that many parts of Japan are still rural, 
even if they are not quite as exotic as the film portrays.
In the film, these gaps are shown to be overcome by young love (or, at 
least, the strong will to not forget each other), as well as the bond of 
musubi (knot)—a key concept that is repeated many times in both the 
film and the novel and is highly reminiscent of kizuna. The concept is 
introduced in a key scene where Taki (in Mitsuha’s body) goes to visit the 
shrine god’s body in the mountains to make an offering of Mitsuha’s saliva 
sake, with her grandmother Hitoha and younger sister Yotsuha. During 
their journey, Hitoha explains the many meanings of musubi:
The linking of threads is musubi. The linking of people is musubi. 
The passing of time is musubi. It’s all the same. Musubi is kamisama, 
the gods and their power. The kumihimo ropes that we make 
2  The ‘discover Japan’ campaign is explored in detail in Marilyn Ivy’s (1995) Discourse of the 
Vanishing, which is discussed in more detail in the next section.
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are also the work of kamisama and represents the flow of time 
itself. Gathering together to form shapes, twisting and tangling, 
sometimes going back, getting cut off and then linking up again. 
That is kumihimo. That is time. That is musubi.
With this awareness that time is not necessarily linear, Taki later succeeds 
in going back in time by drinking Mitsuha’s sake and saves Mitsuha and 
the town from the disaster, despite the various challenges posed by the 
extremely fragmented nature of his memory of his time in Itomori.
Although it is tempting to view this as a simplistic tale of human bonds 
that are facilitated by the kamisama, overcoming differences and even 
disasters, it is important to remember that the final encounter between 
Mitsuha and Taki occurs as a result of a series of miraculous events, as well 
as strong romantic sentiments. While presenting a strong message of hope 
for these two main characters in the film, Shinkai does not clearly show 
how this translates to hope in real-life, post-disaster Japan. In particular, 
the bonds, or musubi, become much less important once the objective 
of the two characters has been achieved. In short, the ancient musubi 
traditions of the fictional town of Itomori, from the dances to the rope-
making and the sake-making, which are so carefully passed down from 
generation to generation, function solely as a device for saving Mitsuha 
and thus lose much of their meaning once disaster has been averted 
by a successful evacuation of the town’s residents.
The ending of the film takes place in Tokyo and indicates that all the 
main characters from Itomori end up moving to Tokyo after narrowly 
escaping the disaster, despite the fact that there are many bigger towns 
and cities around Gifu Prefecture, such as the city of Gifu, Nagoya or 
Kyoto. In this strangely Tokyo-centric ending, the film shows that 
Mitsuha and her friends, Tessie and Sayaka, have survived the disaster, 
but no information is given regarding what remains of Itomori or how 
its cultural traditions are being preserved. If anything, the disaster is 
presented as a liberating force that allowed these characters to escape the 
small town and its customs. For example, it is revealed in Kimi no na wa: 
Another Side Earthbound (2016), which is a prequel to the film written 
by Shinkai’s collaborator, Kanoh Arata, that Tessie wanted to move out 
of Itomori after high school, but thought that he would be unable to do 
so due to his personal circumstances—his father owned a local building 
business that he was expected to inherit. Blood links are still considered 
to be of utmost importance when it comes to inheriting family businesses 
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in the community and it would cause confusion and inconvenience to 
the company’s employees if he does not stay to continue on the business. 
Tessie describes these customs as the shigarami (a term that expresses 
these human ties in a negative way, unlike musubi) that keeps him tied 
to the small town. The disaster cuts these chains that bound him and is 
implicitly presented as a positive event that allowed these young characters 
to develop their potential in the nation’s capital, away from restrictive 
small-town customs.
Overall, while Shinkai presents a kind of rural Other in the traditions of 
the fictional town of Itomori, the film also contributes to the ‘homogenous 
Japan’ myth in that this is presented as an anomalous case that needs to 
be corrected by means of integration into mainstream Japanese culture. 
Shinkai ultimately presents a future Japan in which heterogeneity has 
been erased and happiness is found in the homogeneity of urbanised 
Japan. In Shinkai’s fictional universe, rural heterogeneity only remains as 
a source of nostalgia for ‘old Japan’, which is consumed for entertainment 
but is no longer part of contemporary Japanese identity.
L’océan dans la rizière [The ocean in the rice paddy] by Richard Collasse 
(2012a), author and CEO of the Japanese subsidiary of the French brand 
Chanel, is also a story of a young man from Tokyo who saves a youth 
from the disaster-hit areas, although Collasse manages to portray the 
countryside around Fukushima in a much more positive light than 
Shinkai does. L’océan, which has been translated into Japanese as Nami: 
Sōsuke, 17sai no ano hi kara no monogatari [The wave: the story of Sosuke 
since that day when he was 17] (2012), tells the story of Sakai Sosuke, 
a 17-year-old boy who lives in a traditional household in a fishing village, 
until the tsunami comes and takes away almost all his known family 
members and loved ones, friends and belongings. Although the story’s 
main characters are fictional, more than a few scenes and peripheral 
anecdotes are based on true testimonies given by survivors of the disaster. 
For example, Sosuke and his friends are part of a student jazz band in 
Kesennuma, the ‘Swinging Dolphins’, which exists in real life (although 
it is called the ‘Swing Dolphins’) and his sister’s character is based on 
the young woman who was employed by the council of Minamisanriku 
and was tragically swept away while issuing an evacuation warning on 
the radio.
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Through his experience of working as a volunteer in the region, giving 
makeovers and massages to female disaster victims in temporary housing 
and shelters, Collasse felt that Japan had split into two: those who are 
going on with their everyday lives in Tokyo and those who are still in 
a difficult living situation in the disaster-hit areas (2012b). Further, 
Collasse expressed his discomfort with the issue of municipalities across 
Japan rejecting the plea to incinerate and bury debris from the disaster-hit 
areas (as it was perceived to be radioactive, even when it was scientifically 
proven to not be), observing that ‘it’s sad that a foreigner like me has to 
point out that the Japanese are no longer helping each other’ (2012b).
To portray this gap between the disaster-hit areas and the rest of Japan, 
Collasse also split his novel into two, between the story of Sosuke and his 
traditional background and his 23-year-old uncle Eita, an otaku, freeter 
and semi-hikikomori3 from Tokyo, who spends most of his days locked 
up in a room in his parents’ house. Eita, who arrives in Kesennuma with 
his Ray Ban sunglasses and Harley Davidson bike, is the epitome of the 
materialistic and spoiled Tokyo youth. However, Eita is also Collasse, or 
the French reader in general, who is reading about the experiences of the 
victims in their comfortable armchairs. Collasse confesses, ‘In a way Eita 
represents me. Seeing the devastation in Tohoku made me realize how 
blessed a life I was living’ (Kunisue and Hirata, 2013, n.p.). In many ways, 
this division also plays on the stereotype of Japan as the country where 
old Japanese traditions coexist with new Western influences: Collasse 
demonstrates that while this stereotype is true to some extent, these two 
sides of Japan are so separated geographically and culturally that it can 
produce a culture shock between them when they meet.
Although there is an initial culture shock when Eita and Sosuke meet, 
with Sosuke maintaining a strong demarcation between ‘you’ (the people 
from outside of the disaster-hit areas) and ‘us’ (people strongly affected 
by the disaster), the two young men eventually become as close as real 
brothers and work together towards reconstruction, in what is perhaps 
Collasse’s expression of hope for the young generation. Unlike Taki, Eita 
is not a hero who came to save Tōhoku. His motivation is much more 
banal—curiosity, as well as the fact that he was ordered by his father to 
go. Unlike Kimi no na wa, in which all characters end up in the capital, 
in L’océan dans la rizière, Eita discovers his raison d’être in Kesennuma 
3  The term freeter refers to Japanese youths who are not in full-time employment. Hikikomori 
refers to Japanese youths who cut themselves off entirely from society.
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and decides not to return to Tokyo. Tōhoku is a location of healing, both 
for Eita and Sosuke. Eita remarks that it was ‘not the ideal solution’ to 
catapult Sosuke into the urban jungle of Tokyo so he can build a new life, 
as his father had intended (p. 283). For Eita as well, who was ‘sinking 
deeper and deeper into a bottomless pit’ (p. 329) in his life as a hikikomori 
in Tokyo, Kesennuma represents a land of new opportunity, where he will 
take up his new responsibility as young Sosuke’s caregiver and ‘reconstruct 
himself ’ (p. 319). In contrast to the exoticised portrayal of rural Japan in 
Kimi no na wa, Collasse portrays a more reciprocal relationship between 
the capital and Tōhoku, in which Tokyo is helped by Tōhoku just as much 
as it helps Tōhoku.
Towards a Tōhoku Identity: Gretel Ehrlich’s 
Facing the Wave
Based on Gretel Ehrlich’s (2013a) journeys to the Fukushima, Miyagi and 
Iwate prefectures, Facing the Wave: A Journey in the Wake of the Tsunami 
takes these regional differences one step further, towards a future vision 
of a strong and unique Tōhoku identity. To explain this, it is necessary 
to establish the history of how the region has been constructed in the 
Japanese popular imagination. The history of the Tōhoku region is 
marked by struggles with Japan’s central government. After a string of 
defeats in various civil wars, Tōhoku was eventually forced into replacing 
their successful mix of hunting, gathering and farming with rice farming 
(for which the land was not suited). This provided the capital with food 
and kept the region dependent on the resulting income, which caused 
extended periods of famine in times of cold weather. In the early twentieth 
century, Tōhoku-born scholar Yanagita Kunio attempted to bring a positive 
image to his homeland, which had become associated with poverty and 
backwardness. As a producer of rice, Tōhoku was reconstructed as the 
core of Japan’s homogenous rice-eating culture, where Japan’s genfūkei or 
old Japan could be found (the term genfūkei usually refers to scenes from 
childhood memories, but is also often used in this meaning of ‘scenery 
that evokes collective nostalgia’, regardless of whether you actually spent 
your childhood there). This can be observed in Yanagita’s (1940) Yukiguni 
no haru [Spring in snow country], in which he refers to Japan as mizuho 
no kuni (a country abundant with rice). Tōhoku was symbolically pushed 
towards the centre and away from its Other roots (which includes Ainu 
influences) by Yanagita and his ideas remain influential in Tōhoku’s image 
RE-ImAgININg JApAN AFTER FukuSHImA
80
construction. One can observe the continued influence of Yanagita’s 
scholarship in the work of Umehara Takeshi (1994), who also argued in 
his Nihon no shinsō—Jōmon/Ezo bunka wo saguru [The depths of Japan: 
exploring the Jōmon Ezo culture] that pre-industrial Tōhoku culture was 
at the heart of Japanese identity, although he focused on the prehistoric 
Jōmon (cord-marked, referring to the pottery style characteristic of the 
period) culture that was developed in the region, instead of rice farming.
However, Tōhoku is still not completely free from Othering representations 
vis-à-vis central Japan. For example, Marilyn Ivy (1995) analysed the 
twenty-first-century exoticisation and commercialisation of certain 
Tōhoku destinations such as Tōno and Osorezan, which were marketed 
as being so different from the rest of Japan that the average Japanese 
must discover them as tourists, as in the ‘Discover Japan’ campaign of the 
Japanese National Railways. Today, Tōhoku occupies a complex position 
in the Japanese consciousness, in which Yanagita’s legacy as well as the 
Nihonjinron myth of the Japanese tan’itsu minzoku (homogenous people) 
coexists with this Othering, exoticising force.
The question of Tōhoku’s place in Japan has been brought to the fore 
following the Fukushima disasters, which highlighted the fact that the 
capital lives on power supplied by its surrounding regional areas. Akasaka 
Norio (2014), a member of the government’s Reconstruction Design 
Council in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, controversially 
declared on Asahi Shimbun that Tōhoku remains Japan’s internal colony. 
Akasaka’s (2014) argument was that the underlying power structure 
between the region and the central government has not changed. 
The  Tōhoku region now supplies nuclear power, machinery parts 
(produced by low-waged labour) and rice to central Japan, instead of the 
‘soldiers, prostitutes and rice’ of the pre-WWII period.
Ehrlich’s work is important because it addresses both this ingrained image 
of Tōhoku as an exotic Other, as well as its more recent assimilation into 
the hegemony, through portrayals of various residents in the disaster-
hit areas and their journey of recovery following the tsunami. Ehrlich 
constructs a unique and positive image of Tōhoku culture, complicating 
the one-dimensional negative image of an irradiated zone now universally 
evoked by the toponyms of ‘Fukushima’ and ‘Tōhoku’, or ‘Northern 
Japan’. Ehrlich’s Tōhoku differs to the rest of Japan in their resilient 
fishermen, a unique and respectful relationship with the dead and 
a culture of coexisting with different groups.
81
4 . HETEROgENOuS JApAN
Facing the Wave portrays a distinct difference in culture between the 
fishermen and the rice farmers of the areas Ehrlich visits. Fishermen are 
demonstrated to be full of survival know-how, courageously riding out to 
the sea towards the tsunami to save their expensive boats. Fishermen are 
also shown to be working independently to restore their lifestyles as soon 
as possible, such as the man in North Miyako Bay who survived to tell his 
tale: ‘There was a big hole in the hull. Now I’ve fixed it. The government 
is busy. There’s no use waiting for them’ (p. 79). By December 2011, 
fisherman Hirayama and his son were selling their catches of saury and 
had ‘already rebuilt their tool and storage shed and [were] making buoys 
for clam season’ (p. 178) in the lively Miyako harbour. The presence of 
these strong fishermen in the book, who identified themselves as ‘men 
of the sea’, living ‘according to our instincts and needs’ (p. 80), directly 
challenges the myth of a rice-based Tōhoku, constructing it as a place 
that is Other to central Japan. The areas that Ehrlich visits are also shown 
to have a rich cultural heritage based on fishing, such as the hamauta of 
the last geisha of Kamaishi, a song that ‘always brought fish into the nets’ 
(p. 82). Residents of the small outer island Ehrlich visits in Matsushima 
Bay, where the main industry is fishing, are portrayed to be carrying on 
with their festivals and celebrations despite the disaster damage.
Conversely, Tōhoku farmers, who depend on their land, are shown to be 
more vulnerable and dependent on government support. For example, 
Kazuyoshi, who is the uncle of Masumi, a woman Ehrlich stays with, 
loses everything and is forced to take up a short-term government job 
involving debris cleaning. Masumi’s great uncle Satoru also has difficulty 
recovering due to his attachment to the land—his happiness depends 
on whether the government will let him rebuild the house that he grew 
up in, where his family grew their own rice, vegetables and flowers. 
Satoru attempts to plant a vegetable patch at his temporary home while 
he waits for permission, but this is also destroyed shortly by a typhoon 
and his ‘hope darkens, as if hope itself was tenebrific, the cause of night’ 
(p. 166). Although we are told in the epilogue that Satoru was able to 
rebuild his house and start living there, no one in the book returns to rice 
farming within the timeframe of the book. As Kazuyoshi explains, ‘all our 
machines and everything was covered in four feet of mud’ and ‘no matter 
how deeply we dug in the old rice field, we still found debris’ (p. 151).
This contrast is particularly interesting in light of the aforementioned 
debate surrounding Tōhoku as being the rice capital of Japan. Akasaka 
(2009), who believes that Tōhoku derives much of its culture from the 
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times before rice-growing was forcefully instituted in the region, has 
torn Yanagita’s thesis apart even further following the disaster (2014) by 
claiming that it is better to not replant rice in the rice-farming communities 
that were inundated by the tsunami. According to his research, these rice 
fields were located on land that was reclaimed from the sea in a process 
called ‘kasaage’ in the Edo period, when the population was rapidly 
growing and are naturally at high risk of tsunami damage. Now that 
Tōhoku’s population is ageing and shrinking, it does not make sense for 
these saltwater-inundated areas to continue producing rice, in Akasaka’s 
view. Although Ehrlich does not go as far as to object to the idea of rice 
farmers going back to their pre-disaster lifestyles, her work does contest 
the notion of Tōhoku people being not much more than rice producers 
for the capital and hints that rice farming may become less important in 
the region’s future.
Another way in which Ehrlich explores the unique traditions of Tōhoku is 
through her portrayal of how the living relate to the dead—a specialty of 
Yanagita’s, as demonstrated by his Tōno monogatari [Legends of Tono], an 
anthology of folk legends from Tōno, in Iwate Prefecture. Ehrlich explains 
that the dead ‘continue to be a “living” presence in the household’ even 
after death: ‘They are demigods, guarding the house and instructing 
young and old in matters of moral rectitude’ (p. 141). There are also 
many ways of interacting with the dead in Tōhoku. Even the Western-
educated Masumi pays Jin the ‘apprentice shaman’ to take a ghost off 
her and follows with enthusiasm the latest earthquake predictions of an 
Iwate blogger whom she calls a kamisama and uranaishi (fortune-teller). 
The Tōhoku region is also known for their itako, who are ‘blind mediums 
who communicate with the dead’ (p. 121), whom Ehrlich spent many 
weeks talking to when she was in Japan 23 years earlier.
These kinds of superstitious beliefs are still widespread in the Tōhoku 
region. As Marie Mutsuki Mockett (2015, p. 27) remarked in her 
post-3.11 memoir:
It may seem odd to a Westerner to learn that Tōhoku is awash 
with ghosts; we associate ghosts with superstition and Japan has 
the image of being a highly modernized country. But the soul of 
Japan is still very much connected to her twelve-hundred-year-old 
history and within that belief system, ghosts are a powerful and 
meaningful presence.
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Ghost sightings were the subject of a 2013 NHK Special program 
entitled Naki hito tono ‘saikai’ [‘Encounters’ with those who passed], 
which was a rare involvement for a TV channel known for its objective 
and factual reporting.4 Ehrlich’s serious treatment of ghosts echoes this 
recent acceptance of the supernatural as a form of healing in mainstream 
Japanese media, but also presents this omnipresence of the dead as being 
an important part of Tōhoku’s culture. Ehrlich (2013a, p. 46) remains 
open-minded and respectful throughout her journey towards this idea 
of the dead coexisting with the living, asking herself whether the dead 
are ‘also alive’ if ‘the cosmos is constantly splitting into a multiverse in 
which quantum objects are broken and unbroken at the same time’.5 
When walking through the former site of Kannonji, ‘the temple behind 
Ookawa Elementary School that was washed away’, she comments that 
‘no boundaries exist’ in this space (between the dead and the alive) and 
attempts to imagine herself interacting with the ghosts there, giving 
them ‘a pair of legs to walk on’ (p. 137). Ehrlich seems to be following 
in the footsteps of Lafcadio Hearn, whose work she mentions in her 
bibliography:6 while not being a complete believer of these ghosts, Hearn 
(1897) admits in his Living God (which, coincidentally, introduced the 
term tsunami to the West) that he finds himself ‘for a moment forced into 
the attitude of respect towards possibilities’ (p. 4).
Ehrlich portrays this coexistence between the living and the dead in 
a positive light and questions the negative, fearful relationship that some 
Tōhoku residents have with their ghosts. Ehrlich explains that ‘even after 
Buddhism merged with Shinto, old Shinto beliefs’, according to which 
‘death is an unseemly corruption; ghosts are ubiquitous and to be feared 
… prevail in Tohoku to this day’ (p. 16). Masumi’s mother, Kazuko, packs 
garlic and salt in her lunches and places salt on her garden shrine ‘to scare 
the bad spirits away’ (p. 12). When Ehrlich visits the ‘river where the dead 
were pulled by grieving relatives out of the mud’ in Ishinomaki, Masumi 
becomes scared after feeling a ghost on her back, throwing salt in the air 
4  See Parry (2014) for detailed summary of ghost sightings in post-3.11 Tōhoku, and Kudō 
(2016) for the reporting of ‘ghost customers’ by taxi drivers in Ishinomaki.
5  This sentence is particularly interesting because ideas from quantum physics are also explored by 
Ruth Ozeki, another North America–based writer whose post-3.11 work is analysed in Chapter 5.
6  Lafcadio Hearn, aka Koizumi Yakumo, spent his later life in Japan and wrote extensively on the 
spiritual traditions in the country. One of the very few sources of information on Japan in the Western 
world at the time of publication, in the late nineteenth century his writings were greatly influential in 
the creation of Japanese hetero-images. Following their translation into Japanese, these texts became 
an important source of self-images for the Japanese.
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to scare it away (p. 136). Ehrlich asks: ‘Do ghosts need to be scary? … 
Shouldn’t we, instead, try to make them feel at home?’ (p. 138). Ehrlich 
points out the strangeness of the fact that certain ghosts are revered as 
demigods, whereas others are feared as a form of corruption (kegare).7 
However, whether they are liked or disliked, Ehrlich demonstrates that 
such spiritual beliefs are a part of what makes Tōhoku culture unique.
If Ehrlich’s Tōhoku is a place where (at least some of ) the dead and the 
living come together, it is also a place where the living live in collective 
harmony. As Ehrlich explains:
Japanese ideas about religion, architecture, theater and literature 
are based on wa and shunyata—concepts of plenitude and 
uncertainty, of togetherness framed by impermanence (p. 12).
This concept of wa (togetherness) is like the concept of kizuna 
(see  Chapter  1). Although it could be said that wa refers to collective 
harmony, whereas kizuna refers to individual bonds, they are both used 
in very much the same way in discourses on Japan. In Nihonjinron 
discourse, wa no kokoro (spirit of wa), which comes from Confucianism, 
is often described as being the foundation of the Japanese spirit.8 
The  basis for this argument is usually Shōtoku Taishi’s 17-article 
constitution, which sets it out as an ideal. Ehrlich (2013b) describes it 
as the Shintō idea of ‘together living’, but it is a concept also influenced 
by Buddhism and Confucianism, like Shintō itself. This can be observed 
in the kind of altruistic sharing behaviour mentioned by Ehrlich, such 
as the young woman who continues her routine gift of farm vegetables 
after the tsunami,  ‘apologiz[ing] that she had only one orange to give’ 
(2013a, p. 45) and the fisherman who ‘trolled up a bag with 10 million 
yen inside’ and donated it to aid relief (p. 182).9
Although Ehrlich repeats the age-old stereotype of Japanese collective 
harmony portrayed in both the domestic and international media, she 
shows that the disaster also had the effect of forming unexpected wa in 
Tōhoku. Ehrlich observes that, traditionally, ‘to be a hippie in northern 
Honshu means taking a political stand’ (p. 63) and that any deviation from 
the hegemony is seen to be undesirable for the collective wa. Wakao-san, 
7  This kind of shunning inevitably brings to mind the other fear of unknown ‘corruption’ in post-
3.11 Tōhoku: the prejudice against the ‘new hibakusha’, as Ehrlich calls them (p. 202).
8  An English-language example of this is Robert Whiting’s You Gotta Have Wa (1990, p. 113).
9  Ehrlich balances this with mentions of looting (pp. 17, 78) and of ‘people who are trying to get 
more than they deserve from the government’ (p. 151).
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an oceans campaigner for Greenpeace, feels the need to confirm that 
‘I’m Japanese. Maybe not as much, but yes’ (p. 69), showing that activists 
are indeed on the fringe of the definition of what it is to be Japanese. 
However, the disaster had the effect of bringing these people together 
in Tōhoku. For example, members of the Sea Shepherd Conservation 
Society, who were opposing the capture and killing of Dall’s porpoises 
in the town of Ōtsuchi, turned into volunteers following the tsunami. 
Ehrlich also observes that ‘many of the local fishermen in the Fukushima 
area now welcome the Greenpeace campaigners—the very people they’ve 
been fighting in southern whaling waters’ (p. 68). In short, ‘the March 
disaster changed protocol and erased territorial boundaries’ (p. 186). This 
brings the Japanese closer to the true meaning of Shōtoku Taishi’s ideal of 
wa wo motte tōtoshi to nasu, which is often interpreted as ‘harmony at all 
cost (by supressing differences, if necessary)’, but was originally intended 
to mean ‘harmony despite differences’. In this sense, Ehrlich’s Tōhoku 
wa is a broader concept than kizuna, which is unlikely to form between 
people who disagree, but wa can refer to a coexistence despite differences 
in opinion. Ehrlich hints at a continuation of this trend as she documents 
that a geisha from Tokyo learned the hamauta from the 84-year-old 
Miyagi geisha Ito-san, which was a rare occurrence because geisha acts are 
‘never passed from one region to another, much less from one province to 
another’ (p. 187). Ito-san, who in many ways represents the longstanding 
tradition, appears excited about the fact that she saw Caucasian and male 
geishas in Tokyo, where she went to perform her song. It is suggested that 
the tsunami will continue to be a catalyst for this acceptance of minority 
views and lifestyles to spread from Tōhoku to the rest of Japan.
Ehrlich also reveals that the concept of wa is no longer synonymous with 
unquestioning passivity and obedience in Tōhoku, especially when faced 
with inept authorities. Great uncle Satoru represents this attitude with 
his words: ‘We Japanese tend to be too polite, so the government doesn’t 
do anything … We have to change how the country is ruled’ (p. 147). 
Ehrlich observes how the post-3.11 behaviour of the authorities has had 
an impact on the Tōhoku people’s trust in the government: ‘When the 
government tests, they wave a dosimeter over the top of the fish as they 
come off the boats, but that doesn’t work’ (p. 69), reports one fisherman; 
whereas Jin the shaman observes that the authorities do not hesitate to 
cover-up the extent of radiation damage because the effects will only be 
felt when they are long gone. In some cases, the Tōhoku people even 
wilfully disobeyed the authorities, ignoring the order of the police to 
leave bodies as they found them (p. 58). Further, this kind of resistance 
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is shown to have influenced the authorities in turn. For example, in the 
cordoned-off areas, the police had sympathy for the abandoned animals 
and encouraged the animal rescuers who were there ‘illegally’ (p. 90). 
Perhaps most importantly, plant manager of Fukushima Daiichi Masao 
Yoshida began pumping seawater into the reactor core, against the wishes 
of the TEPCO officials, in an attempt to cool it down (p. 26). Ehrlich thus 
portrays Tōhoku as the centre of civic engagement and change, which is 
driven by the disaster. Despite the stereotype of gaman (persevering 
in the face of adversity, often by putting others before yourself ), Ehrlich 
demonstrates that the Tōhoku people are not the meek and obedient rice 
farmers that they are portrayed to be today. Her portrayal evokes their 
warring Emishi ancestors from pre–rice growing times, who refused to be 
subjugated by the central government for many centuries.
The strength and uniqueness of Ehrlich’s work lies in her literary and 
symbolic reconstruction of Tōhoku as a place, as well as the objective 
evaluation of traditions allowed by her status as a semi-outsider. Ehrlich’s 
portrayal of post-3.11 Japan is not radically different from the media 
portrayals of a Japan that is calmly and collectively responding to the 
disaster, but she situates these characteristics carefully in a Tōhoku 
context, which, surprisingly, was not a common feature of Japanese-
language cultural responses—mainly written by mainstream authors 
based in Tokyo, many of whom had not even visited the areas affected 
by the tsunami. Further, Ehrlich paints post-3.11 Tōhoku as a fertile 
ground for new ideas and collaborations, which also retains the positive 
aspects of traditional culture. Ehrlich’s work, filled with personal stories 
from the disaster-hit areas, is a powerful antidote for the one-dimensional 
association of Tōhoku with nuclear disaster in the English-language media.
The traditional lifestyles of the Sanriku fishermen and farmers that were 
brought to the fore in the aftermath of the earthquake sparked an interest 
from both Japanese city dwellers and non-Japanese alike in various areas 
of rural Japan, where ‘the core of Japanese identity’ is thought to be found. 
The future visions for rural Japan that I have explored in this chapter 
ranged from portraying rural Japan as the exoticised Other that must 
eventually be assimilated into a modern and Westernised Japan, to an 
attempt to explore the idea of a distinct Tōhoku identity. The two non-
Japanese authors (Collasse and Ehrlich) presented a more nuanced and 
positive view of the region’s future as a place of healing and resilience, 





In a desperate attempt to cool down the overheated fuel rods at 
Fukushima, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) sent in helicopters to dump 
seawater down on the power plants from 17 March 2011. The image 
of tiny-looking jets of water mercilessly getting dispersed in the wind 
before hitting the buildings elicited despair and even laughter from many 
Japanese. Yoshida Masao, who was the Fukushima Daiichi plant manager 
at the time, later described this act as ‘meaningless’ and ‘ineffective’, 
likening the image to ‘a cicada peeing’. This failed attempt was followed up 
by another more successful attempt, in which concrete pumping trucks—
nicknamed kirin [giraffes] for their long ‘necks’, which can measure up 
to 60 metres—were brought in from China and the rest of Japan to pour 
water directly onto the plant. It seemed as though the image of Japan as 
a land of technology and ‘cool’ was crumbling further as these decidedly 
‘uncool’ and low-tech solutions were broadcast around the world.
Japan has long been in possession of its own brand of soft power, which 
has been especially noticeable following WWII, when Japanese mass 
entertainment and technology started to be consumed all over the world 
(spearheaded by Godzilla in the 1950s). However, it was only in 2002 
that Douglas McGray coined the term ‘Gross National Cool’ to explain 
Japan’s soft power and the economic value of Japan’s cultural exports was 
recognised by the government. Ironically, the subsequent government 
recognition and institutionalisation of Japan’s cool as the ‘Cool Japan 
Strategy’ by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industries, only served 
to make the country less cool. There are also issues of appropriation. 
For example, with Japanese manga and technology having started off as 
imports from the West (or, at least, heavily influenced by the West), there 
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has always been a certain unease surrounding the promotion of these 
cultural products as being quintessentially Japanese. Further, Japan is also 
viewed to be in a technological identity crisis, in which it is unable to 
effectively market its consumer brands overseas, especially in comparison 
to its neighbour South Korea, who has had enormous success with both 
its cultural and technological exports in recent years (e.g. Samsung 
and K-POP).
Perhaps this context explains the massive box office success of the 2016 
film Shin Godzilla, which portrays Japan as a country that has ‘still got 
it’ and gives hope to a Japanese audience feeling disillusioned by its own 
government, industries and people. The images contained in these works 
point to a Japan that is, although no longer number one in the economic 
sense of the 1970s and 1980s, very much still number one in culture 
and attitude. Conversely, Ruth Ozeki introduces a more philosophical 
perspective on what could be cool in post-disaster Japan, which is explored 
in the second half of this chapter.
Shin Godzilla’s Vision for a ‘Cool Japan’
Hardcore Godzilla fans awaited the July 2016 release of Shin Gojira [Shin 
Godzilla, aka Godzilla Resurgence] with a healthy dose of scepticism. 
Not much was revealed about the film prior to its release, apart from the 
fact that it would be a live-action film co-directed by Anno Hideaki, the 
anime director of Evangelion fame (Evangelion is a cult anime series of the 
1990s) and that it would feature many well-known mainstream actors, 
including Hasegawa Hiroki, Takenouchi Yutaka and Ishihara Satomi. 
Although it was expected that otaku with an interest in Evangelion would 
go and watch the movie, it was not a hotly anticipated mainstream release. 
However, as viewers started to emerge from half-empty movie theatres to 
rave about the film on social media, its popularity exploded to become 
an 8.2-billion-yen box office success by the end of the year. Part of the 
reason behind the film’s commercial success was that it was designed to 
be viewed multiple times. The numerous hints and intertextual references 
that bombarded the audience at super speed made it possible for viewers 
to discover something new during each viewing. Further, the film could 
be read as a kind of feel-good movie that represents an alternative reality 
and future in which the 3.11 disaster is overcome by the collaborative 
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effort of the Japanese. In portraying this feel-good alternative to the 3.11 
disaster, it also managed to elevate certain aspects of Japanese culture to 
cool status and stroke the audience’s nationalistic pride.
In many ways, Shin Godzilla can be thought of as a return to the ‘roots’ 
of the Godzilla series—the original Japanese Godzilla of 1954. The main 
plot of the film is just like for any other Japanese Godzilla film: a giant 
monster referred to as ‘Godzilla’ comes to Japan and causes havoc. The 
twist that is given to the 2016 version is that the only way to destroy 
the monster seems to be to drop an atomic bomb on Tokyo, which is 
a scenario that is narrowly averted by the quick thinking of the Japanese 
team headed by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Yaguchi Randō (played 
by Hasegawa). There have been many Godzilla films made in Japan over 
the past 65 years, but the most important point of comparison for Shin 
Godzilla is the original Godzilla of 1954 because they both encourage 
the audience to reflect on real-life nuclear disasters that directly impacted 
Japan. These two films are also different in nature to most of the Japanese 
Godzilla films that came in between, which feature other giant monsters 
that Godzilla fights against and are aimed at a younger audience.
The original Gojira [Godzilla] (1954) was inspired by the Daigo 
Fukuryūmaru (Lucky Dragon No. 5) incident in March of the same year, 
in which a group of Japanese tuna fishermen became exposed to nuclear 
fallout from the US hydrogen bomb testing at Bikini Atoll (the so-called 
‘Operation Castle’). This incident was met with outrage in Japan, where 
the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was still fresh. The directors of 
the film, Honda Ishirō and Tsuburaya Eiji, made a film about a prehistoric 
creature that gets chased out of its habitat by nuclear bomb testing and 
goes on a rampage in Tokyo—Godzilla was born. With regards to this first 
Godzilla, Susan Napier (2006) says the following:
Many scholars, me included, believe that the initial Godzilla—
with his links to nuclear testing and radiation—may in many 
ways be seen as a displaced version of the atomic bomb. His 
story and its ultimately happy outcome—Godzilla is vanquished 
through Japanese science—may, therefore, be read as a form of 
cultural therapy, allowing the defeated Japanese to work through 
the trauma of the wartime bombings in the scenes of panic or 
destruction and, with the film’s happy end, giving them a chance 
to reimagine and rewrite their devastating defeat (p. 10).
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While the US nuclear testing was a direct catalyst for the creation of the 
film, the atomic bomb was equally important as a source of inspiration 
for the monster.
Just like the first Godzilla was a form of cultural therapy that responded to 
the horrors of the atomic bombings, it is possible to read Shin Godzilla as 
a manifestation of the desire of the Japanese to overcome the 3.11 nuclear 
disaster. Featuring a monster that is inspired by that of the original film 
in design, the 2016 version clearly pays homage to this cultural therapy 
heritage. Set in late 2016, Shin Godzilla strongly references the triple 
disaster by replicating its four stages in the four Godzilla appearances in 
Tokyo: the earthquake, the tsunami, the helicopters pouring water on the 
Fukushima Daiichi power plant and then, finally, the ‘giraffe’ concrete 
pump vehicles coming to the rescue. The very first glimpse the audience 
gets of the 2016 Godzilla is its tail as it emerges from the sea—its long 
body resembling that of a catfish, which in Japanese folk mythology is 
said to be a divine messenger that brings about earthquakes. We soon find 
out that the monster in this film has the ability to rapidly metamorphose 
in response to various environmental and biological conditions, as the 
monster grows limbs and manages to walk along the Nomi River in 
Kamata, Tokyo, causing flooding and forcing residents to be chased by 
a wave of water in a manner reminiscent of the tsunami. By its third 
appearance in Tokyo, Godzilla can stand on its two feet, albeit gingerly 
and appears unfazed by the attacks of the helicopters of the SDF and 
the US strategic bombers (this SDF attack was highly reminiscent of the 
‘cicada pee’ watering of 2011 in its ineffectiveness and visual composition). 
Further, by this point we find out that the monster is fuelled by nuclear 
power and leaves radioactive material and chaos in its wake, much like an 
angry, walking version of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant. The scenes 
of people taking pictures and videos of Godzilla on their mobile devices, 
sharing radiation measurements on social media networks such as Twitter 
and gathering in evacuation shelters after being instructed to leave the city 
also evoke the 3.11 disaster, except this time the consequences are borne 
by the capital instead of north-eastern Japan. As if all this was not enough, 
Anno’s intention to reference the triple disaster is made crystal clear in the 
way that Godzilla is described as sōteigai (beyond expectation) multiple 
times by one of the ministers (TEPCO used the same term to describe 
the tsunami height in 2011). In the finale, the monster becomes frozen in 
the middle of Tokyo thanks to the concrete pump vehicles, much like the 
unresolved situation in Fukushima.
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Ultimately, Godzilla is a beast of a metaphor that represents different 
things to different people and this is part of its symbolic value. Some 
scholars have read Godzilla as a symbol of a larger power, such as a kind 
of divine kami figure, an allusion that is ‘especially evident in the scenes 
that herald his arrival’, marked by earthquakes and typhoons (Boss, 2006, 
p.  105). Katō Norihiro (Katō & Fujimura, 2016) believes that the 
monster serves as ‘an empty vessel for the unconscious’ for the Japanese, 
even capable of representing the Emperor (Godzilla’s suffering embodying 
his suffering as a marginal figure). However, it would be fair to say that 
both the 1954 and 2016 Godzillas have their origins in nuclear disasters 
and that the 2016 Godzilla would not have been created were it not for 
the 2011 triple disasters.
However, what I would like to highlight in my analysis of the 2016 Shin 
Godzilla is not what exactly Godzilla itself could represent, but rather the 
interesting ways in which the film portrayed previously criticised Japanese 
culture and values as being cool that results in a form of cultural therapy 
for the horrors of the 2011 triple disasters. This may be one of the reasons 
why the film could not replicate the huge commercial success it had 
domestically in overseas markets. Although the total gross box office figure 
in Japan was US$75.4 million, the US figure was a modest US$1.9 million 
and negligible in other markets. For comparison purposes, the film Your 
Name of the same year (covered in Chapter 4) grossed US$235.3 million 
in Japan, US$5 million in the US and a staggering US$83.7 million and 
US$27.9 million in China and South Korea respectively (Shin Godzilla was 
never released in China on the big screen, but the South Korean number 
makes a stark comparison).1 The three main aspects of ‘Japan cool’ in the 
film that appealed to the domestic audience (but not to foreign audiences) 
were Japanese technology, otaku and corporate values. Although there is 
some overlap between these three aspects, I analyse them each below.
‘Cool’ Technology
The Fukushima incidents were not the first time Japanese technology 
came  under fire in recent years. Since the 2000s, Japanese technology 
companies have been criticised for being unable to respond to global 
needs. Japan has become known as a kind of Galapagos, which has evolved 
1  Numbers for the two movies taken from Box Office Mojo: www.boxofficemojo.com/ movies/ 
?page=intl&id=shingodzilla.htm; www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?page=intl&id= yourname.htm 
(30 October 2018).
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in isolation from the rest of the world, producing products that are highly 
specialised to its local market, yet unwanted overseas. As contemporaries 
in neighbouring countries such as Samsung, Huawei and Oppo become 
more and more successful in the global market and de-throne previous 
Japanese market leaders such as Toshiba and NEC, there has been 
a growing sense that Japanese companies are no longer having the global 
impact that they used to.
One of the possible reasons why Shin Godzilla made post-3.11 Japanese 
(but not other) audiences feel good may be because there is a long-running 
theme of ‘Japanese technology saving the world (especially from US 
technology)’ in Japanese Godzilla films, which is perhaps not appreciated as 
much by non-Japanese viewers. In the original Godzilla (1954), American 
science is shown to have created the monster by conducting nuclear tests 
in Bikini Atoll and destroying Godzilla’s seafloor habitat. Conversely, in 
the Hollywood Godzilla (2014) by Gareth Edwards, the US nuclear tests 
are shown to have been well-meaning attempts at killing the monster. 
Japanese science is portrayed to be of a much more responsible variety 
in the 1954 original. Serizawa decides to take the secret of his ‘oxygen 
destroyer’ weapon to his grave by using it to kill both himself and Godzilla 
to prevent the possibility of this new and destructive technology being 
used for war. As Anderson (2006) explained:
At least one Japanese scientist thus proves himself to be more 
ethically engaged and concerned for others than the implicitly 
negligent US scientists who unleashed the A-bomb and the 
H-bomb upon humanity in general and Japan in particular (p. 25).
The 1954 film shows Japanese technology being used to undo the harmful 
consequences of US nuclear technology.
In Shin Godzilla (2016), Anno complicates the origins of the monster by 
characterising Godzilla as a prehistoric deep-sea creature that consumed 
some radioactive waste that was illegally dumped into the sea by various 
countries during the late 1940s and 1950s (including both Japan and the 
US). This can be read as reflecting the mixed origins of the Fukushima 
nuclear power plants, some of which were built by the General Electric 
Company and some of which were built by Toshiba or Hitachi. However, 
regardless of the origins of the monster, Japanese technology saves its 
motherland (and potentially the world) in the film. The UN Security 
Council plans to kill Godzilla by dropping a nuclear bomb on Tokyo 
(a move driven mainly by the US), but the Japanese Government manages 
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to prevent this.2 After hypothesising that the monster uses its own blood to 
cool down its system, the Japanese team manages to feed Godzilla a large 
amount of blood coagulant to make it perform a kind of reactor scram, 
causing it to literally freeze in its tracks. The solution is highly symbolic of 
Japanese technology—it is not new or flashy, but requires high precision 
and involves a lot of blood, sweat, tears and overtime. The scenes of the 
blood coagulant being poured into Godzilla’s mouth is almost identical 
to the real-life scenes of the concrete pumping vehicles pouring water 
on the Fukushima nuclear power plants that aired on television; except 
in this case the solution single-handedly solves the problem and evokes 
nationalistic pride (instead of shame) in the Japanese audience.
By the second half of the film, it becomes clear that the battle of Japan 
v. Godzilla has turned into that of Japanese technology v. US technology. 
At first, the Japanese SDF deploy AH-64 Apache helicopters to first fire 
their autocannons, then their 30  mm chain gun rounds, then rockets 
to no avail. Tanks and self-propelled howitzers follow suit, but Godzilla 
remains completely unscathed and unfazed. Japanese officials can do 
nothing but watch in awe or grit their teeth when American forces drop 
Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs on the creature from their B-2 stealth 
bombers, which at least has the effect of injuring Godzilla and angering it. 
This display of American might is necessary to make the eventual Japanese 
victory as awe-inspiring as possible.
From the beginning, the film repeatedly makes reference to the issues 
surrounding US–Japan relations, underscoring this tension. The US is 
portrayed as self-serving and untrustworthy. For example, when asked 
whether the US scientists have managed to make any progress on 
understanding Godzilla, Yaguchi comments that he has been told ‘no’, but 
‘that may not be the truth’ and that ‘it’s better not to rely on them now’. 
Further, it is revealed by Kayoko Ann Patterson, a Japanese-American who 
is sent as a special envoy from the US president (and whose own internal 
conflict mirrors the tension between the two countries), that the US had 
been aware of the existence of Godzilla all along, prior to the incidents. The 
US remains completely self-interested from the start, dumping nuclear 
waste into the Pacific Ocean, then not bothering to tell Japan about the 
monster that is born in its midst and then deciding to drop a B83 nuclear 
2  The idea of using nuclear weapons to combat Godzilla is not unique to the 2016 version. 
For example, the US and the Soviet Union attempt to use tactical nuclear weapons in Japan in the 
1984 Godzilla film directed by Hashimoto Kōji, but they eventually give up on the idea.
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bomb on Tokyo to prevent the 13 per cent chance of Godzilla landing on 
the West Coast of its country. It becomes clear at this point in the film 
that to let the US bomb Tokyo under these circumstances would signify 
for Japan a complete acceptance of this relationship of subjugation and 
exploitation.
This is the tension at play during the climax of the film, when the 
countdown towards the nuclear bomb detonation begins and the Japanese 
team rush to prepare their alternative ‘Yaguchi plan’ before this happens. 
At this stage, the American scientists who had joined the team earlier 
are nowhere to be seen because they have clearly abandoned the mission 
(relying on the nuclear alternative) and it is up to the remaining Japanese 
scientists and politicians to gather enough blood coagulant, vehicles and 
manpower to conduct the Yaguchi plan. While the US attempts to blindly 
obliterate Godzilla by using a thermonuclear bomb, the Japanese team 
attempt to try and understand the monster and decipher the hints left by 
Maki Goro, a former Japanese scientist who was working on Godzilla by 
request from the US Department of Energy. The US forces treat Godzilla 
as a kind of vermin that must be eliminated, but the Japanese characters 
in the film repeatedly refer to its ‘God-like’, awe-inspiring nature by using 
terms such as kami (God, spirits) or sen’nin (a mountain-dwelling immortal 
sage, which also evokes oft-repeated debates on nuclear power as a kind of 
‘fire of Prometheus’, a technology that is beyond the full understanding 
of humans). Directors Anno and Higuchi further underscore this divine 
portrayal by employing a motion capture of Nō artist Nomura Mansai’s 
slow movements to give the monster a majestic presence on the screen.
The ability of the Japanese team to understand Godzilla as an unprecedented 
form of being, instead of just viewing it as an enemy to be bombed and 
attacked, is symbolised by university professor Hazama Kunio’s solution 
to decode the map left by Maki Goro. The lines on what appeared to be 
a map of Godzilla’s cellular processes represent folding lines and the map 
can only be read and understood when it is folded into its 3D origami 
shape (origami being a piece of Japanese culture that has cutting-edge 
scientific applications such as nanotechnology and space satellites). This 
breakthrough led the committee to discover that Godzilla’s cells are able 
to break down any element that it encounters to power itself through 
nuclear fusion (meaning it can survive in air or water, without eating), 
but also that there is a type of extremophile bacteria that lives on these 
cells, which block this reaction to some extent. Through an extremely 
advanced understanding of biology, the Japanese team manage to produce 
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both the blood coagulant and this extremophile bacteria to be fed to the 
monster at the same time, to prevent the blood coagulant being broken 
down by Godzilla’s cells. The details of whether the science is sound or 
not is arguable, but the main message is clear—Japanese science is so 
sophisticated that scientists can fully understand a creature like Godzilla 
within a matter of days and even reproduce from scratch the bacteria that 
is present in its body.
Japan’s ethical science eventually wins over the world and many countries 
agree to lend their supercomputing power to Japan, despite the risk of 
having their valuable research stolen, and even the US participates in the 
plan in the end, by contributing high-end drones (these are crucial for 
the execution of the plan, along with the shinkansen bullet trains and 
the commuter trains that transport many Tokyoites every day—the 
recognition of which adds another element of pride and enjoyment for 
the audience). The success of the plan represents a victory of Japan’s cool 
technology over the brute force approach of the US. Japan decides to take 
the humane approach of coexisting with the frozen Godzilla and brings 
the world together in the process. As a final blow to the US plan, the 
very last shot of the film, showing winged human-like creatures frozen 
mid-evacuation from Godzilla’s tail, points to the possibility that the US 
strategy would have been completely ineffective, aside from the fact that 
a nuclear bomb would have been detected by Godzilla’s radar and shot 
down in the first place, the monster would have simply metamorphosed 
during this time into winged humanoids who would have flown away 
from its tail and wreaked havoc on earth. That is, only Japanese technology 
was capable of saving the day.
‘Ota-cool’
What is interesting about this technology is that it is a bottom-up strategy, 
devised by the rag-tag ad-hoc committee that Yaguchi Randō gathered, 
made up of ‘Kasumigaseki [an area of Tokyo where government offices 
are located] misfits who will never by promoted anyway: lone wolves, 
weirdos, otaku, trouble-makers, outcasts and academic heretics’, among 
others. This creates an environment in which these unique individuals can 
voice their opinions and ideas freely, and it is this team that ultimately 
decode the information left by Maki Goro, find out essential information 
about Godzilla and come up with the plan for freezing it. What these 
oddballs lack in communication and social skills, they make up for in 
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their highly specialised technical expertise, a characterisation that is often 
employed to describe the otaku. This is significant because the otaku were 
the initial supporters and the target audience of the film (as I mentioned 
earlier, Anno has a semi-divine reputation among this community as the 
creator of the Evangelion series).
Here I am not using the term otaku in a derogatory sense, but in a sense 
that is closer to Ota-king, from Okada Toshio’s (2000) definition (Okada 
is an otaku scholar and a well-respected otaku): the otaku is not just ‘those 
who like anime, manga and games’, which leads to them being ‘anti-social 
and gloomy people who stay at home all day’ (p. 13), but instead positively 
defined as ‘a new type of human, born in the twentieth century, who have 
an extremely evolved sensitivity to moving images’ (p. 14). In Okada’s 
definition (p. 14), otaku have ‘an evolved sense of vision’ developed from 
hours upon hours of watching different anime frame-by-frame to detect 
the slightest differences in style between different animation directors and 
also to gain a deeper understanding of how these directors create their 
works within their budget limitations. In short, otaku are a species of 
advanced viewers who seek satisfaction in their ability to analyse these 
subculture works deeper than the average viewer by understanding 
external factors such as budgets, industry trends and production processes, 
but also the highly technical aspects of content creation. Although this 
may result in the ‘antisocial and gloomy’ image from the rest of society, 
many otaku are very social when it comes to discussing and sharing their 
findings and quite happy in their belief that their refined eye allows them 
to enjoy content much more than other non-otaku viewers.
The Godzilla team members can also be considered to be otaku who 
have an extremely refined eye when it comes to their respective fields 
(e.g. molecular structures, computers, trains and weapons), but do not 
bother with other details of their lives, such as appearance or what others 
think about them. Most committee members speak like fast-forwarded, 
expressionless robots, except when they make an exciting discovery 
regarding Godzilla. It is clear that Anno knew some of his audience 
members will be of this otaku type because of his Evangelion past and that 
he was trying to appeal to this crowd. For example, the extreme amount 
of information displayed on the screen every second in a similar way to 
Evangelion (e.g. names of people with their titles, names of government 
committees and the type of bomb, aircraft or train that is being used to 
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attack Godzilla) is clearly not designed to be fully read and comprehended 
by a casual one-time viewer, but rather for the otaku-type viewer to decode 
during the course of multiple viewings of the film.3
What Anno perhaps did not expect so much is that these otaku characters 
would be received so positively by the mainstream audience and not just 
his hardcore otaku fans. This was evidenced by the fact that some of the 
most popular characters in the film were Ogashira Hiromi and Yasuda 
Tatsuhiko, the two otakus in the committee played by Ichikawa Mikako 
and Takahashi Issei, rather than those played by the headliner actors 
Takenouchi Yutaka and Ishihara Satomi. Ogashira Hiromi’s popularity in 
particular was extraordinary, with numerous fans and professional manga 
artists alike submitting illustrations of the character on Twitter under the 
#Ogashira Hiromi hashtag.4 In the film, Ogashira is a socially awkward 
young woman who wears no makeup and expressionlessly talks to people 
without looking into their eyes, much like Yasuda—hardly a recipe for 
a conventional film heroine (unlike the glamorous Kayoko Ann Patterson, 
played by Ishihara Satomi). It was the tiny hint of a smile she shows at 
the end, when she realises that the radiation damage left by Godzilla in 
Tokyo was not as bad as it had previously been believed, that resulted 
in a huge gyappu moe (a term that describes falling in love with anime 
or manga characters who display seemingly contradictory traits or gaps, 
such as a handsome and sophisticated-looking man who is very clumsy) 
sensation—so much so, that 24 different versions of this scene (shot from 
different angles) were included in the bonus footage of the Blu-ray edition 
of the film, along with numerous versions of a scene in which Yasuda 
screams and jumps up and down upon finding out that the monster is 
radioactive, in another rare display of emotion.
One factor that perhaps made these otaku characters more digestible for 
the mainstream audience was that they were not the so-called kimo-ota 
(disgusting otaku) who dress unfashionably and are unfit and ungroomed. 
3  There are many other parallels drawn between the film and the Evangelion series: most noticeably 
the music, which was created by Sagisu Shirō for both films (one song, ‘Decisive Battle’, is used in 
exactly the same way before each battle), as well as the unresolved nature of the ending. Various 
lines and appellations similar to Evangelion are scattered throughout Shin Godzilla. For example, 
an important strategy in Evangelion is called Yashima sakusen (the Yashima strategy), while the final 
strategy in Shin Godzilla is Yashiori sakusen (the Yashiori strategy). Yashima sakusen also evokes the 
3.11 disaster because some Evangelion fans were using the term to describe their efforts to save 
electricity, while nuclear power plants were closed down in Japan.
4  Some examples of this can be seen on Togetter, a Japanese Twitter aggregator website: togetter.
com/li/1012670 (30 October 2018).
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Even Yasuda, who is arguably the most otaku character in the film 
(being the only character who is explicitly referred to as one), with his 
twitchy face and unfitted suit, is portrayed as stylish in some ways, with 
his iPhone, MacBook Air and limited edition 18k gold Apple Watch, 
whereas all his bureaucrat colleagues type away on their grey Fujitsu and 
Panasonic laptops. In a memorable escape scene, Yasuda is seen calmly 
grabbing his MacBook—clearly his only important possession—and 
walking away while everyone else scrambles to gather their belongings. 
Likewise, although Yaguchi is a model train otaku, who displays his 
collection proudly in his office (and perhaps also had a hand in coming 
up with using trains as a weapon in the final battle against Godzilla), he 
is without doubt a cool character, who is not only extremely capable but 
also always dressed sharply—even when he ‘hasn’t showered for days’, his 
shirt looks as white and crisp as ever, his hair without a trace of oil and 
his face cleanly shaven.
In the past, images of the otaku ranged from creepy and dangerous 
(as  exemplified by the paedophile and necrophile ‘otaku murderer’ 
Tsutomu Miyazaki) to unfashionable and socially awkward (as exemplified 
by the densha otoko [train man] whose successful love story became 
a social phenomenon around 2004/05). In contrast, the otaku qualities 
of the committee members portrayed in Shin Godzilla are portrayed and 
received as being cool, representing a 180-degree turn from these negative 
images. Shin Godzilla accurately reflects the heightened status of otaku 
in Japanese society today, in which otaku are now welcomed as valuable 
tourists and consumers by small Japanese towns and otaku kei danshi 
(otaku-type men) are even viewed as the most desirable type of men for 
marriage by some women, due to their perceived loyal nature.
‘Shachi-cool’
This brings us to the third feel-good aspect of the movie, which is that the 
heroes are not superhuman beings, but rather average Japanese who work 
as bureaucrats, chemical engineers, plant workers, firefighters, SDF and 
administrative assistants who bring rice balls to committee members. The 
implication is that it is through the collective effort of all Japanese citizens 
that Godzilla, or the 3.11 disaster, would be overcome. There is no one 
‘hero’ in this film—while leadership roles such as the prime minister 
are important, his task is limited to listening to advice and putting an 
administrative stamp of approval on their ideas (after asking ‘where do I put 
the stamp?’). At each stage of the fight against Godzilla, the involvement 
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of numerous different departments and people is emphasised, with the 
camera rapidly cutting between characters every few seconds for most of 
the film. In one scene in which the team are analysing the decoded results 
of Maki Goro’s map, provided by super computers from all over the world, 
the results are displayed in the foreground with the committee members 
gathered round in the background, giving the audience the impression 
that they are inside the computer that they are looking at. The focus on 
the screen is rarely on one character, but rather on a group of characters, 
gathered around the meeting table or a computer.
These characters are not just great team members, they also work 
incredibly hard. It would not be far-fetched to describe these individuals 
as a kind of shachiku (corporate livestock), which is a term that has become 
popular in Japan in recent years to describe employees who become so 
enslaved to their bosses and exploitative companies (often called ‘black’ 
companies) that they lose their free will and mindlessly work long hours. 
In one scene, followed by an aerial shot of the protesters outside of the 
National Diet building, the staff inside are shown to be exhausted and 
falling asleep in the most impossible positions on their chairs or their 
desk as a man collects a large rubbish bag full of empty instant ramen 
bowls. Morning comes and the delivery of rice balls and tea creates an 
excuse for a brief break. During this break, Shimura, Yaguchi’s right-hand 
man, reveals that some team members have not gone home or seen their 
families for many days, despite having permission to do so and are all 
working on what they can, without even being told what to do. What 
is perhaps more surprising to a Western audience is that this is talked 
of as a most noble act that ‘really moves’ Shimura and leads Yaguchi to 
conclude that ‘this country is not half bad’. Being a good worker is clearly 
shown to be more important than being a good father, mother, husband 
or wife during a crisis situation.
As a Godzilla film, Shin Godzilla is unique in its complete lack of romance 
or familial and personal relationships. Of the committee members, only 
Mori, who acts as a vice-chairperson to Yaguchi, is shown to have family 
(a photo of his wife and baby is shown on his mobile phone background 
for a brief second during the aforementioned break) and no one, apart 
from him, attempts to contact their loved ones despite the emergency. 
The heroes are shown to be utterly devoted to their jobs to the point of 
absurdity (one would assume that in real life, there would be at least a few 
staff members who decide to flee or at least not want to volunteer to work 
24/7 under these circumstances) and this is presented as an admirable 
trait that is necessary to overcome national crises such as a Godzilla 
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attack (or, symbolically, the 3.11 triple disaster). These hardworking men 
defeat Godzilla by holding meetings, following necessary bureaucratic 
procedures, stamping documents, bowing to each other and working 
overtime, instead of going home and looking after their family, just like 
any good worker.
The film has the effect of making modern-day ‘corporate livestock’ 
audiences feel good about their jobs and their lifestyles, in what could 
be termed ‘shachi-cool’, in the same vein as ‘ota-cool’. This is a  clever 
strategy on Anno’s part because many of the audience members who 
grew up watching the Evangelion series in their adolescent years and 
who became adults in the ‘employment ice age’ of 1993–2005 are now 
likely to be part of this unmarried, ‘corporate livestock’ group. This is 
in contrast to the age group of their parents and superiors, the so-called 
dankai (baby boomer) generation, for whom the economic situation was 
ideal throughout their different life stages. In the film, this generation is 
depicted from the viewpoint of the shachiku generation, as mostly inept 
and narrow-minded individuals, who are unable to adapt to change. 
At the beginning of the film, following the Aqualine underwater tunnel 
accident in Tokyo, the prime minister laughs off Yaguchi’s idea that the 
accident may have been caused by a giant underwater creature. This is 
immediately followed by a shot of Godzilla’s tail rising up from the sea, 
proving the prime minister and his cronies wrong. Many comic relief 
moments in the film are based around these older characters, such as 
the prime minister asking, ‘What? I decide here? Now!? You didn’t tell 
me about this in advance’ when asked to give permission to deploy the 
SDF against Godzilla (showing that the prime minister does not usually 
make any real decisions), or the exchange of ‘what!? it moves?’ and ‘of 
course, it’s alive’ by his ministers, upon receiving the report that Godzilla 
is moving towards the Tama River (demonstrating how slow these old 
men are at ‘getting’ new concepts). Conveniently, this older generation 
ends up being killed off in the third Godzilla attack on Tokyo because 
the helicopter that was carrying them to safety gets hit by the atomic 
laser beam emitted from the monster’s mouth. The extent to which this 
made the audiences of the film feel good is shown by the loving nickname 
used by fans online to refer to this incident: naikaku sōjishoku bî-mu 
(Cabinet en masse resignation beam).5
5  Another important reason why Godzilla fans used this nickname instead of referring to the 
incident was that they were trying to prevent the spread of spoilers to encourage more people to go 
watch the film. However, the name clearly makes a joke out of the situation.
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The film presents a convenient alternative reality to 3.11 for the long-
suffering Evangelion generation, in which the rōgai (a derogatory term used 
to describe old people who are useless and cause others trouble, without 
realising it themselves), who usually boss them around and make them 
do unnecessary tasks, are killed off and the younger generation become 
the heroes who save Japan. In doing so, it also portrays the shachiku as 
a kind of cool figure—highly competent and hardworking who are simply 
unable to reach their full potential due to the older generation. This can 
be seen as a return to the positive concept of the kigyō senshi (corporate 
warriors) of the 1990s, except that the shachiku is a much more passive 
figure, preferring to work in groups rather than to stand out through 
individual achievements.
This kind of corporate shachiku mentality is even carried over to the 
SDF. For example, when a platoon leader is asked whether they will 
ask for volunteers to go and attack Godzilla from a helicopter, which is 
an unprecedented and dangerous mission as the target may behave in an 
unexpected (sōteigai) manner, he simply replies that they will follow their 
usual rotation because they have all been ready for the worst since they 
joined the SDF. While this is a tear-jerking moment for the audience, it is 
doubtful that most members of the SDF, which has never been dispatched 
to combat, have actually prepared themselves for the possibility of death 
in combat when they signed up (as evidenced by an earlier attack scene by 
the Tama River when a nervous Private First Class is heard saying, ‘It’s still 
hard to believe we will actually be fighting here’). In this way, this shachiku 
mentality is also highly nationalistic and current in the context of a Japan 
that is currently debating whether to expand the range of the SDF’s 
activities by changing the Constitution. It may also be important to note 
here that the film had the full cooperation of the SDF, which the SDF 
famously only allows for films that portray the forces in a positive way.
The speech delivered to the SDF by Yaguchi further reinforces this 
romanticisation of self-sacrifice for one’s own country:
During the yashiori plan, you may be hit by radiation beams or 
suffer from acute radiation poisoning. I cannot guarantee that 
you will make it back alive. However, I am begging you to go! 
Our  nation’s power is gathered here today. The SDF is the last 
bastion of hope for defending this country. I am entrusting you 
with the future of our country. That is all.
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It is possible to read all this as a kind of big ‘black joke’—it is clear that 
the ‘real Japan’ is not like this at all, the older generation are still alive and 
will not be suddenly killed off by a single radiation beam, the shachiku 
are more  likely to commit suicide or become depressed than to defeat 
monsters and Japanese technology has not been cool for many decades. 
Did Anno want the Japanese audience to reflect on how terrible they really 
are, instead of believing that they would be capable of overcoming such 
a national crisis? One could say that the old scientists in the film, who said 
there is nothing that can be said about Godzilla using the current level 
of science, are absolutely correct—no one can understand such a beast, 
let alone find a way to beat it in a matter of days. We could even say 
that the decidedly uncool idea of nuking Tokyo and sacrificing most of 
the country to save the world from the monster seems like a much more 
reliable solution, given the circumstances.
Katayama Morihide, a political scientist who also writes widely on music, 
suggests that one possible reading is to view the second half of the film as 
a fantasy, which is contrasted against the reality of the first half (Katayama 
& Yamanaka, 2016). That is, the world does indeed ‘end’ following 
Godzilla’s rampage in Tokyo and what happens afterwards (the Yashiori 
plan and its success) is just an ideal scenario of ‘what could have been’ 
for the film and also for Fukushima. He points out that the music also 
underscores this. During the scenes of the catastrophe, the melancholic 
chorus of the classical-style music in the background evokes a Gregorian 
Dies irae melody, a symbol for the Last Judgement, often used for Requiem 
Mass. However, after this, from when Yaguchi’s team rebuilds in the city 
of Tachikawa, 40 km west of central Tokyo, the music changes to a mix of 
upbeat and dramatic melodies from Evangelion and Uchū daisensō [Battle 
in Outer Space] (1959),6 which helps the audience to suspend disbelief 
when the young government suddenly starts to function and everything 
falls into place to defeat the monster.
Whether we read the ending as being realistic or not, I argue that it was 
Anno’s intention that the film would be read in many different ways. 
In the film, Maki Goro leaves the following cryptic words with his notes, 
before disappearing: ‘I did as I pleased. Do whatever you want’. The 2016 
collection of essays by Nikkei Business Online, which contains the above 
6  Composer Ifukube Akira, who created the soundtrack for the 1954 Godzilla, also created 
the soundtracks for Battle in Outer Space. The two films were both made by the Honda Ishirō and 
Tsuburaya Eiji duo, who created many other films together for Toho.
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Katayama article, is a testament to the fact that many have taken Anno 
up on this challenge and have developed their own readings. However, for 
the general Japanese public, I argue that Anno’s film played an important 
role of psychologically healing the nation from post-3.11 frustration and 
anger, like the original post-war Godzilla of 1954 helped to restore faith in 
the nation. By elevating Japanese technology, otakus and shachikus to cool 
status, Anno shows that the Japanese are very much capable of dealing 
with a disaster like Fukushima in the future, so long as the old rōgai are 
removed and the young talents and misfits are able to shine.
Quantum Zen as a Philosophy for the 
Twenty-First Century in Ruth Ozeki’s 
A Tale for the Time Being
The portrayal of Japan as continuing to be relevant in the modern 
world was not limited to tangible areas such as advanced technologies. 
The following example that I explore involves the portrayal of Zen 
Buddhism, meditation practices and the concept of ikigai as philosophies 
that continue to be cool and globally helpful in the twenty-first century. 
Whether people are conscious of their influence, there is no doubt that 
Eastern philosophies are frequently relied upon in the West as ways to 
relieve the tensions of modern corporate life, as well as to find meaning 
in life, such as yoga and the mindfulness movement. More recently, the 
concept of ikigai (a Japanese version of raison d’être) took off outside of 
Japan with the publication of Héctor García and Francesc Miralles’s book, 
Ikigai: The Japanese Secret to a Long and Happy Life, which was also popular 
in other Western languages such as French and Spanish (first published 
in Spanish in 2016). Ikigai has now become the next lifestyle ‘it’ word, 
along with Danish hygge or the Swedish lago and has inspired numerous 
other publications.
Ruth Ozeki’s 2013 English-language novel, A Tale for the Time Being, 
portrays Japan as a centre of this spiritual cool. An American-Japanese 
author raised in Connecticut and an ordained Buddhist priest who 
currently divides her time between the US and Canada, Ozeki is 
undoubtedly well placed to be a proponent of Zen. Ozeki demonstrates 
the continued power of Japanese ways of thinking in three main ways: 
first, by showing the power of Buddhist ‘radical interconnectedness’ in 
bridging gaps between people; second, by revealing how Zen can be 
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used to combat contemporary social issues such as suicide; and third, 
by exploring the concept of ikigai, although her teenage protagonist and 
her grandmother use the term ‘superpower’ instead. In doing so, Ozeki 
contributes to the more recent representation of Zen as a philosophy 
and logical way of thinking that can help modern humans to find their 
purpose in life, rather than being a religion (as the term ‘Buddhism’ evokes 
to most Western readers). Although Ozeki is not the first to introduce 
Zen Buddhism to the West, it is still not widely regarded as a solution 
to real-life problems, such as suicide prevention in the Western world. 
Especially in the US, Zen Buddhism was consumed by most as a stylised, 
frivolous fad, even when it was at the peak of its popularity, in the late 
1950s (Iwamura, 2011, pp. 33–35). Although this may be changing today 
with newer forms of Buddhism-based practices such as the mindfulness 
movement, meditation continues to be associated with relaxation in 
most of the Western world rather than the serious philosophy that Ozeki 
attempts to describe in her book.
A Tale for the Time Being received wide critical acclaim for its thoughtful 
combination of the Bildungsroman genre and philosophical explorations. 
The book was shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize and won the Los 
Angeles Times Book Prize for Fiction and UK Independent Booksellers 
Award. It has also been translated into French, Spanish, Italian, 
Portuguese, Russian, Hungarian and Japanese. The plot is deceptively 
simple: a Japanese-Canadian writer, Ruth (a  semiautobiographical 
character based on Ozeki), picks up a freezer bag containing a diary and 
other valuable items that seems to have washed ashore on Cortes Island, 
British Columbia, as a result of the 3.11 tsunami. The diary, which is 
concealed between the covers of Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu, 
contains the story of a teenage girl, Nao, who spent her childhood in the 
US—her father worked as an IT professional in Silicon Valley before the 
dot-com bubble burst. Back in Japan, Nao faces horrific bullying at her 
school as well as her father’s repeated suicide attempts and depression 
as a result of not being able to provide for his family. Hope is presented 
towards the end of Nao’s story when she receives the care and wisdom 
of her great-grandmother Jiko, who is a 104-year-old ex-anarchist poet 
and a Zen Buddhist nun. The novel begins in Nao’s voice, as she decides 
to tell the story of her great-grandmother’s life in the diary of Nao’s last 
days on earth, before she commits suicide. Through the act of reading 
the diary and working through the other clues in the freezer bag, Ruth’s 
life becomes intertwined with Nao’s and Ruth becomes more and more 
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obsessed with Nao and her current situation; even though, as her husband 
Oliver reminds her, the diary was written more than a decade ago and it is 
probably already too late to save Nao. Did Nao commit suicide? Was she 
a victim of the tsunami? The reader never finds definite answers to these 
questions. Instead, the resolution of the book lies in an exploration of Zen 
Buddhism, quantum physics7 and the interconnectedness of all things.
Ozeki had written Nao’s story prior to 3.11, but had spent many years 
attempting to find an appropriate reader for the diary; she had even 
experimented with a nameless, genderless, ageless reader (2013d). 
However, the events of 3.11 inspired Ozeki to write herself, as well as 
her husband and her surroundings into the story, which was something 
she had avoided before as she considered it to be too ‘self-conscious’ 
(Ozeki, 2013c). The addition of Ozeki into the novel establishes a link 
between Nao’s pre-3.11 story and 3.11, as well as between the novel and 
the reality of 3.11. By inserting herself into the novel, Ozeki dissolves 
the various boundaries between self and other—between herself and 
her readers, non-Japanese and Japanese, as well as non-victims and 
victims. This is just one of the ways in which the Buddhist concept of 
interconnectedness is manifested in the novel. In Ozeki’s (2013b) words: 
‘Two of the most important tenets of Zen Buddhist philosophy are 
impermanence and no-self. All phenomena are impermanent. As such, 
nothing has a fixed self or identity, but instead, all things exist in a state of 
radical interconnectedness’. Ozeki attempts to transcend the self-versus-
other binary and show that identity, on both personal and national levels, 
is constantly in flux, existing in a web of complex interactions.
Having a hybrid identity and being an author, Ozeki’s alter ego Ruth is 
a highly appropriate reader for Nao’s story, who bridges the gap between 
Western readers and the ‘Japanese’ Nao. At first, Ruth is somewhat 
tormented by her status as a spectator. Ruth admits to ‘feeling vaguely 
prurient, like an eavesdropper or a peeping tom’, although she also 
points out that novelists in general ‘spend a lot of time poking their 
noses into other people’s business’ (p. 27). Ruth’s genuine concern for 
Nao’s wellbeing eventually overrides this hesitance. When beachcombers 
hear about Ruth’s discovery and come to hunt for washed-up safes and 
valuables on her island, she gets angry at them, even though she has 
decided to keep Nao’s freezer bag, as her neighbour and friend Muriel 
7  Quantum physics or quantum mechanics deals with physical phenomena at an atomic and 
subatomic level, where the laws of classical physics no longer apply.
RE-ImAgININg JApAN AFTER FukuSHImA
106
points out. Being a Japanese-American, Ruth is also able to add footnotes 
to Nao’s story, providing her own insight and explanations where Japanese 
terminology and concepts are used. This helps Ruth to better understand 
Nao’s story because her Japanese vocabulary was ‘out of date’, making her 
resort to internet searches for pop culture references (p. 50). The footnotes 
are not limited to definitions of Japanese terms and include personal 
remarks such as ‘88. Miyagi … Sendai is in Miyagi!’ (p. 206) when Ruth 
realises that Nao is about to go to an area of Japan that was hit hard by 
the earthquake and tsunami. There are some footnotes that refer to the 
appendices at the end of the novel, such as ‘9. For more thoughts on Zen 
moments, see Appendix A’ (p. 20). In some instances, Ruth does not have 
the answers. For example, she is unable to find the kanji for the name of 
Jiko’s temple (p. 247) and her limited knowledge of French means that 
she incorrectly interprets the line in Monique Serf ’s song Le mal de vivre, 
‘vaille que vivre’, as ‘It’s brave to live?’ (p. 314).8 Although these footnotes 
help Ruth, they are also useful for the reader who requires these further 
explanations, which raises the question of whether it is really Ruth (the 
character) that wrote them or Ozeki (the author). Strangely, there are also 
footnotes in Ruth’s part of the story (pp. 103, 143), which has the effect 
of dissolving the boundaries between Ruth and Nao, as well as between 
Ozeki and the reader (the layering bringing to light the double role of 
Ozeki as author and reader of her own writing). The numbering of the 
footnotes is continuous throughout the novel, from the Dōgen and Proust 
quotes that are provided at the beginning of each of the four parts of the 
novel to Nao and Ruth’s respective stories and also in the appendices.
Radical Interconnectedness
As mentioned earlier, Ozeki demonstrates her idea of ‘radical 
interconnectedness’ most noticeably through the relationship between 
Ruth and Nao. Ruth begins to feel ‘oddly protective of Nao and her diary’ 
(p. 212) as she reads through her story, even feeling ‘a strong sense of 
almost karmic connection with the girl and her father’ (p. 447). Although 
she becomes increasingly curious about Nao and searches for clues on the 
internet, Ruth decides not to rush ahead and ‘read at the same rate she’d 
lived’ (p. 537), so that ‘she could more closely replicate Nao’s experience’ 
(p. 63). Ruth becomes so involved in Nao’s story that she begins to 
8  It should be ‘we must live the life we have. We must soldier on’, according to Ruth’s French 
neighbour, Benoit (p. 220).
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influence it herself. For example, words disappear from the last pages of 
the diary as Nao finishes recounting past events and catches up to her 
present, her ‘now’ (the homonymy is particularly apt here). Ruth makes 
the words reappear by responding to Nao’s cry of help through a dream. 
In an unexpected surrealist twist to an otherwise very realistic story, it is 
this dream encounter that reunites Nao with her father, which creates 
a happy ending for her story. There is a sense that Nao (the author of the 
diary) is being helped by Ruth (the reader of the diary) just as much as 
Nao helps Ruth.
Ozeki’s Zen ‘radical interconnectedness’ is presented as being as much 
a  solution for the problems afflicting post-3.11 Japanese society as it 
is for her post-3.11 novel. Most importantly, the concept is helpful in 
alleviating the strict demarcation between victim and non-victim that 
often occurs after a disaster. For example, those who are direct victims 
of 3.11 have the tendency to distance themselves from non-victims or 
indirect victims because they feel as though non-victims cannot possibly 
have a full understanding of their devastation.9 This results in a situation 
in which only disaster victims are engaged with disaster-related issues 
and non-victims feel as though it is somehow wrong to get involved. 
Ozeki’s radical interconnectedness provides an alternative to this, giving 
non-victims the right to care. Ruth finds that even though ‘she received 
confirmation that the people she knew were safe … she couldn’t stop 
watching’ the footage of the tsunami (p. 165), because ‘the images 
pouring in from Japan mesmerized her’. Ruth is a non-victim, who does 
not personally know anyone involved in the disaster (with the exception 
of Nao, who may or may not have been a victim), but she still cares 
deeply about all those affected. Nao’s story seems to awaken this sense of 
interconnectedness in Ruth, reminding her of the impact such events can 
have on her own life, even if it is not immediately visible. The reader is also 
led to empathise with the suffering of disaster victims such as Mr Nojima, 
a sanitation worker who lost his whole family and house in the tsunami, 
speaking in a video that Ruth is watching. Through the representation of 
Mr Nojima, a fictional character who represents the real-life experiences 
of many tsunami victims, Ozeki encourages empathy that extends beyond 
our immediate circle of family and friends. While watching the tsunami 
footage, Ruth remarks that ‘there was a haphazard quality to the images, 
9  Wagō Ryoichi, the Fukushima-based poet explored in Chapter 3, expressed this as a feeling on 
the part of the victims that ‘we can feel the pain, but those who are not in pain would not understand’, 
which creates barriers between victims and non-victims (Wagō & Sano, 2012, pp. 202–204).
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as if the photographers didn’t quite realize what they were filming … not 
understanding the danger they were in … but always, from the vantage 
point of the camera, you could see how fast the wave was traveling and 
how immense it was’ (p. 166). Being at a similar ‘vantage point’ with 
regards to the disaster, with a knowledge of what might come to hit Nao, 
Ruth obsesses over her troubles and attempts to retrospectively become 
involved in her story, even though she knows it is probably too late.
Ozeki further highlights this interconnectedness by tightly weaving 
together  various elements in the plot. Like the gyres that connect the 
Japanese ocean to Cortes Island in British Colombia, where Ruth and 
Oliver live, all events in the novel are shown to have a global impact. 
For example, the September 11 attacks cause Nao’s father to become 
even more depressed and the US bombing of Afghanistan causes Nao’s 
menstrual bleeding to resume. 3.11 is also framed as a global disaster that 
has global causes and implications. The most obvious one is the tsunami’s 
role in linking Ruth’s life to Nao’s story over time and space, but the novel 
also points out facts, such as the coast of Japan moving closer to British 
Colombia by 13 feet and the length of the day being shortened as a result 
of the earthquake and the radiation fallout causing anxiety regarding 
foods  such as oysters and salmon where Ruth lives.10 Additionally, 
a  Japanese jungle crow, which seems to be a kind of reincarnation of 
Nao’s great-grandmother Jiko, appears in Ruth’s dreams and physically 
finds its way to Cortes Island by riding on the tsunami debris. Nao’s 
hikikomori story makes Ruth uneasy as she realises that she and Oliver are 
a kind of hikikomori as well and Nao’s father and Oliver make the same 
‘pu-pu-pu’ sound with their lips as they sleep. The universe of the novel 
can be described as functioning like an interconnected quantum system, 
as Ruth implies in the appendix on entanglement in quantum mechanics. 
In  quantum mechanics, particles can become ‘entangled’—that is, 
‘coordinate their properties across space and time and behave like a single 
system’ (p. 583). When two particles are entangled, the behaviour of one 
particle can influence the other in a  way that cannot be explained by 
classical physics (i.e. the influence even happens at such a distance that the 
particles would have to be travelling faster than the speed of light to have 
an impact on each other). Within the world of the novel, Ruth, Oliver, 
Nao and Jiko have all become entangled through Ruth’s act of reading 
10  There have been real-life examples of tsunami debris, including fishing floats, soccer balls and 
fuel tanks, arriving on the coasts of North America (Barboza, 2012; Wian, 2012).
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Nao’s diary. Further, although Ruth is the observer of Nao, creating 
her story, one could say she is being created by Nao, as Oliver claims, 
because classical chronological conceptions of time no longer apply in this 
quantum system. In exploring the theme of interconnectedness through 
the lens of Zen Buddhism as well as the modern discoveries of quantum 
mechanics, Ozeki cleverly creates numerous entangled and interconnected 
layers in her writing, which makes it possible for her to explore Japanese 
society from various perspectives.
Meditation as a Solution to Suicide
At first glance, the Japan that is portrayed by Ozeki does not appear to be 
a reliable source of advice on how to live—suicide is the most important 
social issue explored in the novel, both for the plot and because of what 
it reveals about Japanese society. Many types of suicide are portrayed: 
Nao’s father attempts suicide several times due to his depression and 
Nao considers suicide as a result of the horrific bullying she is subjected 
to at school. There is also the mention of the suicide of Socrates, Nick 
Drake, quantum physicist Hugh Everett’s daughter, the Japanese troops 
and Okinawan civilians in Tetsu no Ame (rain of steel; the 1945 Battle of 
Okinawa), the 9/11 suicide bombers and their victims who opted to jump 
instead of being burned alive and even the nineteenth-century depiction 
of the seppuku namazu, the Suicide Catfish, committing seppuku to atone 
for the deaths he caused by wiggling and thrashing underground. The issue 
of suicide is particularly relevant to post-3.11 Japanese society because 
Ozeki also mentions the post-Fukushima suicide of those displaced by 
the fallout, as well as the Certain Death Squad (aka Fukushima 50) that 
remained at the nuclear power plants to prevent a full meltdown (arguably 
a form of unrealised voluntary death).
Further, the readers’ perception of a high rate of suicide in the country is 
further strengthened by the figure of Nao’s father, who internalises foreign 
stereotypes about Japan as the land of harakiri and kamikaze. As he puts 
it in his stilted English, ‘Sometimes I think American people cannot ever 
understand why a Japanese would like to make a suicide. American people 
have a strong sense of their own importance. They believe in individual self 
and also they have their God to tell them suicide is wrong’ (p. 133). This is 
contrasted with Japanese Zen Buddhism, which does not explicitly reject 
the idea of suicide, unlike Christianity. To overcome his Japanese urges, 
Nao’s father attempts to read Western philosophy to find meaning in his 
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life and even emails an old friend psychology professor Dr Leistiko, to ask 
him to teach him ‘a simple American way to love my life’ (p. 133). In his 
email, Nao’s father describes that the Japanese have ‘appreciated suicide’ 
for ‘many thousands of years’ (p. 129), using it as a way to (ironically) 
truly experience life, ‘at least just for a moment’ (p. 130). This echoes the 
stereotypical idea in foreign Nihonjinron that suicide is socially accepted 
in Japan and that ‘the Japanese respect for [suicide] allows it to be an 
honorable and purposeful act’ (Benedict, 1946, p. 166).
One of the manifestations of this honourable suicide in modern Japanese 
society is the Japanese middle-aged workers who lose their jobs due to 
downsizing and attempt to hide this from their family by spending their 
days in a park, until they become ‘scared and feel ashamed like gomi’ 
(p. 131)11 and commit suicide, as Nao’s father explains. Suicide is also 
a problem in the modern Japanese schooling system that Nao finds 
herself in when she returns from the US. According to Nao, Japanese 
high school exams ‘decide your whole future and the rest of your life 
and even your afterlife’ (p. 190), because they determine your choice of 
university, employment prospects, income, potential partners, the life of 
your children and whether you receive a proper funeral, allowing you to 
enter the Pure Land and to not have to come back as a vengeful ghost. 
It is this kind of singular thought that does not allow for alternatives, 
which leads to suicide—just like a rōnin no longer had a raison d’être 
without his master, the existence of a modern-day rōnin (a student who 
fails their entrance exams and is preparing for the next session) hinges 
on his success in an examination. Without success, the rōnin turns into 
a nobody in the eyes of Japanese society, similar to Nao’s father, who turns 
into a hikikomori after attempting to commit suicide by throwing himself 
in front of a train. Nao notices that in this state, he looks eerily similar to 
what she imagines ghosts of workers who commit suicide look like. Even 
while still alive, Nao’s father is somewhere in between the realms of life 
and death. Nao ‘feels like a ghost’ (p. 186) after her ostracism at school 
and after she discovers that no one (even her best friend from Sunnyvale, 
Kayla) was responding to or viewing her emails and blog posts. Japanese 
society is shown to be a breeding ground for this kind of half-dead, 
half-alive outcast class, due to the lack of alternatives when one’s life does 
not go exactly to plan.
11  Gomi means ‘rubbish’ in Japanese.
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This idea that Japanese society does not provide alternatives is an oft-
repeated one in foreign Nihonjinron: in Japan as Number One, Ezra Vogel 
(1979) claimed that the Japanese have a tendency to condemn misfits, 
causing high suicide rates among those who do not ‘enter a place of 
work that he or his family consider[s] desirable’ and that ‘suicide rates 
are high among Japanese youth and those who are discouraged by not 
making the proper organization may be more depressed than their 
American counterparts, who will have a variety of later options open to 
them’ (p. 240). In these earlier pages of the novel, Nao and her father 
reinforce the stereotypical foreign portrayal of the Japanese as people who 
derive their meaning of life or happiness from a stable career. In this view, 
residents of the disaster-hit areas who still have not been able to return 
to their previous occupations would naturally be unhappy, as proven by 
the example of post-Fukushima suicides. Such a view carries the risk of 
masking the alarming nature of the high incidence of suicides following 
a disaster such as 3.11, which throws the lives of many off course.12 Nao’s 
story is centred around Nao and her father’s journey towards rejecting this 
internalised Nihonjinron idea of suicide and finding their own Japanese 
way to affirm life.
In the end, Ozeki demonstrates that the Japanese way of thinking points 
to life and that it may even be more helpful than its Western counterparts 
in helping people to avoid suicide. Nao’s great uncle Haruki (referred to 
as ‘Number One’ in the novel because Nao’s father is also called Haruki), 
who was a philosophy student at Tokyo University before getting drafted 
to the war, is the primary voice Ozeki uses for the comparison between 
Zen Buddhism and Western philosophy. Haruki chooses to seek meaning 
in the remaining few moments of his life as a kamikaze pilot through his 
knowledge of Zen Buddhism, rather than Heidegger’s philosophy, which 
he presumably studied at university. Haruki puts Zen master Dōgen’s 
philosophy on an equal footing with those of Western philosophers. 
He  points out that, ‘to philosophize is to learn to die’ (p. 464), even 
if there is a difference between East and West in ‘the notion of what it 
meant “to philosophize”’ (p. 464). Zen prevents Haruki from becoming 
despondent thinking about his imminent death and Dōgen’s idea that 
‘both life and death manifest in every moment of existence’ (p. 466) 
12  There were 117 suicides officially reported as ‘3.11-related’ in the Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate 
prefectures from 2011 to 2013. However, this figure is likely to be understated as it only includes 
suicides that could be formally attributed to the disaster (e.g. suicides that took place in evacuation 
shelters and temporary housing) (Cabinet Office, 2013).
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encourages him to live his last moments carefully. Haruki decides to use 
his last moment to turn his plane off course and to ‘end [his] life in watery 
disgrace’ (p. 466), with this knowledge that a single moment can have an 
impact on the fate of so many.
Although Heidegger and Dōgen both emphasise that a constant 
engagement with one’s death is necessary to live authentically, Haruki 
compares the thoughts of Heidegger to ‘labyrinthine Teutonic chambers’, 
while representing Dōgen’s thoughts as ‘quiet, empty rooms’ in which 
he finds comfort in the face of death—as Haruki puts it, ‘in between 
the words, Dōgen knew the silences’.13 Haruki finds ‘greater satisfaction 
in Zen and my own Japanese traditions’ (p. 467), which encourage 
understanding through the bodily experience of zazen (seated meditation), 
rather than words and analysis. In this way, Zen can offer a more direct 
affirmation of life—thinking and understanding in one’s mind that one 
must live authentically is different to feeling in one’s body that one must 
live authentically. Therefore, despite what the other Haruki in the novel—
Nao’s father—initially believes, Zen Buddhism is shown to be a more 
effective method to find meaning in life than text-based Western thought.
Nao’s father also eventually finds meaning in his life through Zen 
Buddhism, after some exploration of Western philosophy. After turning 
into a hikikomori, Nao’s father turns to the ‘Great Minds of Western 
Philosophy’, a book series that Nao’s mother receives for free from her 
workplace, as it was not selling well (perhaps an indication that Western 
philosophy does not suit Japanese tastes). When he finds a philosopher 
that he does not agree with, he takes their pages out of the books and 
folds origami insects with them—philosophers that get rejected include 
Hobbes and Nietzsche. This is particularly interesting because these 
two philosophers represent differing views on suicide. Hobbes, from his 
perspective of social contract theory, believed that the desire to commit 
suicide was irrational (and insane) and, therefore, based on reason, ‘a man 
is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away 
the means of preserving the same and to omit that by which he thinketh 
it may best be preserved’ (Hobbes, 1651, p. 64). Although there is no 
consensus on what Nietzsche’s thoughts were on suicide, he never rejected 
13  Haruki or Ozeki is not the first to compare Heidegger’s philosophy to Zen Buddhism. Reinhard 
May (1996) explored Daoist and Zen Buddhist influences on Heidegger’s work (especially his concept 
of ‘nothing’) and Steven Heine (1985) pointed out similarities in the conception of time in Heidegger 
and Dōgen’s works (Dōgen’s ‘impermanence’ being similar to Heidegger’s ‘finitude’).
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the act, claiming that ‘the thought of suicide is a great consolation: 
by means of it one gets successfully through many a bad night’ (Nietzsche, 
1909–1913, no. 157). Nao’s father rejects both extremes in the Western 
thought on suicide—outright prohibition, or moral acceptance. The one 
philosopher that seems to impress him is Heidegger, who would cause 
him to read passages aloud and interrupt Nao’s homework. However, even 
Heidegger is not entirely helpful, as shown when an even more depressed 
Nao’s father begins to fold a Japanese rhinoceros beetle out of his page. 
The words of another Western philosopher, Socrates, are used to justify 
his second suicide attempt: ‘I should only make myself ridiculous in my 
own eyes if I clung to life and hugged it when it has no more to offer’ 
(p. 407). Although Heidegger helps him, he finds the ultimate answer 
in the Zen Buddhism of his grandmother, Jiko. After all the things he 
tries, Jiko’s final words of ‘to live, for the time being’ is the only thing that 
convinces him that ikiru shika nai (we don’t have a choice but to live), for 
the time being (as in now, temporarily, but also in the sense that humans 
are ‘time beings’, with a time limit) (p. 518). Even though many Western 
philosophers condemn suicide, the simplicity of Zen Buddhist teaching is 
what convinces him in the end that life is worth living.
Zen Buddhism also helps Nao live and face her problems in several ways. 
First, Jiko teaches her to be always respectful and polite to others, no 
matter how they treat her. There is an especially illustrative and humorous 
scene when Jiko and Nao go to a Family Mart to buy some rice balls 
and chocolates for a picnic and they encounter some yankî (delinquent) 
school girls. Jiko calmly returns their nasty words with a bow, which earns 
her respect and causes them to return the bow. This respect also extends to 
objects (which are also beings, according to Zen), as shown by the careful 
re-using of ‘every rubber band or twist-tie, every piece of string or paper 
or scrap of fabric’ (p. 295) at Jiko’s temple. Although Nao disagrees with 
Jiko that ‘our original nature is to be kind and good’ (p. 262) and remarks 
that ‘many of the Great Minds of Western Philosophy back me up on 
this’ (p. 262), spending time with her great-grandmother gives her the 
ability to forgive. Second, Jiko helps Nao to find calm and peace within 
herself through zazen, which to her is like ‘a home that you can’t ever lose’ 
(p. 264). This is particularly significant for Nao, who ‘never had a home 
except for Sunnyvale, which [she] lost’ (p. 264). After moving back to 
Japan, Nao feels ‘like a foreigner living in that stupid Tokyo apartment 
with these strange people who said they were [her] parents but [she] barely 
even knew anymore’ (p. 199). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Zen 
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Buddhist ideas on time and impermanence are what ultimately stop Nao 
from ending her life. The Buddhist teaching of impermanence, as Ozeki 
shows, does not point to a nihilistic view of human existence; instead, 
it teaches Nao to cherish life precisely because it is fleeting. As Nao says 
when she is reflecting on her decision to end her life, ‘There’s nothing like 
realizing that you don’t have much time left to stimulate your appreciation 
for the moments of your life’ (p. 476). Zen Buddhism allows Nao, who 
grows up surrounded by adult lies and cover-ups, to eliminate her fears 
for life by allowing her to think about death and face it squarely for the 
first time.
At first, Nao believes that there are certain suicides that are more controlled 
and dignified (Haruki) than others (Nao’s father)—as Nao points out 
when she confronts her father, Haruki’s suicide was ‘totally different’, 
because ‘he wasn’t a coward’ and ‘he flew his plane into the enemy’s 
battleship to protect his homeland’ (p. 377). However, as Nao later finds 
out from reading Haruki’s secret French diary, Haruki had flown his plane 
deliberately into the sea instead of the battleship to avoid causing any 
casualties. Even in the case of a forced suicide like Haruki’s, we can still 
be in control of our own death—every moment of our existence counts, 
up to our last one because each moment contains numerous possibilities. 
Dōgen divided the snap of a finger into 65 moments to remind himself 
of this and, as Haruki puts it, ‘in even a fraction of a second, we have the 
opportunity to choose and to turn the course of our action either towards 
the attainment of truth or away from it’ (p. 466). With this realisation, 
Nao learns to cope with life by living each moment to the full, while 
being fully aware of the limited time we have, as time beings. Through the 
journeys of the main characters, Ozeki shows that despite Nao’s father’s 
belief that suicide is a Japanese phenomenon, the Japanese tradition of 
Zen Buddhism points to life.
Ikigai
Another way of finding happiness in life that is explored in the novel is to 
become a superhero with one’s own superpower (or ‘SUPAHIRO-!’ and 
‘SUPAPAWA-!’ as Jiko pronounces them)—the terms are first mentioned 
by Jiko after Nao tells her about her bullying at school and Jiko decides 
to give Nao instructions on how to sit zazen. Jiko’s Zen superpower is 
a kind of enlightened state, which gives people the strength to live their 
life by becoming superheroes. Interestingly, Heidegger also uses the term 
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hero, a concept that Haruki mentions in his diary. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger (1996) refers to man’s possibility of choosing one’s ‘hero’ 
(p. 385)—a great example of a human being—in the struggle to live 
authentically. Haruki Number One becomes Nao’s new hero when she 
finds out about him through Jiko and this also helps her to live her life. 
However, what she does not realise yet at this stage is that her own father 
is also ‘a total superhero’ (p. 555) who was fired from his job for standing 
up for his beliefs—refusing to apply his fun and addictive computer game 
interface to weapons technology, which would facilitate soldiers to carry 
out destructive bombing missions. It is through the examples of these two 
Harukis as well as Jiko that Nao learns what it is to live authentically.
According to both Zen Buddhism and Heidegger, anyone has the 
potential to be a (super)hero and have superpowers. Your superpower is 
what you do best, your raison d’être or ikigai, which you must focus on, 
accompanied by the knowledge that life is fleeting. Once Nao’s father 
decides to live, with the help of Zen Buddhism, he gets his superpower of 
programming back and delves into the world of quantum computing.14 
Getting inspiration from Nao’s bullying, Nao’s father devotes his time 
to developing an online encryption and security system called ‘Mu-Mu 
Vital Hygienics’, which involves using a web crawler to sanitise personal 
information on the internet. The crawler uses two methods, one 
mechanical and the other a much more complicated method involving 
the use of quantum computing to ‘collaborate between worlds and switch 
possible pasts’ (p. 549). As for Nao, she finds her ikigai in the ‘superpower’ 
of writing—on the last pages of her diary, she announces that she will 
write the story of Jiko’s life next and decides that ‘at least until I finish 
writing her story, I absolutely don’t want to die’ (p. 558).
Through the concept of radical interconnectedness as well as quantum 
entanglement, Ozeki asserts Ruth’s right to care about Nao and other 
potential 3.11 victims and makes the case for the global relevance and 
importance of the Japanese disaster. Ozeki suggests that the solution to 
Japanese problems such as suicide have been contained in the Japanese 
tradition of Zen Buddhism and that post-3.11 Japanese society needs to 
reclaim its traditional thinking to overcome these problems of modernity. 
Ozeki’s critique of Japanese society is not directed towards its social 
problems per se, but rather towards the fact that the Japanese have 
14  Quantum computers are in development at the time of writing and may soon become a reality, 
as Galchen (2011) explains in her New Yorker article (which Ozeki consulted for her book).
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internalised foreign stereotypes about themselves and have ignored their 
own traditions. As a transnational author, Ozeki provides a view from the 
outside on what traditions make Japan unique.
Ozeki’s focus on Zen Buddhism is particularly interesting in light of the 
fact that authors and commentators in Japan focused more on Shintō and 
animistic beliefs, such as the idea of earthquakes as divine punishment, 
as a spiritual framework for post-3.11 Japan (e.g. Wagō and Kawakami). 
Ozeki, an ordained Zen Buddhist priest who lives outside of Japan 
and who has consequently witnessed the popularity of Zen philosophy 
in the West in recent years, suggests that Zen Buddhism rather than 
Shintō, is the philosophy that has the power to remain relevant in the 
post-3.11 world. Japanese Zen philosophy is shown to be a particularly 
helpful tool for maintaining a positive attitude towards life and accepting 
changes to one’s life plans. Although all the thought systems explored 
in the novel—Zen  Buddhism, Heidegger and quantum mechanics—
embrace multiplicity and teach us to cherish our present in the face of 
impermanence, Ozeki concludes that zazen and writing are especially 
effective ways to experience this. A Tale for the Time Being is Ozeki’s 
expression of her continued belief in the power of fiction as well as Zen 
Buddhism in the post-3.11 world.
While otaku scholars such as Morikawa Kaichirō and Takekuma Kentarō 
(see Chapter 1) predicted the downfall of Japan’s cool culture following 
3.11, Shin Godzilla and A Tale for the Time Being affirm Japan’s continuing 
cultural and technological relevance to the world, albeit in different ways. 
These works both demonstrate that, with some searching, Japanese people 
can find the solutions to their post-3.11 problems within their own 




Mirroring the high level of interest in the Fukushima disasters in 
the French media, French-language authors were quick to respond to the 
Japanese triple disaster and were focused on the nuclear aspect, like many 
of the English-language authors. Early cultural responses such as Daniel de 
Roulet’s (2011) short book Tu n’as rien vu à Fukushima [You saw nothing in 
Fukushima], which takes the form of a letter addressed to a young Japanese 
woman living in Tokyo, or Après Fukushima—recueil de haïkus du cercle 
Seegan [After Fukushima—a collection of haiku by the Seegan group], 
edited by Seegan Mabesoone (2012), echoed the heightened attention 
towards nuclear power that dominated the media response to the disaster 
in France. Poet and Medievalist scholar Armelle Leclerq’s (2014) poetry 
collection Les équinoxiales [Equinox writings] continued this exploration 
of nuclear power by juxtaposing her writings on arbitrary, man-made 
nuclear disaster exclusion zones and radiation exposure limits against 
her pre-3.11 exploration of natural beauty in everyday Japanese scenes. 
In a similar way to Kawakami Hiromi’s Kamisama 2011 (see Chapter 2), 
the invasion of nuclear radiation into the everyday life of the Japanese, in 
which people must now protect themselves against rain, air and even food, 
is captured in her verse, producing a melancholic effect combined with 
the beauty of her earlier writing. Christophe Fiat (2011) produced his 
Retour d’Iwaki, as well as the radio fiction series Sur les traces de Godzilla 
(2013) on France Culture, both of which recount an author’s visit (Fiat in 
the former and a character called Guy Commerçon in the latter) to Tokyo 
and Tōhoku following the disaster, in which he is tormented by the cries of 
Godzilla and the history of Hiroshima. These responses demonstrate that 
Fukushima has become embedded in the French imagination of Japan 
in a similar way to Hiroshima. Fiat’s Godzilla metaphor is particularly 
RE-ImAgININg JApAN AFTER FukuSHImA
118
apt because in much of the French literary imagination, Japan is now 
associated with an omnipresent and ominous shadow of the nuclear, 
despite its appearance of normalcy.
Many of the cultural responses to 3.11 in the French language are examples 
of insightful writing that attempt to challenge the mainstream discourse 
surrounding the disaster, including Richard Collasse’s (2012a) L’océan dans 
la rizière (see Chapter 3), as well as Michael Ferrier’s (2012) Fukushima: 
Récit d’un désastre [Fukushima: the tale of a disaster], Nadine and Thierry 
Ribault’s (2012) Les Sanctuaires de l’abîme: Chronique du désastre du 
Fukushima [Snatched Away to Darkness: The Story of the Fukushima 
Disaster] and Philippe Nibelle’s (2011) Journal d’apocalypse [Diary of the 
apocalypse]. Written by French residents of Japan, these three latter works 
carefully trace the everyday issues experienced by those living in Japan 
at the time, such as the lack of information on radiation levels following 
the disaster, inaccurate media portrayals of disaster-hit areas by outlets 
based in the capital or overseas and the complicated nature of the Japanese 
nuclear power industry, making it possible for French speakers to gain an 
insight into everyday life during and after the disaster in Japan.
However, it is clear that japonisme is present in many French literary 
works, which continue to portray Japan as being fundamentally Other 
to the West. Interestingly, recent works seem to be harking back to the 
original, aesthetic japonisme of the late nineteenth century, in that they 
tend to portray Japan as a dreamy land of exotic beauty, rather than the 
typical late twentieth-century techno-Orientalist portrayal of the Japanese 
‘as if they have no feeling, no emotion, no humanity’ (Morley & Rovins, 
1995, p. 172). Perhaps the perceived weakening of Japan’s political and 
economic power following the triple disaster makes the country less 
threatening compared to the image of ‘ants’ working tirelessly for world 
domination, famously popularised in 1990s France by the then prime 
minister Edith Cresson. For example, Belgian French-language novelist 
Amélie Nothomb (1999) played a role in spreading exoticising portrayals 
of Japanese corporate life with her Stupeurs et tremblements [Fear and 
trembling]. This book traces the degrading experiences of Amélie as 
a young employee at a rigidly hierarchical Japanese company, filled with 
workaholic robot-like Japanese. However, Nothomb’s post-3.11 writings 
retrieve some of the gentler aspects of her stereotypes of Japan, found in 
Métaphysique des tubes [The character of rain] (2000) and rebrands the 
country as a heart-warming and beautiful place of childhood and nostalgia. 
Nothomb published a special edition of Stupeurs et tremblements three 
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months after the earthquake, which was accompanied by the short story 
Les myrtilles [The blueberry trees], the proceeds of which were donated to 
the Japanese operation of the Doctors of the World organisation. Unlike 
the book cover of the previous Livre de Poche edition (2001), which 
features a terrified-looking Nothomb against a backdrop of three Japanese 
men bowing in their suits, the 2011 book cover presents a beautiful red 
kimono pattern with the title and the author’s name in an Asian-style 
font. The disaster is markedly absent from Les myrtilles, a short and simple 
retelling of Nothomb’s heart-warming encounter with a man on the 
Asama Mountain, where she goes to find blueberry trees, reinforcing this 
idea of an exotically beautiful Japan.
In this chapter, two more works in this category of néo-japoniste fiction 
are explored to answer two questions: What exactly about Japanese people 
is still perceived as different and exotic by these French authors? If such 
a trend exists post-3.11, is it any different to the japonisme of yore?
Exotic Precarity in Thomas Reverdy’s 
Les evaporés
French author Thomas Reverdy’s (2013) novel Les evaporés 
[The  evaporated],  shortlisted for the Prix Goncourt 2013, was written 
during his six-month stay at the Kujōyama Villa in Kyoto from January 
to August 2012, as part of an art residency program associated with the 
Institut français du Japon-Kansai.1 The novel is the second of Reverdy’s 
recent noir-style works, preceded by L’Envers du monde (2010), set 
in post-9/11 New York and followed by Il était une ville (2015), set  in 
Detroit following the 2008 financial crisis. Although Reverdy had 
the idea to write a novel on the phenomenon of jōhatsu (evaporation; 
disappearances without known causes) prior to 3.11, the novel is based on 
this experience of living in post-3.11 Japan that the Kujōyama residence 
gave him. Reverdy’s work is rare in that it focuses on the margins of 
Japanese society, such as the jōhatsu, the day labourers of San’ya and the 
homeless, who are not usually associated with the Western image of Japan 
as a wealthy and egalitarian country. However, Reverdy’s novel is not a 
1  Renowned French author Eric Faye also took advantage of the program in 2012 and published 
Malgré Fukushima [Despite Fukushima] (2014), which was a personal journal and record of the 
beauty that remains in the country, despite the nuclear disaster.
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work of social criticism. Reverdy does not attempt to invite his readers 
to pity these marginalised social groups, but portrays them in a dignified 
light, at times even giving them an exotic, noir-style allure. Rather than 
questioning the myth of a homogenous Japan through the portrayal of 
its margins, Reverdy displays that the margins of Japanese society contain 
the essence of Japanese culture. Although Reverdy is aware of the not-
so-pretty side of living in the margins of post-3.11 Japanese society, he 
opts to portray them in this romanticised way as part of his defence of 
the dreams, imagination and fiction that fuels our lives, which runs like 
an undercurrent throughout the book. Reverdy presents a vision for 
post-3.11 Japan that continues to have an exotic appeal, despite the issues 
of social inequality that exist in the country.
In this novel, Richard B, a private detective based in San Francisco, spends 
his days pining for his Japanese ex-girlfriend Yukiko, who left him a year 
earlier. He is saved from his solitude by a phone call from none other 
than Yukiko, who asks him for help in looking for her father Kazehiro, 
who has ‘evaporated’—he has intentionally disappeared without a trace, 
for reasons unknown. Still very much in love with her, Richard B agrees 
to accompany Yukiko and search for her father in Japan, a country he 
only knows in relation to Yukiko and the snippets she introduced him 
to: Japanese cuisine, Zen meditation and Buddhist vegetarianism. 
Meanwhile, Kazehiro (now known as Kaze) finds Akainu, who is 
a  lonesome 14-year-old boy in San’ya, Tokyo, where they establish a 
business specialising in removals of all types (mostly unpleasant ones that 
no one else wants to be involved in). Kaze had decided to evaporate after 
being fired from his job at an investment company and being threatened 
by the yakuza, for reasons he believes are related to knowing too much 
about their shady involvement in the post-3.11 reconstruction effort. 
Following an encounter with a pair of yakuza in San’ya, Kaze and Akainu 
flee to the disaster-hit areas, where Kaze finds employment at the nuclear 
power plant and later establishes a business specialising in aiding people 
to evaporate. Akainu, who fled from Tōhoku following the tsunami, 
believing his parents to be dead, is reunited with his father. Richard B 
also miraculously manages to arrange a meeting with Kaze, but he does 
not attempt to persuade Kaze to come back to Yukiko and her mother. 
In Reverdy’s words, ‘in a French novel, they would have never been able 
to find her father and in an American novel, they would have been able to 
bring him back home. But this was the end of a Japanese story’ (310)—
hence the subtitle of the book, Un roman japonais [A Japanese novel].
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The other inspiration for the novel that can be deduced from the subtitle 
is Richard Brautigan’s Sombrero Fallout: A Japanese Novel. He quotes 
extensively from it (as well as Brautigan’s other works), with extracts in 
italics throughout the novel. Brautigan’s Yukiko is characterised by her 
‘long and Japanese’ hair, which is described obsessively by her ex-lover, 
the ‘American humorist’. Reverdy’s ‘Richard B’ is a combination of the 
‘American humorist’ and the real-life Brautigan. ‘Richard B’ is a private 
detective but also a socially awkward, whisky-drinking poet, much like 
Brautigan the author (many of Brautigan’s poems are presented as being 
Richard’s in the novel). This intertextuality is heightened by the fact 
that Brautigan’s novel is inspired by another Japanese novel, Tanizaki 
Jun’ichirō’s Sasameyuki [Makioka Sisters]. Yukiko is the name of one of the 
main characters of Sasameyuki—an ostensibly quiet, typically Japanese 
and beautiful woman, who is unmarried at the age of 30. It is clear that 
Reverdy draws inspiration from Tanizaki’s Yukiko as well as Brautigan’s 
version. There are many parallels between the three texts, including the 
lack of a father figure (due to death in Tanizaki, suicide in Brautigan and 
jōhatsu in Reverdy) and her portrayal as the epitome of old and beautiful 
Japanese tradition, which is juxtaposed with the free and independent 
temperament of her younger sister Taeko in Tanizaki’s novel. The result 
is the complex situation of a French author drawing inspiration from an 
American author who drew inspiration from a Japanese author, with all 
three writing about Japan.
The main undercurrent common to these three authors is their exotic 
portrayal of Japan, centred on the depiction of Yukiko as a desirable, 
beautiful Japanese female figure, who is lost in life, unmarried, unattached 
and waiting for the right man. Out of Tanizaki’s Makioka Sisters, it is not 
the Westernised and individual Taeko but the frail-looking and typically 
Japanese Yukiko that Brautigan and, subsequently, Reverdy choose to 
portray. There is a strong desire to portray Japan in an exotic manner on 
the part of the two authors. In Brautigan’s case, he chose to write about 
a Japanese woman despite the fact that the novel was inspired by a real-life 
break-up with his Chinese girlfriend, Siew-Hwa Beh. Reverdy, however, 
defends his decision in his endnote: ‘what we call the imaginary—the 
Japanese imaginary of nô or genre films, but also the occidental imaginary 
of Japan—are part of the reality of things. They shape our world. Without 
it, a forest will only ever be the sum of its trees’ (p. 314). In his view, both 
images and representations of Japan have value in themselves, regardless 
of how inaccurate they are, and he is not ashamed of contributing to this 
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exoticism. Reverdy also writes that ‘everything that is told here is true’, 
commenting on the truth of fiction and of imagination—once we think 
of something, it inevitably becomes part of our reality and starts to shape 
our view of the world. It is no surprise that Reverdy was inspired by 
Brautigan’s Sombrero Fallout, in which the American humourist’s imagined 
and absurd story starts to take a life of its own in his rubbish bin. Just 
like we can indulge in Brautigan’s tale of a below-freezing-point sombrero 
falling from the sky, there is nothing inherently wrong, in Reverdy’s view, 
in enjoying the exoticised portrayal of a beautiful, unchanging Japan that 
only exists in our imaginations.
Through the eyes of Richard B, who is visiting Japan for the first time, 
Reverdy explores Western stereotypes surrounding Japan as a country of 
contradictions. Within days of arriving in Japan, Richard manages to 
encounter ‘all the clichés’ from geiko, Japanese-style gardening and public 
baths to synthetic drugs sold freely and eating live icefish on his third day 
(a miraculous feat, considering that many Japanese people would not have 
seen these in a lifetime of living in Japan), as though Yukiko is determined 
to show him all that is strange about the country. Richard expected to see 
what he had seen in manga, films and literature on Japan and finds that 
‘all the clichés about Japan are true, even those that contradict each other’ 
(p. 84). Japan is a blend of the modern and the traditional, Western and 
familiar in appearance but Other in many ways. Although Westernised 
and modern in many ways, Japan is also an island nation where things 
‘do not change very quickly’ (p. 268). The men appear to be in control, 
but it is in fact the women who control their lives (p. 127) and so on.
In some ways, this phenomenon of contradiction is explained by the 
idea that ‘all of Japan today is but a weakened reflection of the tradition’ 
(pp. 102–103). The tradition exists as traces in a country that is modern 
and Westernised for the most part, giving the impression of contradiction. 
Just like Tanizaki’s Yukiko, Reverdy’s Yukiko represents the beautiful dying 
tradition. In Reverdy’s case, Yukiko’s traditionally Japanese elements are 
preserved in time due to her escape to the US. However, Reverdy makes 
it clear that this is a phenomenon not limited to Japan. Richard is also 
a specimen from a bygone era, from ‘the country of large spaces and trout-
fishing’ (p. 267). Yukiko and Richard represent the stereotypical exoticised 
hetero-images of their respective countries and yet they are lost, even at 
home, as their ‘countries don’t exist anymore’ (p. 267). Nevertheless, 
unlike Tanizaki’s Yukiko or ‘the French who think France is a country 
of literature, even though they only make perfume and Bordeaux there 
123
6 . ExOTIC JApAN
now and the Italians who would talk about opera for hours’ (p. 267), 
Yukiko and Richard are painfully aware of their outdatedness, living in 
the modern world.
Reverdy also speaks to the impossibility of understanding the Other in 
a complete manner, through the relationship of Richard and Yukiko. 
Richard realises that ‘during the whole year that they were together, 
sleeping together at her place—occasionally at first, then more and more 
frequently and finally virtually every night—he basically didn’t know 
anything about her’ (p. 52). Richard’s feeling is also underscored by the 
fact that, although the two were sleeping at ‘home’, Yukiko only feels truly 
at home when she returns to Japan—what Richard thinks of as being 
Yukiko’s home is not even her real home. If even lovers who spend all 
their time together cannot understand each other, then it seems like an 
impossible notion that one can come to an understanding of a cultural 
Other, with whom there is little interaction. Even Kaze, a Japanese-born 
Japanese, has an exoticised view of his own country. It is revealed that his 
image of Tōhoku is a highly romanticised one, involving rice, sake and 
solitary pines. Reverdy claims that all Japanese have a furusato—‘an image 
tinged by nostalgia which inspires popular songs’ (p. 288), involving 
some traditional and unchanging element, such as a festival, flowers or 
a bridge. If exoticism is to be defined as the allure of the Other, often 
involving reductive representations, then it is everywhere around us—we 
even exoticise our own childhood, selectively remembering what we can 
no longer experience easily as adults. It is difficult to blame Richard, who, 
even after his various experiences in Japan, reduces the Japanese to three 
characteristics: polite, delicate and beautiful (when it comes to women). 
Reverdy allows his readers to feel comfortable with this and to indulge in 
Richard’s exotic experiences.
Japan is portrayed as a country that continues to have an exotic appeal to 
the West. This is contrasted with America, which gives people dreams but 
disappoints them when they get to know the country. Unlike Richard, 
whose real-life experiences in Japan do nothing to quell his exotic 
Japanese dream in the form of Yukiko, she cannot love Richard because 
her ‘American dream’ involved ‘being an actress, marrying a young and 
handsome man that she meets by coincidence, who would come home 
at night to eat dinner with her and make love and take her to holidays 
in Europe’ (p. 291). Her dream is irreconcilably different to the reality of 
the old, overweight and broke Richard. For Yukiko, her experience with 
Richard makes her realise that this ‘American dream’ was not for her and 
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she loses all hope for America. She can no longer maintain that dream 
because she has realised that her life with Richard would never be the 
American life she envisioned. Convinced that her real home is in Japan, 
she decides to not go back to San Francisco.
Richard is aware of the negative sides of Japanese society, such as 
‘the playacting, the misunderstandings, the solitude, the conformism’ and 
insists that there is no need to accept the whole Japanese ‘package’, even if 
he appreciates other aspects of Japanese culture (p. 267). At the beginning 
of the novel, Richard defends his dying profession of private detective by 
criticising people who would rather set up webcams in their own home 
and carry out their own detective work than ask for professional help. In 
his view, private detectives exist for the purposes of shielding their clients 
from the harsh, bare reality of the images of adultery and to soften the 
blow of the news. In a similar way, there are many dreams in the novel 
that are maintained by the characters not knowing or opting to not chase 
the full reality. These include Richard’s hope for another relationship 
with Yukiko, the dream of the Bubble economy or even the dream that 
the government protects its citizens. Despite his insistence, Richard, 
representing the West in this novel, is reluctant to face various truths 
regarding Japan, opting to turn a blind eye to the social problems in the 
country to keep his exotic images alive. For Richard, Japan continues to 
be a mysterious place of alternatives or escape, where anything is possible. 
Another interesting metaphor is the story of an old gentleman and art 
lover told by Yukiko, in which the gentleman created an artists’ retreat 
and then went blind, becoming unable to view the beautiful art around 
him. However, according to Yukiko, the gentleman was able to obtain 
satisfaction and peace because he believed the art to be beautiful even 
though he could not see it. Reverdy implies that the West is like this blind 
man—Westerners are too far away (either by circumstance or will) to 
know the real Japan, but they believe the country to be beautiful and they 
derive enjoyment out of this game of imagination.
In keeping with his argument on the merits of constructed images, 
Reverdy  does not explicitly criticise the Japanese way of not always 
disclosing the full reality, in both the public and private spheres, unlike 
other authors and intellectuals commenting on post-3.11 Japan. Kaze’s 
evaporation, central to the plot, involves disappearing without telling his 
wife anything to protect her. Although Yukiko initially struggles with this, 
she eventually comes to accept that her father now lives a different life 
(it is unclear whether her mother comes to such an understanding). Yukiko 
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implicitly admits that her mother lying to her during their weekly calls, 
reassuring her that everything was fine following 3.11, helped her to focus 
on her own life in the US. In the earlier pages of the novel, Richard reflects 
on the seismologists who bravely explained that even if it were possible to 
predict an earthquake a few days in advance, the population would not 
be told because there is a higher probability of more people dying from 
the panic than the earthquake itself. Richard asks: ‘Why do politicians, 
experts and journalists depress us with the prospect of catastrophes for no 
reason, then?’ (p. 18). This inevitably brings to mind the delayed public 
response of the Japanese Government to the Fukushima nuclear disasters. 
Reverdy appears to be defending their decision to some extent. Similarly, 
when he meets Kaze at the end of the novel, Richard decides that there 
is no point in talking to him about his daughter who crossed the Pacific 
to find him or his wife’s sadness because he is now a different man and 
he cannot return to his former life. Richard simply calls this ‘tact’, or the 
‘virtue of poets’ (p. 300), and gives logic and reason to what Japanese 
intellectuals criticised as ‘hide-ism’, or the ‘Japanese sickness’.
Reverdy explores what is usually hidden in Japanese society, as long as it 
fits in with his exotic hetero-image. The French journalist that Richard 
meets explains that ‘those on the margins … are more reliable when it 
comes to knowing about a society … If you want to know the country, 
study its basement’ (pp. 223–224). Throughout the novel, Reverdy 
emphasises the notion that it is in the margins of Japanese society that 
the essence of Japaneseness is found. Richard notices the way in which 
the homeless in Ueno Park prefer to take care of themselves by finding 
food in rubbish bins rather than begging and how they place their shoes 
outside of their tents, just like those Japanese living under a roof. In the 
way of living of the homeless, Richard sees the traces of an ancient code 
of individual and social honour, exemplified by bushidō (the way of the 
warrior). This symbolic centrality of the margins in Japan is also explained 
through the metaphor of ukiyo (the floating world), which is often used to 
refer to the worldly existence of prostitutes, actors and vagrants of the Edo 
period (as in ukiyo-e), but has its roots in the typically Japanese concept 
of impermanence—the idea is that because the world is impermanent, it 
made sense to Edo-era Japanese to spend their lives seeking pleasure and 
these marginal figures were necessary. It is important to note that this 
image of the ‘floating world’, exemplified by woodblock prints, was also 
a staple of the japonisme movement, which was how Japan was culturally 
introduced to many in Europe. Richard (and Reverdy) incorporate Japan’s 
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margins into their dream of an exotic Japan—the margins represent 
a typically Japanese space, which does not contradict all the stereotypical 
clichés about Japan, but rather exemplifies them.
Japan is often described as a wealthy nation, composed entirely of the 
middle class (ichioku sō chūryū)2 and only in recent years has there been any 
attention paid to the country’s poor or its social margins, especially in the 
Western media.3 One explanation for this lack of attention is philosopher 
Maruyama Masao’s metaphor of Japanese society as being a  collection 
of octopus pots, quoted by Richard (p. 123), which suggests that these 
marginal social groups are isolated from each other as well as from 
mainstream society, like the octopus in different pots, preventing their 
plight to be known to the world. For example, the yakuza traditionally 
take special care to distance themselves from mainstream society, which 
they call katagi (respectable, honest) and the average Japanese does not 
know much about them. However, Reverdy’s portrayal of the margins 
does not aim to bring his reader’s attention or awareness to their plight. 
Reverdy is, for the most part, happy for these marginal groups to stay 
in their respective octopus pots, each with their own social codes and is 
only interested in them as a source of exoticism within Japan. Reverdy’s 
portrayal of the margins include the day labourers of San’ya, the homeless 
and the women of the ‘lost generation’, but his portrayal gives dignity to 
these groups and at times even romanticises them, rather than denouncing 
their situation.
The most notable marginal group that appears in the novel is the day 
labourers of the district, known as San’ya, in the Taitō ward of Tokyo, 
where they are given precarious and often dangerous jobs in construction 
or cleaning, if they are lucky. San’ya labourers are of particular interest 
in the post-3.11 context, when there was an influx of labourers from the 
disaster-hit areas, as Reverdy describes: ‘those who had debts or who lost 
themselves in trauma came to Tokyo in the hopes of starting a new life’ 
(p. 73). Ironically, in Reverdy’s novel, they are then sent back to Tōhoku to 
work in the decontamination effort or at the nuclear power plant because 
‘these men were excluded from the statistics that allow normal people to 
2  The term ichioku sō chūryū refers to the idea that all 100 million (ichioku) Japanese people believe 
that they are middle class (chūryū). The Digital daijisen dictionary (2015) explains that the term 
came about in the 1960s, when the majority of Japanese began to describe their standard of living as 
‘middle class’ in national opinion polls.
3  In recent years, there has been increased attention on the issue of the working poor. Examples 
include articles by Fackler (2010) for the New York Times and by Kim (2014) for Reuters.
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feel safe’ (p. 74). It is implied that these men were originally the ‘workers, 
fishermen, craftsmen and farmers’ from the disaster-hit areas, forced to live 
closer and closer to the water (and, therefore, being in a more vulnerable 
situation in the case of a tsunami) due to their economic position relative 
to the landowners (p. 188). However, Reverdy remarks that an interesting 
aspect of San’ya is that the area does not look like a slum. It looks like an 
ordinary suburb like any other to an undiscerning eye. One really has to 
know what to look for, which makes it perfect for Reverdy’s mysterious, 
noir-style setting. In the style of French crime fiction, even the urban 
landscape of San’ya is endowed with a dark, exotic beauty. For example, 
the recruiting of day labourers on the street is gracefully described as 
‘a ballet without music or poetry’ (p. 71), with the men rolling up their 
sleeves to show they are not cold, taking off their hats and smiling to show 
their healthy hair and teeth.
A French ex-journalist in the novel explains that 70 per cent of those 
living in San’ya are jōhatsu (p. 274), which is unsurprising considering 
the tens of thousands that disappear every year in Japan. As Reverdy 
reminds us time and again, the police do not typically investigate these 
cases and the families do not like to discuss the issue either because it is 
considered dishonourable. Nevertheless, the notion of disappearing and 
starting a new life seems to hold a romantic appeal to the French, rather 
than repel them. Lena Mauger and Stephane Remael’s (2014) reportage 
Les évaporés du Japon [Evaporations in Japan] was met with enthusiasm 
by French readers. The book has many factual similarities with Reverdy’s 
work and includes the story of a man who runs a business helping people 
to evaporate, much like Kaze. The French fascination with the idea of 
evaporation is likely to be linked to domestic economic factors in France, 
where unemployment reached record levels in 2015. Perhaps this makes 
the idea attractive to French readers who dream of starting their life 
afresh, like the jōhatsu.4 Although Richard initially confesses that he does 
not understand why anyone would do this in Japan, he eventually comes 
to a certain understanding of the phenomenon. Introduced by the French 
journalist, Richard meets a real-life jōhatsu, the ex–pink film director 
Pinky, who was forced to evaporate due to some debt that he incurred 
from the yakuza for the budget of one of his ambitious films. Richard 
describes Pinky as having a ‘certain allure … of an old beauty which has 
4  This contradicts the idea that Japan is a country in which you are given one chance for everything 
in life, as observed in Ozeki’s work. Although evaporation is living outside of normal society and is not 
truly comparable, it is an indication that stereotypes of Japan tend to exist in contradictory pairs.
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preserved its charms’ (p. 244); preferring to meet in bars hidden in the 
upper levels of old buildings and armed with a bragging grin (p. 273), 
he is undoubtedly a likeable character, despite his past.
People in Japan do not always evaporate for financial reasons. It could be 
claimed that Yukiko is also a kind of jōhatsu. Reverdy seems to encourage 
this interpretation by calling his novel Les évaporés, when the singular 
L’évaporé would suffice to refer to Kaze’s evaporation. Yukiko became an 
adult during the lost generation of the 1990s, when ‘the youth never had 
so little future outlook’ and ‘there had never been more people committing 
suicides and running away’ (p. 48). Yukiko runs away from home at the 
age of 18 and starts waitressing at a bar in Tokyo. Although Yukiko was 
not in debt like many of the other jōhatsu in the novel, she escapes from 
mainstream society and attempts to start a new life, first in the underworld 
and then in the US. Her Japanese friends are also shown to be precarious, 
marginal figures, but in a different way; having missed the ‘right age’ to 
marry at 25, now they are leftover ‘Christmas cakes’ that no one shows 
interest in after the 25th (Christmas Day). Without a stable job, they 
rely on part-time work and dates with older men to support themselves. 
However, Reverdy paints their existence in a romanticised light as being 
beautiful and seemingly without worry, such as snacking and drinking 
tomato shōchū and shiso tantakatan in an izakaya in Meguro.
Although most Japanese marginal figures are an object of Reverdy’s 
romantic Western gaze, from the labourers of San’ya and the jōhatsu to 
the ‘Christmas cake’ girls of the lost generation, there is one exception: 
the yakuza, who are often portrayed in a positive manner and exoticised 
in the West, in a similar way to the Italian mafia. French readers would 
most likely associate the yakuza with Kitano Takeshi films such as 
Zatōichi, in which the chivalrous code of ninkyō is respected. Following 
3.11, foreign media focused on yakuza disaster relief efforts, which were 
not reported on in Japan (e.g. Adelstein 2011b, 2012; Bouthier 2011). 
Similarly, in the novel, the yakuza are initially described as having had 
a role in re-establishing order in the disaster-hit areas before the police 
and reclaiming their ‘historic role as the protector of the nation’ (p. 177). 
Yukiko even takes the role of defending the yakuza by saying that they 
make society safer and describes it as ‘a company for people who couldn’t 
become salarymen’ (p. 266). Reverdy also takes advantage of their seedy 
mystery on a superficial level, as evidenced by his depiction of the lavish 
traditional-style abode of a yakuza ‘shōgun of the shadows’, who lives with 
a 12-year-old girl dressed in elaborate maiko gear and blackened teeth.
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However, just like this girl who appears beautiful at first glance but 
conceals a terrible secret, the yakuza is shown to be rotten at the core. 
Despite the traditional portrayal of the yakuza as a Robin Hood–style 
figure who helps the downtrodden in the spirit of ninkyō, Reverdy 
shows that the yakuza in post-3.11 Japan could not be further from this 
ideal. Kaze was fired from his job because he knew too much about the 
involvement of the yakuza in the reconstruction business in the Tōhoku 
region. These yakuza, as we find out, send the people who have borrowed 
money from them and the homeless to the disaster-hit areas, where the 
lucrative reconstruction contracts are, to take a cut. The yakuza take 
advantage of the indebted victims in Tōhoku, whose houses, still under 
loan, were washed away or devalued close to zero. The bleak and bare 
villages of temporary housing with plastic bathrooms are the only part 
of Japan exempt from Reverdy’s exoticism, which highlights this contrast 
between the ninkyō ideal and reality.
There is no longer a strict demarcation between normal society and the 
yakuza, as supposedly dictated by their chivalrous code, with the yakuza 
posing as legitimate companies to secure these reconstruction contracts. 
The yakuza are described as being involved in petty crimes and violence 
from racketeering, beating up Koreans and selling Chinese prostitutes, to 
threatening people who cannot pay back their debt. They take advantage 
of those in the margins instead of helping them. Similar to when he 
describes the temporary housing in Tōhoku, Reverdy’s language becomes 
raw and bare when it comes to these crimes committed by the yakuza, 
which makes his criticism clear. The French ex-journalist underscores this 
idea that the yakuza has lost touch with their chivalrous roots, when he 
describes their past activities: ‘It was more human. It smelled of urine 
and bitter alcoholic sweat … It was violent, brutal, unfair, tragic, if you 
will, but fun, noisy, colourful, sensual. It was life’ (p. 226). Reverdy 
speaks through the voice of Kaze, who is disgusted by the world of the 
yakuza and creates his own system of escaping them—jōhatsu and yonige 
(skipping town, especially when one is indebted to the yakuza), which are 
undoubtedly precarious forms of living, but at least ones in which you 
can be in control of your own destiny. This provides justification for the 
motivation of Kaze’s clients, who do not wish to ‘be victims for their 
whole lives’ (p. 257). When Richard finally meets Kaze, he does not 
criticise him for his choice, accepting that this is a suitable way of living 
for some Japanese.
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In Reverdy’s novel, almost everything about Japan continues to be exotic, 
beautiful and different to the West following 3.11, even the indebted, 
the homeless, the day labourers from Tōhoku and unmarried women in 
precarious situations. While Reverdy is generally a fan of the exoticised 
Japanese hetero-image and its artistic value, this does not make him blind 
to Japanese social issues, which he demonstrates in his condemnation of 
the kind of petty and unchivalrous crimes against the weak committed 
by the yakuza. Nevertheless, Reverdy returns to exoticism at the end of 
the novel by romantically portraying the evaporated in Japan as a form 
of escape from this unpleasant reality. Reverdy’s imagination of an exotic 
and mysterious Japan, as exemplified by Yukiko and her ‘long and 
Japanese hair’ is protected, in a demonstration of the strong hold this 
image continues to have on the French in the post-3.11 world.
Perfectionist shokunin in Hubert 
Haddad’s Le peintre d’éventail
An important aspect of the exoticised image of Japan in the Western 
world  is  that of the Japanese craftsman (shokunin). The shokunin 
dedicates his life to the perfection of his technique, in such a way that his 
dedication, well-practised motions and way of life move the viewer. The 
Daijirin (2006) defines shokunin katagi, the ‘character of the shokunin’, 
as ‘a characteristic that is common among the shokunin. The tendency to 
have confidence in one’s skills and only completing tasks in a way that 
one can be happy with, without compromising easily or departing from 
one’s principles for money’. In the West, this shokunin work ethic has 
partly been captured in the term kaizen, especially in the context of the 
automobile industry. Although the term simply means ‘improvement’ 
in everyday usage, kaizen in a company management context refers to 
the philosophy of continuous improvement most famously adopted 
by Toyota and introduced to the West by Imai Masaaki’s (1986) book, 
Kaizen: The Key to Japan’s Competitive Success. Imai (1986) explained that 
‘the Kaizen philosophy assumes that our way of life—be it our working 
life, our social life, or our home life—deserves to be constantly improved’ 
(p. 3). The  tradition of the shokunin, which is typified by hard work 
and constant innovation, has been applied to all employed Japanese in 
Nihonjinron discourse, rather than being limited to those occupations 
that are involved in manufacturing, as explained by cultural anthropologist 
Funabiki Takeo (2003, p. 190).
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Another derivation of the shokunin philosophy is the term monozukuri, 
which is perhaps better known than kaizen in France because Renault 
incorporated the concept into their strategic plan at the time of their 
alliance with Nissan in 1999. Monozukuri literally means ‘making things’ 
in Japanese and is used to refer to the spirit of the Japanese manufacturing 
industry—the realm of the modern shokunin. As observed in the Japanese 
Government’s continuing positioning of the country as a monozukuri 
taikoku (the great country of monozukuri) through various schemes 
such as the database of monozukuri meisters or the monozukuri hojokin 
(monozukuri assistance grant), these ideas of continuous improvement 
and a strong manufacturing industry (as opposed to service-based 
economies in the rest of the developed world, such as the UK, Australia 
and the US) remain an important part of Nihonjinron. Referring to the 
establishment of the Monotsukuri University/Institute of Technologists 
in 2001,5 which is an institution centred on practical skills rather than 
abstract knowledge, Funabiki observed that this was Japan’s challenge to 
the imported Western concept of the university (pp. 179–180). The ideal 
of the shokunin has even become a source of pride and point of difference 
for the Japanese, vis-à-vis Western civilisation. As Kita Yasutoshi (2008) 
wrote in his Takumi no kuni Nippon [Japan, a country of artisans]:
The social influence of the ‘shokunin spirit’ on the culture of our 
country cannot be overstated. The mentality of ‘making things 
laboriously’, ‘learning without giving up’ and ‘not compromising 
on quality’ has been transmitted among the Japanese as though 
it is written in their DNA. It is also a generator of the country’s 
power and wealth (p. 70).
This image of the Japanese as being a people who are especially adept at 
creating practical products, due to their strong work ethic, philosophy of 
continuous improvement and manual dexterity, is especially interesting 
to examine in the post-3.11 context because the reconstruction efforts 
revealed a serious decline in the shokunin population (especially those 
involved in carpentry and construction) that had been occurring prior 
to the disaster and, due to this, many felt the urgency to preserve and 
promote this part of Japanese culture. One example of this kind of effort 
in France was the plan to create a building called ‘Takumi Project’ in 
Alsace by the end of 2016, to ‘spread the techniques and crafts of the 
shokunin overseas’ (‘Takumi no waza’, 2016). The 2012 documentary film 
5  Monotsukuri is another way to say monozukuri.
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Jiro Dreams of Sushi by American director David Gelb (also distributed 
with French subtitles as Jiro rêve de sushi by Les Films Séville) was effective 
at popularising the shokunin philosophy overseas, by telling the story of the 
never complacent 85-year-old sushi master Ono Jirō, who spends every 
second of his day thinking about how to improve his sushi. For example, 
he always wears gloves outdoors to protect his hands and experiments 
with massaging an octopus for 45 minutes instead of 30 minutes. In the 
following section, I explore Hubert Haddad’s (2013a) novel, Le peintre 
d’éventail [The fan-painter], which presents a vision of the shokunin spirit 
rebuilding cultural traditions in post-3.11 Japan.
Tunisian-born French-language author Hubert Haddad is a recognised 
master of making Other figures accessible to French-speaking readers 
through his ornate and poetic prose. A prolific author, Haddad has 
produced more than 70 publications in his career, but he is best known 
for his ‘dictionary-novel’, L’Univers [The universe] (1999), Palestine 
(2009) and, most recently, Le peintre d’éventail (2013a; Le peintre 
hereafter), following which, Haddad received the Prix Louis Guilloux and 
the Grand Prix SGDL de littérature.6 L’Univers explored the reconstruction 
of the memory of an Eastern European man whose family died in the 
concentration camps, whereas Palestine is the story of an Israeli soldier 
becoming the Other, a Palestinian, after losing his memory and being 
adopted by a Palestinian family. In a similar way, Haddad brings the 
post-3.11 story of fictional gardener and painter Matabei Reien to his 
French readers in Le peintre. Le peintre was published simultaneously with 
Les haikus du peintre de l’éventail [The haikus of the fan-painter] (2013), 
which is a collection of haiku poems that belong to the novelistic universe 
of Le peintre. Following the success of these books, Haddad also wrote 
another Japan-inspired novel, Ma (2015), which is a story of lovers linked 
together by the real-life early twentieth-century haiku master Santōka.
Haddad’s ability to put himself in the shoes of such a varying range of 
protagonists from different cultures and places is partly due to his erudition 
and extensive research, but he also fills in the gaps using his imagination. 
At the time of writing, Haddad had never visited Japan, but was ‘fascinated 
from a distance … by the extraordinary refinement of a civilisation that 
has based its fragile reality on an awareness of impermanence between 
6  The Grand Prix SGDL de littérature was also awarded in 2015 to Laurent Mauvignier for his Autour 
du monde [Around the world], a collection of individual stories in various parts of the world, linked 
together by the events of 3.11. This demonstrates the high level of cultural interest in 3.11 in France.
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destructive typhoons, or during the long wait until the next earthquake’ 
(2013b). The names of the characters in Le peintre d’éventail, such as Lady 
‘Hison’, ‘Osue’ and ‘Enjo’, are not names typically considered Japanese 
within Japan, but rather names that sound Japanese in French. The novel 
is set in the imaginary Atōra region near the Fukushima power plants, 
by  the Jimura Mountain and close to a village called Katsuaro in the 
Fubata district (although this is inspired by a village called Katsurao in 
the Futaba district, Fukushima Prefecture).
In Le peintre, Haddad creates an ephemeral and elusive wooden ryokan 
(inn), owned by the retired geisha Lady Hison,7 which attracts ‘deserters 
of everyday life’ (p. 60). At this inn is an ever-changing garden of 
unimaginable beauty, meticulously maintained by the frail master 
gardener and fan-painter Osaki Tanako. Burmese-Japanese Matabei 
Reien, Lady Hison’s lover and guest, receives some of Osaki’s teachings 
before his death and becomes his successor, devoting his time to Osaki’s 
art of maintaining the garden according to the seasons, then capturing its 
ephemeral beauty in brushstrokes on a paper fan, using a combination 
of painting and haiku. Matabei eventually creates his own disciple out of 
Xu Hi-han, Lady Hison’s new Taiwanese-Japanese kitchen boy. Following 
a complicated love triangle involving Lady Hison’s beautiful new female 
guest Enjo, Hi-han flees the inn to attend university in Tokyo. The 
3.11-inspired tsunami arrives shortly after, as though to echo this human 
drama, razing virtually everything to the ground and killing everyone 
except Matabei, who happens to be taking a walk around the hills at the 
time. Matabei manages to overcome extraordinary circumstances in 
the following year to restore Osaki’s washed-away drawings and writings 
on his fans, staying alive just long enough to pass them onto Hi-han, now 
a professor at the University of Tokyo.
Haddad’s Japan is a japonisme-style portrait, exotic and beautiful, full of 
vibrant, colourful flowers that change constantly with the seasons and is 
studded with beautiful pale women with ink-black hair. The cover of the 
first edition of the novel features the words Sublime Japon (Sublime Japan) 
in capitals across a bright red border, on the simple black-and-white leaf 
pattern of the background. It is clear that the publisher, Zulma, felt that 
7  Lady Hison is only described as an ‘ex-prostitute’ or ‘ex-courtesan’ in the text, but French readers 
are likely to associate this with the word geisha (and this was probably Haddad’s intention). Putting 
aside the question of whether geisha provided sexual services, Lady Hison’s appearance—always 
wearing a yukata, with her hair up high in a bun—indicates that she is a courtesan in the traditional 
style, rather than a modern prostitute.
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this theme of sublime Japan was an essential piece of meta-information 
for potential readers because they typically use this red banner to display 
the name of a prize won by the book (rather than information about the 
book’s content). In the early pages of the book, the reader is presented 
with this description of the sublime nature around the inn, as Matabei 
recounts his arrival there:
There were Chinese cedars on the hills, a magnificent ginkgo that 
attracted pilgrims, blue oaks and beautiful chestnut trees, red 
maples up to the wooden bridge—not a reliable means to cross 
the indecisive river—between the Duji lake and the forest of giant 
bamboo trees covering the southern slope of the first mountain 
with green shadows. There was also this ash-coloured light that 
I loved, on foggy mornings, the harmony of the tea plantations off 
the little paths and the snow that took up residence on our heads 
from the end of autumn (p. 14).
The shokunin in this novel, Osaki and Matabei, dedicate their lives to 
capturing the essence of this beauty in their art, both in the garden as 
well as on the fans, relentlessly pursuing a form of perfection that they 
know cannot be obtained and are never complacent with their level 
of achievement. As Matabei tells Hi-han, ‘the ideal garden is only but 
a dream’, but ‘imperfection leads to perfection’ (p. 99).
While the shokunin philosophy came under the global spotlight following 
3.11, there has also been a debate within Japan on whether this kind of 
elaborate training process is necessary. Livedoor founder Horie Takafumi 
(2015) started this debate by commenting on his Twitter account that 
‘only idiots need to train for years’ as a sushi chef and that it was possible 
to learn the essential skills in three months at a ‘sushi academy’ designed 
to quickly train chefs, instead of the traditional requirement of meshitaki 
san nen, nigiri hachi nen (three years cooking rice, eight years shaping 
sushi), or even shari taki san nen, awase go nen, nigiri isshō (three years 
cooking rice, five years adding vinegar and your whole life shaping sushi). 
Horie argued that this lengthy training developed as a way to decrease 
competition in the industry, by keeping the number of trained sushi chefs 
low, rather than out of necessity.8 Horie criticised the Nihonjinron idea 
that the Japanese tend to reward effort (doryoku) rather than talent—
8  ‘Sushi shokunin no “meshitaki 3 nen nigiri 8 nen” wa jidai okure? Horiemon no zanshin na 
kangae to wa’ [Is the ‘three years cooking rice, eight years making sushi’ tradition behind the times? 
Horiemon’s unconventional views] (2015).
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‘not only doryoku (“strenuous effort”) but kurō (“suffering”) is expected 
of a young person who has ambition’, as argued by Takie Sugiyama 
Lebra (1976, p. 75) in Japanese Patterns of Behaviour. An example that is 
often given for this in Nihonjinron is the Japanese examination system, 
which is designed so that the candidate who does the greatest amount of 
memorisation and studying is the most successful, rather than those who 
can think on their feet.
The shokunin that we encounter in Haddad’s novel, namely Osaki, 
is a romanticised image of the traditional system that Horie so despises—
the dedication and endless quest for perfection in the most extreme 
circumstances. Osaki and Matabei are prepared to put in all the sweat, 
blood and tears necessary, prioritising their art over their lives. By the time 
Matabei meets Osaki at the start of the novel, he already ‘seemed to be on 
the verge of death’, ‘his hair so whitened and his body so thin that he gave 
the impression of not belonging to the human race’, although Matabei 
also observes that he was raking the gravel of the paths and climbing trees 
the previous night (p. 30). Osaki carries himself with his will rather than 
physical strength because he feels that he cannot depart from this world 
until his fans are in safe hands. Even at such a dire time he refuses to see 
a doctor, preferring to spend his last bit of remaining energy teaching 
Matabei. Osaki’s selfless dedication to his art at this last stage of his life 
leads Matabei to conclude that he was ‘without doubt an unrivalled artist, 
who, reaching the height of artistic achievement, prioritized his watering 
cans and rakes, hidden behind his paper fans’ (p. 71). Osaki’s ashes are 
scattered around the garden as he wished for, ‘dispersed throughout the 
flowerbeds, on the moss and the arrangements of autumnal flowers, 
chrysanthemums and thriving roses, on the tree roots, through the 
channels of water and on the boulders, in a gesture similar to the offering 
of incense’ (p. 61). Osaki ends his life by becoming part of his own art, 
fertilising the flowers and trees that he cherished.
True Japanese shokunin are shown to live discreetly in their quest for 
perfection, unlike some of their flamboyant and eccentric European 
counterparts, such as Mozart, Picasso and Salvador Dalí. Since they 
are never satisfied with their art, they are not boastful. Osaki does not 
seek money or fame in exchange for his art and, in his lifetime, he only 
ever sells a few paintings to a distant relative. The descriptions of his few 
material possessions underscore this idea of austerity: in the living room 
of his hut where he serves Matabei plain boiled water, ‘the only furniture 
there was a rolled-up mattress and a chest, a portable stove next to the sink 
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and a low table with a heater’ (p. 37). Living in his humble, hidden-away 
hut, which was ‘caulked like the hull of a boat’, Osaki was so invisible that 
it took Matabei a year to notice his presence (p. 15). Osaki is a hermit, 
who does not travel outside the confines of the inn because he feels that 
there is already enough for him to do there. Despite his dedication and 
achievement, Osaki remains his modest self at his deathbed, expressing 
regret for not having been able to paint all the fallen leaves. He claims 
that he painted ‘just a few, from one year to another, a few sheets’ (p. 43). 
After witnessing his quiet death, Matabei comes to the conclusion that 
‘true masters live and die unknown’ (p. 54). Osaki becomes the image of 
the discreet Japanese shokunin ideal. Matabei seems to approach Osaki’s 
artistic heights eventually, but only when he sacrifices his health by living 
alone in the reconstructed hut in the exclusion zone to resuscitate his 
master’s work.
The relationship between Osaki and Matabei and, subsequently, Matabei 
and Hi-han, is that of master–apprentice, which is typical of Japanese 
shokunin. This tradition is shown to be key to maintaining Japanese 
cultural traditions in the face of natural disasters and the resultant state 
of physical impermanence, with Matabei sacrificing his life following 
the tsunami to revive his master’s work, which Hi-han then dedicates 
his academic career to analysing. This relationship is usually commenced 
by the apprentice approaching a potential master and undergoing many 
years of difficult training, before becoming a shokunin. However, in the 
novel it is Osaki who approaches Matabei in search of a successor, due 
to his failing health. In a style typical of the apprentice system, Matabei 
does not receive much guidance—exemplified in the Japanese idiom of 
mite nusumu (to see and steal), disciples are expected to ‘learn using their 
bodies’, by observing and doing. As Hi-han observes when he is getting 
started as a kitchen boy:
A dictionary of season words does not produce the right emotions 
for a haiku poet and neither do recipe books give inspiration to an 
apprentice cook. But observing an ancient woman with deformed 
hands cutting up some raw fish will make you a master in knife 
skills (p. 67).
When Osaki first invites Matabei to his humble abode, he suggests that 
Matabei helps him and that he would show him some ‘little things’ 
(p. 38). Matabei ‘learned customs through his voice and techniques from 
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his hands, by simply walking by his side and helping him more and more 
as he became weaker’ (p. 78), but he mainly learns his art indirectly from 
the works and the garden that Osaki left.
However, Haddad’s idea of a shokunin revival in post-3.11 Japan is 
subversive compared to the aforementioned Nihonjinron conventions, 
in that he portrays a wide range of characters with this shokunin spirit. 
Although he does not draw much attention to this, Matabei is a foreigner. 
His father was a rich Burmese who seduced and married a young woman 
from Kyoto, whose last name he adopted as necessitated by the customs 
at that time in Japan. Hi-Han, Matabei’s apprentice, is also a foreigner, 
whose parents were among the Taiwanese who were sent to Japan after the 
war. However, foreigners are not the only atypical shokunin in Haddad’s 
novel. Although Haddad’s three main characters are male, there are a few 
female characters who display shokunin qualities, such as manual dexterity, 
hard work and persistence. This is particularly interesting in light of the 
difficulty for women to be shokunin in most fields in Japan.9 For example, 
Aé-cha, who is Korean as well as being female, creates various Japanese-
style dolls from carved and round-shaped gosho to hollow paper-mâché 
daruma for good luck and lacquered wooden kokeshi, which are kept in 
a dollhouse in her room. Although never given a name, the mute and 
ancient ex–rice farmer maid of the inn expertly carries out her cooking and 
cleaning duties and moves about with a smile despite her age and fragility. 
Lady Hison proves herself to be an able okami (a female proprietor and 
manager of a traditional inn) with the spirit of omotenashi,10 and a master 
of ‘the art of presentation’, according to Hi-han (p. 68). Although not 
placed on the same level as Osaki or Matabei, these female characters 
with strong dedication and work ethic reinforce the idea that the shokunin 
spirit resides in all Japanese.
In Le peintre, Haddad portrays post-3.11 Japan as a country in which 
beauty continues to be found everywhere, created and maintained 
by humble old masters, who stubbornly chase their unattainable ideal 
9  Takeuchi (2004) contended that ‘the very body of the creator is a corollary to the sanctity of the 
product. Thus women were automatically banned from certain trades where the notion of pollution 
by blood would have been sacrilegious’ (p. 9). For example, there are very few female sushi chefs, 
with commonly cited reasons ranging from elevated body temperatures making the sushi too warm 
to menstrual cycles affecting their sense of taste.
10  Omotenashi refers to the Japanese spirit of hospitality, which has gained popularity since TV 
presenter Takigawa Christel used the term in her speech in 2013, in the successful bid campaign to 
bring the Olympics to Tokyo in 2020.
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of perfection through a lifetime of training. Despite the frequency of 
natural disasters, manual skills are securely transmitted from generation 
to generation through a demanding apprentice system. Haddad expands 
the range of possible shokunin considerably from the standard Nihonjiron 
concept. Even those who are only partially Japanese or women are shown 
to carry the shokunin spirit within them.
In contrast to the recurring stereotype of Bashō, Zen Buddhism and 
suicide, which were apparent in the English-language texts that portrayed 
Japan’s uniqueness, the two selected French authors focused more on 
post-3.11 Japan as a source of aesthetic and artistic inspiration, as well as 
a faraway place of escape and mystery, which appears to be a revival of the 
japonisme of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In these texts, 
there is limited portrayal of social issues and the literary events occur in 
traditional settings in Kyoto or Tōhoku, which are considered suitable 
for the depiction of old Japan. Perhaps the Fukushima nuclear disasters 
prompted these authors to reflect on what could be at stake if such events 
were to happen again in Japan and that this encouraged them to focus on 
what makes Japan exotic and different from the rest of the world. More 
broadly, parallels can be drawn between the exoticism of these works and 
the post-3.11 self-Orientalising discourse in Japan, as observed in the 
promotion of Japanese traditional culture through government initiatives, 
such as the ‘Takumi project’ or setting up ‘Japan Houses’ in overseas 
cities. Japan’s continued exotic appeal in the post-3.11 world perhaps did 
not grow organically in France, but rather had some of its seeds planted 




Birmingham and McNeill (2012) summarised the confusion that the 
Japanese had regarding their identity following the triple disaster:
Can Tohoku recover? Inevitably, the question leads to an even 
more fundamental one: What sort of country does Japan want 
to be? The nation’s epic industrialization drive seems to have run 
out of steam. Its dream of energy self-sufficiency lies in ruins. Its 
population is aging and declining. Japan’s squabbling political 
leadership seems powerless to stop the nation’s slide down the 
economic league tables (p. 180).
This self-perception took an interesting turn as images of the cool, calm 
and  collected response of the Japanese to the 3.11 disaster impressed 
the world. These images, which were imported back to Japan along 
with reactions of non-Japanese viewers, inspired many Japanese to live 
up to this ideal and restored their pride in a country that had been 
dwindling in  global economic and technological influence during the 
‘lost two decades’.
Combined with the prospect of the 2020 Tokyo Olympics and 
the renewed direction and hope brought by Abenomics, Japan has 
experienced a surge in patriotism and nationalism, which has manifested 
itself in some cases through extreme xenophobia and hate speech against 
those considered to be ‘anti-Japanese’. Both traditional values as well as 
modern economic and technological progress were restored as a source 
of pride for the country. Further, Prime Minister Abe (2013) claimed 
to have brought the unprecedented nuclear disasters ‘under control’ and 
aimed to use the opportunity to build an international reputation for the 
Japanese as producers and exporters of nuclear reactors and know-how 
(Kingston, 2013).
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At the same time, criticisms against the ‘typically Japanese’ lack of 
transparency on the part of authorities in dealing with the Fukushima 
nuclear disasters and their attempt to suppress dissenting voices through 
a uniting official discourse (most notably under the slogan of kizuna) were 
what characterised other Japanese images in non-fiction discourses. Some 
felt that the various habits and attitudes of post-war Japanese society, 
such as blind trust towards authority and the safety myth of nuclear 
power, came crumbling down in the aftermath following the disaster. 
Public intellectuals emphasised that the Fukushima incident represented 
the end  of an era that had lasted 66 years—the time was now saigo 
[post-disaster], as opposed to sengo [post-war]—and that Japan should 
step down from its position as an economic superpower and steer itself 
into a more sustainable future, appropriate for its ageing society. Authors 
such as Ōe Kenzaburō and Murakami Haruki, while condemning 
the response of the authorities, stressed the continuity of Japan from the 
legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and called for Japan to live up to its 
identity as a ‘no-nuclear’ nation.
In many cases, it was this context of conflict between contradictory visions 
for society that Japanese authors addressed in their writing, rather than 
the tragedy of the disaster itself. Although cultural responses to disasters 
such as war literature often attempt to record personal and individual 
experiences to counteract the dehumanising and generalising effect of 
the cold facts and numbers of mainstream media, in the case of 3.11, the 
internet allowed ordinary Japanese citizens to fulfil this role by expressing 
their first-hand experiences through channels such as Twitter and personal 
blogs. Instead, what was required from authors was to describe and make 
sense of the invisible—the nuclear radiation or the general mood in 
post-3.11 society (kūki, to borrow Shiriagari’s word)—to help guide their 
readers, especially those who were not directly affected by the disaster 
but felt indirectly responsible for the events at Fukushima, to mentally 
reconstruct themselves and their identity as Japanese citizens. Recognising 
the need to help resolve tensions between contradictory visions for their 
society, Japanese authors offered imaginative alternatives in their fictional 
responses to the disaster.
What Japanese-language authors such as Wagō Ryōichi, Kawakami 
Hiromi and Shiriagari Kotobuki proposed in their responses was for 
Japan to proceed by focusing on regaining the traditional, Shintoistic 
and harmonious relationship that the Japanese have with nature by 
making use of their resilience, which some public intellectuals had also 
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recommended. While the degrowth theory of economic decline voiced by 
intellectuals was not commonly accepted in mainstream media, fictional 
texts, in which these ideas were represented in terms of positive and 
heart-warming everyday changes, were more approachable and better able 
to connect with the Japanese public. Other Japanese-language authors, 
such as Takahashi Gen’ichirō, and the authors of dystopian responses, 
such as Tawada Yōko, encouraged multiplicity and dialogue by directly 
portraying the pressure to conform and the lack of discussion in Japanese 
society. In their own ways, these Japanese-language responses helped to 
reconcile the ideological polarisation that was observed in Japanese critical 
discourse following the disaster and aimed to create a future path for Japan 
somewhere between the two extremes of radical pro-nuclear nationalism 
and strong criticism of the entire Japanese post-war system. Shin Godzilla 
also embodied a reconciliation of these two camps, in that the work 
could be viewed both as nationalistic propaganda and a parody of it. The 
general feeling that one gets from these responses is that the Japanese 
are a people who will overcome their current state of confusion and 
domestic squabbling to eventually distinguish themselves from the rest of 
their world through their philosophy of impermanence and harmonious 
coexistence with nature, which will lead them to become pioneers in 
sustainable living. This is because, despite their critical attitudes towards 
Japanese society, most authors left off their works with a glimmer of hope, 
be it in the power of words and open discussion, the new generation, 
a stronger regional Japan, technology or Japanese resilience.
While some Japanese-language authors were backward-looking in their 
assessment of post-3.11 Japanese society, in many cases evoking nostalgia 
for ‘the good times past’, English-language authors were generally more 
forward-looking in that they focused on valuable cultural, spiritual and 
philosophical elements found within Japanese culture and how these 
continued to be relevant in post-3.11 reconstruction, as well as for social 
issues such as suicide and bullying. There was a particular focus on Zen 
philosophy, as opposed to the Shintō focus of the Japanese authors, which 
demonstrated the continued popularity of Japanese-style Buddhism, 
meditation practices and lifestyle concepts in the English-speaking 
world. The two chosen English-language texts by Ruth Ozeki and Gretel 
Ehrlic built on and updated the one-sided post-3.11 media portrayals 
of kizuna and gaman, with their nuanced exploration of concepts such 
as Zen interconnectedness and wa, which, in their view, inform the 
Japanese psyche. At the same time, their elaborate exposition of Japanese 
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ways of thinking helped English-speaking readers to understand how the 
Japanese deal with devastating disasters and continue rebuilding and also 
challenged Western conceptions of life and death. The English-speaking 
world has much to learn from these intangible assets of the Japanese, 
even though the country has become physically damaged and polluted by 
nuclear radiation.
Although there were many French-language authors who took similar 
approaches to the Japanese-language and English-language authors 
summarised above, Thomas Reverdy and Hubert Haddad (see Chapter 6) 
focused on the more exotic elements of Japanese culture, such as raven-
haired women, the yakuza, shokunin philosophy or the sublime nature. 
This reflected the primarily cultural interest many French readers have 
for Japan and their continued perception of the country, at least in some 
literary texts, as being a place of beauty, mystery and escape rather than 
a complex real-life entity with its contemporary social issues. Although 
the French media showed a strong interest in the Fukushima nuclear 
disasters, this element of a ‘polluted Japan’ was not strongly present in the 
two chosen works of book-length fiction. It seems that nuclear radiation 
does not hinder French willingness to seek escape and inspiration in 
Japanese culture, an attitude that may conceal the unwillingness of the 
French themselves to face up to the issue of nuclear power, upon which 
their country is heavily reliant.
Many of the Japanese-, English- and French-language responses that were 
examined can be placed on a spectrum ranging from social criticism to 
entertainment, in which the Japanese-language responses tended to be 
the most focused on Japanese social issues, whereas English-language 
responses dealt with social issues but treated them in an entertaining or 
educational way for the readers and French-language responses tended 
more heavily towards exoticism and entertainment, even when they dealt 
with social issues. This makes sense given that foreign-language authors 
were not expected to respond to the aforementioned need of Japanese 
readers to rediscover their identity in the face of increasingly polarised 
ways in which their country was being represented, as well as to come 
to terms with their sense of involvement and responsibility for the 
nuclear disaster. As the examples analysed in this book demonstrate, in 
a situation in which information came in the form of one-sided views 
from mainstream media or a vast expanse of self-published individual 
experiences, Japanese fiction was valued over other media due to its ability 
to provide imaginative alternatives.
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However, reality is never so simple and there are some works that do not 
comfortably fit on this spectrum, especially when it comes to portraying 
differences between Tokyo and Tōhoku. In one case (see Chapter 4), the 
spectrum was completely reversed, with the Japanese-language response 
Kimi no na wa displaying some serious self-exoticisation by the Japanese, 
whereas the English-language response by Gretel Ehrlich and the French-
language response by Richard Collasse were much more socially critical. 
Both these authors had spent a significant amount of time researching, 
travelling and living in Japan and possessed more knowledge about the 
disaster than many Japanese authors. These exceptions go to the very 
heart of my project—the hypothesis that, in this age of globalisation, 
when studying events that have an impact on a global scale, such as 3.11, 
it makes sense to study the responses to the event in a global manner. These 
two examples, as well as the works of French authors, such as Michaël 
Ferrier or Nadine and Thierry Ribault, demonstrate the importance of 
looking beyond national and linguistic borders in the analysis of literary 
and cultural responses to events. Further, based on this evidence, I expect 
to see a growing tendency for self-images and hetero-images of nations to 
converge in the future. As more people travel and live in different parts 
of the world, differences between what a country’s citizens and residents 
perceive as their national character and what foreigners perceive should 
become minimal. As authors move freely between countries, with some 
of them (e.g. Richard Collasse) spending more time in Japan and having 
more on-the-ground knowledge than an ethnically Japanese author born 
overseas, it becomes increasingly difficult to label an image as being a self-
image or a hetero-image.
However, as shown by the references made to the divine punishment 
theory by various intellectuals and authors following 3.11, it was 
mostly Japanese authors who viewed disasters as change agents and 
an opportunity to reflect on Japanese society, as well as addressing the 
question of ‘who are the Japanese?’ As such, Japanese cultural responses 
to disaster are often critical of their own country, which motivates readers 
to act in certain ways. Conversely, foreign-language authors are perhaps 
prompted by Japanese disasters to reflect on what could have been lost 
and express their solidarity through positive portrayals of the country. 
The differences may also be simply explained by the fact that it becomes 
morally difficult for outsiders to criticise a country and its citizens 
following a disaster, which fosters more positive hetero-images. This could 
be understood as ‘a paradise built in the imagination’, which is similar to 
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Rebecca Solnit’s ‘paradise built in hell’—the outpouring of sympathy and 
grief towards victims usually translates to a desire to see the best in these 
people and to temporarily put aside political differences. To understand 
the social and cultural construct of Japan’s post-3.11 future, it is essential 
to study hetero-images from a variety of sources, to contrast them against 
self-images and to determine how they influence each other.
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